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Red Eagle 

and the 

Wars with the Creek 
Indians of Alabama 

By 
GEORGE CARY EGGLESTON 




■ D ENVER PUBL IC - bttiftftfti 

New York 

Dodd, Mead and Company 

Publishers 



Copyright, 1878, 

BY 

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY. 

s OSX k>0~ 



VHt5 



PREFACE. 



A WORK of this kind necessarily makes no pre- 
tension to originality in its materials ; but while 
all that is here related is to be found in books, 
there is no one book devoted exclusively to the 
history of the Creek war or to the life of William 
Weatherford, the Red Eagle. The materials here 
used have been gathered from many sources — 
some of them from books which only incidentally 
mention the matters here treated, touching them 
as a part of larger subjects, and many of them 
from books which have been long out of print, 
and are therefore inaccessible to readers gen- 
erally. 

The author has made frequent acknowledg- 
ments, in his text, of his obligations to the writ- 
ers from whose works he has drawn information 
upon various subjects. By way of further ac- 
knowledgment, and for the information of read- 
ers who may be tempted to enlarge their reading 
in the interesting history of the South-west, he 
appends the following list of the principal books 



IV PREFACE. 

that have been consulted in the preparation of 

this volume : 

Parton's " Life of Andrew Jackson." 

Eaton's " Life of Andrew Jackson.' f 

Pickett's " History of Alabama/ ' 

Drake's " Book of the Indians." 

McAfee's " History of the Late War in the 

Western Country." 

Claiborne's " Notes on the War in the South." 
Meek's " Romantic Passages in South-western 

History." 

" Indian Affairs, American State Papers." 
Kendall's " Life of Jackson." 
Waldo's " Life of Jackson." 
Russell's " History of the Late War." 
Brackenridge's " Historv oi the Late War." 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



PAGE 



Showing, by way of Introduction, how Red 
Eagle happened to be a Man of Consequence 
in History, 13 



CHAPTER II. 
Red Eagle's People, 



CHAPTER III. 
Red Eagle's Birth and Boyhood, . • • 37 

CHAPTER IV, 
The Beginning of Trouble, • .47 

CHAPTER V. 

Red Eagle as an Advocate of War — The Civil 
War in the Creek Nation, . • . . 59 



6 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VI. 
The Battle of Burnt Corn, 71 



PAGE 



CHAPTER VII. 
Red Eagle's Attempt to abandon his Party, . .78 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Claiborne and Red Eagle, 84 

CHAPTER IX. 
Red Eagle before Fort Mims, . • • . 95 

CHAPTER X. 
The Massacre at Fort Mims, 103 

CHAPTER XL 
Romantic Incidents of the Fort Mims Affair, . 114 

CHAPTER XII. 

The Dog Charge at Fort Sinquefield and Affairs 
on the Peninsula, 120 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Pushmatahaw and his Warriors, . . . .132 



PAGE 



CHAPTER XIV. 
Jackson is helped into his Saddle, . „ . 136 

CHAPTER XV. 
The March into the Enemy's Country, . .146 

CHAPTER XVI. 
The Battle of Tallushatchee, 161 

CHAPTER XVII. 
The Battle of Talladega, . . . . 167 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
General Cocke's Conduct and its Consequences, 180 

CHAPTER XIX. 
The Canoe Fight, 191 



8 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XX. 



PAGB 



The Advance of the Georgians — The Battle of 
Autosse, 207 

CHAPTER XXL 

How Claiborne executed his Orders — The Battle 
of the Holy Ground — Red Eagle's Famous 
Leap, 214 

CHAPTER XXII. 
How Jackson lost his Army, . . • . 230 

CHAPTER XXIII. 
A New Plan of the Mutineers, .... 343 

CHAPTER XXIV. 
Jackson's Second Battle with his own Men, . 254 

CHAPTER XXV. 

Jackson dismisses his Volunteers without a Bene- 
diction, 259 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

How Jackson lost the rest of his Army, . . 267 



PAGE 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

Battles of Emuckfau and Enotachopco — How 
the Creeks " whipped Captain Jackson," . 282 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

How Red Eagle "whipped Captain Floyd" — 
The Battle of Calebee Creek, . . . .302 



CHAPTER XXIX. 
Red Eagle's Strategy, 308 



CHAPTER XXX. 

Jackson with an Army at last, . . . .314 



IO CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXXL 
The Great Battle of the War, . . . .318 



PAGE 



CHAPTER XXXII. 
Red Eagle's Surrender, 329 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 
Red Eagle after the War, 340 



RED EAGLE 



AND THE 



WARS WITH THE CREEK INDIANS. 



CHAPTER I. 

SHOWING, BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION, HOW 
RED EAGLE HAPPENED TO BE A MAN OF 
CONSEQUENCE IN HISTORY. 

It is a long journey from the region round 
about the great lakes, where Tecumseh lived, to 
the shores of the Alabama and the Tombigbee 
rivers, even in these days of railroads and steam- 
boats ; and it was a much longer journey when 
Tecumseh was a terror to the border and an 
enemy whom the United States had good rea- 
son to fear. The distance between Tecumseh's 
home and that of Red Eagle is greater than that 
which separates Berlin from Paris or Vienna ; 
and when Tecumseh lived there were no means 
of communication between the Indians of the 
North-west and those of the South, except by 
long, dangerous, and painful journeys on foot. 

A man of smaller intellectual mould than Te- 
cumseh would not have dreamed of the possi- 
bility of establishing relations with people so 
distant as the Creeks were from the tribes of the 
North-west. But Tecumseh had all the qualities 



14 RED EAGLE. 

of a man of genius, the chief of which are breadth 
and comprehensiveness of view and daring bold- 
ness of conception. The great northern chieftain 
did many deeds in his day by which he fairly 
won the reputation he had for the possession of 
genius, both as a soldier and as a statesman ; but 
nothing in his history so certainly proves his title 
to rank among really great men as his boldness 
and brilliancy in planning the formation of a 
great confederacy of the tribes, which extended 
in a chain from the lakes on the north to the Gulf 
of Mexico on the south. He was wise enough 
to learn of his foes. He saw that their strength 
lay in their union ; that it was by " joining all 
their camp-fires/ ' as he phrased it, that they 
made themselves irresistible ; and as he saw with 
consternation that the great tide of white men 
was steadily advancing westward, he understood, 
as few men of his race were capable of doing, 
that there was but one possible way for the red 
men to withstand the ever-encroaching stream. 
Separately the tribes were powerless, because 
separately they could be beaten one by one. 
Troops who were engaged in reducing an Illinois 
tribe during one month could be sent the next to 
oppose another tribe in Mississippi or Alabama. 
Thus the secret of the white men's success, 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 1 5 

Tecumseh saw, lay in two facts : first, that the 
whites were united, working together for a com- 
mon purpose, and helping each other in turn ; 
and, second, that the whites used the same troops 
over and over again to fight the separately acting 
tribes. 

Seeing all this and understanding it, Tecumseh 
conceived his great plan — a plan equally great, 
whether we regard it as a stroke of statesman- 
ship or a brilliant scheme of military combina- 
tion. He determined, as he said, to build a dam 
against the stream. He undertook to form a 
confederacy of all the tribes from north to south, 
to teach them to act together, and to oppose the 
advance of the white men by uniting that power 
which they were wasting separately. 

It was in execution of this plan that Tecumseh 
made that journey to the South in the year 1811 
which, in combination with other causes to be 
mentioned in their place, induced the Creeks of 
Southern Alabama to abandon all that they had 
gained of civilization, and to plunge first into a 
war among themselves, and afterward into that 
struggle with the white men which destroyed 
their nation almost utterly. 

In that war there was one man more conspicu- 
ous than any other — more relentless, more dar- 



l6 RED EAGLE. 

ing, more desperate in his refusal to give or 
to accept quarter, and at the same time more 
brilliant in attack and defence, abler in counsel, 
and having greater skill in the field than any of 
his fellow-chiefs — a man who fought Jackson, 
Claiborne, Flournoy, Floyd, and Coffee, whose 
troops, coming from different quarters of the 
country, surrounded him on every side and out- 
numbered him on every field ; fighting them with 
credit to his own skill and daring, and with no 
little damage to these skilled enemies — a man of 
whom Jackson said, " He is fit to command 
armies/ ' 

This man was Red Eagle, or, in his native 
Muscogee tongue, Lamochattee. 

To the white men with whom he lived a great 
part of his life, and to his enemies in war, he was 
better known as William Weatherford ; and as 
the historical accounts of the war in which he 
won his renown were all written by white men, 
because Red Eagle could not write, his white 
name, Weatherford, is the one by which he is 
generally known in books. His fame was won as 
an Indian, however ; it was the Indian warrior 
Red Eagle, not the half-breed planter Weather- 
ford, who did the deeds which gave him a place 
in American history ; and this neglect of his 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 1 7 

Indian name in all historical works which refer to 
him is an example of the sarcasm of destiny. It 
reminds one of the hero of whom Byron tells us, 
whc, falling in battle covered with glory, lost his 
only chance for fame by the blunder of a printer, 
who misspelled his name in the gazette. We 
have preferred to call the great commander of 
the Creeks by his Indian name, Red Eagle, on 
the title-page of this book, but in writing of him 
it will be necessary frequently to use the name 
Weatherford instead. 

The story of the Creek war naturally follows 
the life of Tecumseh, with which this series of In- 
dian biographies was introduced ; and indeed the 
one story is necessary to the complete telling of 
the other. It may be best told in the form of a 
life of Red Eagle, who commanded on one side, 
and whose genius for command alone made the 
war an affair worth writing about ; but, un- 
luckily for the biographer, the materials for a 
biography of Red Eagle, in the strict sense of 
the word, are meagre and difficult to get at. 

I hinted at the chief cause of this meagreness 
and obscurity when I said, just now, that Red 
Eagle could not write. I always thought, in 
reading Caesar De Bello Gallico, that the Roman 
commander had a great advantage over the poor 



1 8 RED EAGLE. 

Gauls in his rather remarkable dexterity in the use 
of the pen. We do not know how good or how 
bad his handwriting was ; but whether he wrote 
with perfect Spencerian precision or in a scrawl 
as illegible as Mr. Greeley's, Caesar knew how 
to tell his side of the story, and there was nobody 
to tell the other side. Perhaps the tale would 
read very differently if some clever Gaul had 
been able to write an account of the war in classic 
Latin for the school-boys of the nineteenth cen- 
tury to puzzle out with the aid of a dictionary. 
So Red Eagle, if he had known how to write, 
would probably have given us a view of the 
things done in the Creek war which we do not 
get from his enemies. 

It is not merely in the military sense that the 
word enemies is here used, but in the literal one 
as well ; for very nearly all the information we 
have about Red Eagle and his performances is 
drawn from the writings and the spoken testi- 
mony of men who hated him with a degree of 
violence of which one can scarcely conceive in 
our time. These men wrote while boiling with 
the passions of a war which seriously threatened 
the existence of this American nation, and they 
hated Red Eagle as one of the men who added 
very greatly to the country's peril, and sorely 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 19 

taxed its resources when its resources were few- 
est Their hatred was so violent that they could 
not restrain its expression ; while they granted 
to Red Eagle the possession of courage and abil- 
ity, they could not write of him without flying 
into a passion and heaping hard names upon his 
head. 

One of them, in a grave treatise about the war, 
scolded in this way about him : 

* * Among the first who entered into the views 
of the British commissioners was the since cele- 
brated Weatherford, with whom it may not be 
amiss to make the reader better acquainted at 
this time. Weatherford was born in the Creek 
nation. His father was an itinerant pedler, 
sordid, treacherous, and revengeful ; his mother 
a full-blooded savage of the tribe of the Semi- 
noles. He partook of the bad qualities of both 
his parents, and engrafted on the stock he 
inherited from others many that were peculiarly 
his own. With avarice, treachery, and a thirst 
for blood, he combines lust, gluttony, and a 
devotion to every species of criminal carousal. ' ' 

That, certainly, is as pretty a bit of angry vitu- 
peration as one hears from the lips of the worst 
of scolds, and so wholly did the distinguished 
author of the book from which it is taken lose his 



20 RED EAGLE. 

temper, that he lost his discretion with it, and 
forgot that so coarse and brutal a fellow as he 
here declares Red Eagle to have been- — a man so 
wholly given over to debauchery — is sure to show 
in his face, his person, and his intellectual opera- 
tions the effects of his character, impulses, and 
habits. In the very next paragraph this writer 
tells us certain things about Red Eagle which 
forbid us to believe that he was a drunkard, a de- 
based creature, a glutton, or a brute. He says : 

" Fortune in her freaks sometimes gives to the 
most profligate an elevation of mind which she 
denies to men whose propensities are the most 
virtuous. On Weatherford she bestowed genius, 
eloquence, and courage. The first of these qual- 
ities enabled him to conceive great designs, the 
last to execute them ; while eloquence, bold, 
impressive, and figurative, furnished him with a 
passport to the favor of his countrymen and fol- 
lowers. Silent and reserved, unless when excited 
by some great occasion, and superior to the 
weakness of rendering himself cheap by the fre- 
quency of his addresses, he delivered his opinions 
but seldom in council ; but when he did so he 
was listened to with delight and approbation. 

That does not read like an account of the par- 
liamentary methods of a brutish man, degraded 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 21 

by vice and debauched with drunkenness and 
gluttony ; it sounds rather like a description of 
the wise ways of some Webster or Clay. 
Drunken men with the gift of eloquent speech do 
not hoard it and use it in this adroit way. This 
is not all, however. Men who are given over to 
vice, gluttony, and drunkenness usually carry 
the marks of their excesses in their appearance 
and their ways of thinking ; but our writer who 
has told us that Weatherford was such a man, 
tells us how he looked and acted, and what his 
ability was, in this wise : 

" His judgment and eloquence had secured the 
respect of the old ; his vices made him the idol 
of the young and the unprincipled. It is evren 
doubted whether a civilized society could behold 
this monster without interest. In his person tall, 
straight, and well-proportioned ; his eye black, 
lively, and penetrating, and indicative of courage 
and enterprise ; his nose prominent, thin, and 
elegant in its formation ; while all the features of 
his face, harmoniously arranged, speak an active 
and disciplined mind/' A little further down 
the page this writer calls Weatherford " the key 
and corner-stone of the Creek confederacy, ' ' and 
characterizes him as ' ' this extraordinary man. ' ' 

Our purpose is not now to defend Red Eagle's 



22 RED EAGLE. 

memory or to extol his character, though there 
is good reason to remember him with honor for 
his courage in war and for his good faith in 
peace ; and there are abundant proofs that the 
praise which the hostile writer whom we have 
quoted could not deny to the fallen chieftain, was 
far juster than the abuse he heaped upon him. 
We have made these extracts merely to show in 
what spirit of unfair prejudice all the contempo- 
raneous accounts of Weatherford's life and deeds 
were written. It will be better to form our own 
opinions of the Creek warrior's character after we 
shall have reviewed the events of his life ; and no 
one who so examines the facts, although they 
come to us only from his enemies, can fail to form 
a much higher opinion of the unfortunate man than 
that which the chroniclers of his day have offered 
to us ready-made. 

The enmity and prejudice of which we have 
spoken operate still more strongly in another 
way to embarrass the biographer who seeks to 
learn details of Weatherford's life. Where the 
writers of his day have misrepresented his char- 
acter or conduct, it is not difficult to discover 
the fact and to correct the misjudgment ; but, 
unluckily, they too often neglected even to mis- 
represent him. Caring only for their own side 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 23 

and their own heroes, these historians, who were 
generally participants in the events they chron- 
icled, took the utmost pains to tell us just where 
each body of American troops fought ; who com- 
manded them in the first, second, third, and so on 
to the tenth degree of subordinate rank ; how 
many Americans and how many friendly Indians 
there were in each part of every field ; how many 
of these were killed and wounded — every thing, in 
short, which they could find out or guess out 
about the details of their side of the fight, while 
the other side seemed to them unworthy of any 
thing more than the most general attention. 
They were so careless indeed of the Indian side 
of these affairs that it is in many cases impossible 
to discover from any of the accounts what chiefs 
commanded the Creek forces in important bat- 
tles, or even what chiefs were present. In other 
cases this information is given to us by accident, 
as it were, not in the accounts of the battles, but 
by means of a casual reference in an account of 
something else. Thus one of the writers devotes 
many pages and a good deal of stilted rhetoric to 
his account of the Fort Mims massacre, a bloody 
affair, in which Weatherford won solely by rea- 
son of the fact that he was a better and more 
skilful officer than the American commander, 



24 RED EAGLE. 

manifesting indeed some of the best qualities of 
an able general ; but with all this historian's 
minuteness of detail, he wholly forgets to men- 
tion the fact that Weatherford had anything to 
do with the matter. His neglect is not the result 
of any want of information, as is shown by the 
fact that, in writing of other things afterward, he 
incidentally mentions the Creek warrior as the 
leader of the Indians at Fort Mims. 

To the carelessness of the contemporaneous 
writers, to whom alone we can at this day look 
for information upon detailed points of interest, 
must be added, as a cause of the meagreness of 
the record, their lack of opportunity. The In- 
dians kept their own secrets. They were fight- 
ing to destroy the whites, not to win renown ; 
and the Americans who fought them had little 
chance to hear news of any kind from the forces 
on the other side. 

Notwithstanding this lack of detailed informa- 
tion respecting Red Eagle's life and deeds, how- 
ever, we know with certainty that he was, as the 
writer quoted a few pages back said, the ' key 
and corner-stone of the Creek confederacy, ' ' the 
commander of the Creek armies, the statesman 
who guided the Creek councils, and the general 
who planned and conducted the Creek cam- 



INTRODUCING RED EAGLE. 25 

paigns. His was the master mind on the Indian 
side, as positively as Jackson's was on the side of 
the Americans ; and therefore while there is an 
unfortunate lack of information of a strictly bio- 
graphical nature concerning this remarkable man, 
it is still possible to write his life by writing an 
account of the Creek war. After all, it is the 
things a man does which make up his life ; and 
the story of his deeds is his biography, whether 
or not it includes the dates of his birth and his 
death, or tells with precision when or how he did 
this or that. 

Accordingly, instead of beginning this story 
of Red Eagle's life with a chapter about his 
birth and parentage, after the customary manner 
of grave biographers, and following his career 
incident by incident, confining the narrative to 
an account of his direct, personal share in each 
transaction, I shall write an account of the war 
he made, regarding the whole series of events as 
properly parts of one great affair which Red 
Eagle devised and executed. 

To make such an account clearly intelligible, 
however, it will be necessary first to recount 
briefly the history of the Southern Indians, and 
to show who and what the Creeks were, what 
their condition was at the time of the war's be- 



26 RED EAGLE. 

ginning, and what they hoped to gam by their 
contest with the whites — which was not by any 
means a mere outbreak of savagery like some of 
the Indian troubles of our time, but rather a war 
deliberately undertaken with very definite pur- 
poses, after long consideration and no little get- 
ting ready. 

Upon many points the best authorities are con- 
flicting, partly because their works were written 
each with a special purpose and from a special 
point of view, and partly because of carelessness 
in the collection and weighing of facts ; but it is 
still possible to arrive at the truth in all essential 
particulars, and to construct, out of the frag- 
mentary materials at command, a consecutive 
account of the brilliant campaign of 1813-14, in 
which Red Eagle was the foremost figure on one 
side, and Andrew Jackson the master spirit on 
the other. 



CHAPTER II. 

RED EAGLE'S PEOPLE. 

Red Eagle, or William Weatherford, was 
only in part an Indian, as we shall see presently ; 
but his life was so entirely the life of an Indian, 
in that part of it at least which gave him his title 
to a place in history, that we must naturally 
think of him as a member of his mother's race, 
rather than as a white man, and we must regard 
the Indian nation to which he belonged as his 
people. He was born a Creek, and not only so, 
but a great chief of the Creek nation ; that is to 
say, a chief of the highest hereditary rank. 

The Creek nation was not a tribe, but a confed- 
eracy of tribes, united as the Roman Empire was 
by successive conquests. The original Romans 
in this case were the Muscogees, a tribe of In- 
dians so much further advanced toward civiliza- 
tion when white men first encountered them than 
most oi the Indian tribes were, that they had been 
able to preserve greatly more of their own his- 
tory than savages are ordinarily able to do. They 
had fixed laws, too, not merely rules of the chase, 



28 RED EAGLE. 

but laws by which they were governed in the or- 
dinary affairs of life ; and many of their practices 
when the tribe was first known to white men in- 
dicate that they were then rapidly working out a 
system of government and semi-civilization for 
themselves, or else that, as they themselves be- 
lieved, they were descended from a race formerly 
civilized, of whose civilization they still retained 
traces in their customs. 

About the year 1775, an adventurous young 
Frenchman named Le Clerc Milfort visited the 
Creeks, and marrying a woman of the nation be- 
came a chief among them. After living with them 
for twenty years, he returned to France and was 
made a brigadier-general. In the year 1802, Mil- 
fort published a book about the strange people 
among whom he had lived half a lifetime, and 
from him, or rather through him, the world has 
learned what the Creeks believe to be the history 
of their nation. 

This history, Milfort says, existed in the shape 
of a sort of record — not a written record, of 
course, but not merely oral tradition. The Creek 
historians had certain strings of beads, shells, and 
pearls which aided them somewhat as written 
books aid civilized men to preserve the memory 
of their nation's past. These beads meant differ- 



RED EAGLE'S PEOPLE. 29 

ent things according to their arrangement, and 
by their aid the historians were able to remember 
and transmit the traditions committed to their 
charge with something like accuracy. 

The story, as they tell it, is probably apocry- 
phal in most of its details, but it is less improba- 
ble, at worst, than is the story of the foundation 
and early history of Rome. According to the 
Creek historians, the Muscogees fought with the 
Aztecs against Cortez, and when the Spanish in- 
vader gained a secure foothold in Mexico they 
took up their march northward. On their way 
they encountered the Alabamas, whom they 
drove before them for years, following them from 
one part of the land to another, and giving them 
no rest. They chased the Alabamas to the Mis- 
souri River, thence to the Ohio, and thence to 
Alabama, whither they followed their steps. 
Finally, in the early part of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, the persecuted Alabamas despaired of find- 
ing a secure refuge from their relentless persecut- 
ors, and to save themselves trom further destruc- 
tion consented to form a close alliance with the 
Muscogees, submitting to the laws of their con- 
querors and becoming in ettect Muscogees. This 
was the beginning ol that confederacy which at- 
cerward became the Creek Nation. The TooKa- 



30 RED EAGLE. 

batcha tribe, fleeing from their enemies in the 
north, sought the protection of the Muscogees 
next and became members of the nation. Other 
tribes were added to the nation one after another, 
until the confederacy, whose seat was in the region 
along the Alabama, Coosa, and Tombigbee rivers, 
became an empire, embracing in its rule all the 
people round about them, and carrying terror 
even to the tribes beyond the Savannah River. 

The country which the Muscogee confederacy 
inhabited was and still is singularly well watered 
and fertile. Their two great rivers, the Alabama 
and the Tombigbee, are fed by numberless creeks 
of large and small size, and the number of these 
streams prompted the white men who traded 
with the Muscogees to call their land the Creek 
country, and from the land the name was trans- 
ferred to its people, who were thereafter called 
the Creeks. 

These Creeks, as we have said, had a sort of 
semi-civilization of their own when the whites 
first visited them. They had fixed rules and cus- 
toms governing marriage and divorce. They 
lived in houses, wore scanty but real clothing, 
and were governed by a rude system of laws. 
Curiously enough, they even had a system ol so- 
cial caste among them, a sort oi graduated order 



RED EAGLE'S PEOPLE. 3 1 

of nobility. There were certain families who held 
high hereditary rank, hereditary privileges, and 
hereditary authority — the family of the Wind, the 
family of the Bear, the family of the Deer, etc. ; 
and of these the family of the Wind was the 
highest in rank and authority. They constituted, 
indeed, a sort of royal family, the family of the 
Bear ranking just below them. 

When Colonel Benjamin Hawkins was sent on 
an important mission to the Creeks in the year 1 798 
he found an organized and somewhat complicated 
system of government in existence among them. 
Each town had its separate local government, pre- 
sided over by a Micco, who belonged always to 
one of the chief families. They had their public 
buildings and pleasure houses, their fixed rules for 
the conduct of public business, for the promotion 
of warriors, and for all the other things which 
need systematic regulation. 

Beginning thus with a foundation of recognized 
customs upon which to build a civilization, the 
Creeks improved rapidly under the influence of 
the white men when they were brought into con- 
tact with them. They already cultivated the 
ground, and, according to their tradition, had al- 
ways done so. From the white men they learned 
to trade, to carry on their commerce with regu- 



%2 RED EAGLE. 

larity, and even to manufacture cloths and other 
needed articles. They lived generally in peace 
with the white men, and, when the war that de- 
stroyed all this good beginning came, these peo- 
ple had their horses and their houses, their farms, 
their hoes, and their looms. They were not yet 
civilized, but they were well advanced toward the 
acquisition of the arts of peace. They had too 
much hunting land, and the spontaneous or near- 
ly spontaneous productions of their rich soil and 
genial climate made living somewhat too easy for 
their good ; but in spite of these strong incentives 
to idleness, the Creeks were steadily improving. 
Many of them intermarried with the whites, and 
in part adopted white men's modes of living. 
Missionaries went among them, and even the 
traders were in an important sense missionaries. ' 
Many of the Creeks learned to read and write, a 
few were educated men, most of these being half- 
breeds, whose fathers sent them north to attend 
schools. 

Their condition was made the more favorable 
for advancement by the good treatment they re- 
ceived at the hands of the United States Govern- 
ment. It is constantly said in our time that the 
government has never dealt justly or kept honest 
faith with the Indians, and this reproach is usually 



RED EAGLE S PEOPLE. 33 

coupled with a reference to the wiser, better, and 
more humane methods of the British in Canada ; 
but if one were disposed to argue the question 
it might easily be shown that both the assertion 
of the uniform failure of the Americans to deU 
justly with Indians, and the implication that the 
English have as uniformly treated the savages 
well, are false. / In the case of the Creeks, it ap- ^\ 
pears to be certain that the American Government 
did all that could be done to elevate the savages, 
and was only thwarted in the attempt by the in- 
terference of British agents — red and white — who 
incited Red Eagle's people to undertake the war 
which resulted in the destruction of their pros- 
perity and their ultimate removal from the land 
they inhabited. 

Mr. Nathaniel Herbert Claiborne, a prominent 
citizen of Virginia, and a man specially well in- 
formed on the subject, in a work which was writ- 
ten immediately after the Creek war ended, 
wrote as follows on the subject of the govern- 
ment's treatment of the Creeks : 

" It has been demonstrated that the conduct of 
the United States to the Creek Indians was both 
just and honorable. Without any consideration 
save that which arises from the consciousness ot 
doing a good act, the government of the United 



34 RED EAGT.E. 

States had, for more than twenty years, en* 
deavored to reclaim them from a savage to a 
civilized state. By the exertions of government, 
bent only on augmenting the stock of human hap- 
piness, it was evident that the situation of the 
Creeks was greatly ameliorated.^ Many of them 
spoke and wrote our language. Pious men were 
sent, at the expense of government, to instruct 
them in the religion of Christ. The rising gene- 
ration were instructed in numerous schools. . . . 
A sentiment of pity, a fit cement for lasting friend- 
ship, had taken possession of the American breast 
toward the Indians ; and our citizens and govern- 
ment vied with each other in acts of benevolence 
and charity toward them. They were instructed 
in the fabrication of the implements of husbandry. 
The loom and the spinning-wheel were in full 
operation through the whole nation ; while the 
art of house-building, so essential to the accom- 
modation of man and his protection irom the 
winds and waters of heaven, was rapidly approxi- 
mating to perfection. If any of our citizens in- 
iured them a punishment was provided by law, 
and the temper of the nation, in unison with the 
temper of the government, rendered its infliction 
certain. And such was the progress of the 
Creeks in civilization, and the obligations they 



red eagle's people. 35 

were under to the United States, that no one be- 
lieved they could be cajoled into a confederacy 
against us. ' ' 

One other point must not be overlooked, be- 
cause, although its bearing upon the prospects of 
the Creeks may not be fully evident to readers 
who have given the subject no attention, it was 
really the most promising thing in their situation. 
The tribal relation among them was weakening. 
They were taking the first steps from communism, 
which is the soul of savage life, to that individu- 
alism which is the foundation of civilization. 
They were beginning to hold individual property, 
and thereby to become men, with interests and 
wills of their own, instead of mere members of a 
tribe. This was brought about in part by their 
trading with the whites and in part by their in- 
termarriages. The traders who married Creek 
wives and lived in the nation were shrewd fel- 
lows, strongly inclined to look sharply after their 
own interests ; and their half-breed children, who 
retained their rank as Creeks, many of them being 
chiefs of high degree, inherited their fathers' in- 
stincts and learned their fathers' ways. It would 
not have required many years of peace in these 
circumstances to have made of the Creeks a na- 
tion of civilized men. Until the seeds of hostility 



36 RED EAGLE. 

to the Americans were sown among them by the 
agents of the British and the Spanish, their ad- 
vancement was steady, and the effort which the 
Americans were making to civilize them was the 
fairest and most hopeful experiment perhaps that 
has ever been made in that direction on this con, 
tinent. 



CHAPTER III 

RED EAGLE'S BIRTH AND BOYHOOD. 

William Weatherford, the Red Eagle, was 
born in the Creek country, and born a chieftain. 
The exact date of his birth is not known, but as 
he was a man of about thirty or thirty -five years 
of age when the Creek war broke out in 1813, his 
birth must have occurred about the year 1780. 
He is commonly spoken of in books, and especial- 
ly in books that were written while a feeling of 
intense antipathy to him continued to exist, as 
the son of a Scotch pedler, or the son of a Geor- 
gia pedler, the phrase carrying with it the sugges- 
tion that Red Eagle was a man of contemptible 
origin. This was not the case. His father was 
a Scotch pedler, certainly, who went to the Creek 
country from Georgia, but he was by no means 
the sort of person who is suggested to our minds 
by the word pedler. He was a trader of great 
shrewdness and fine intellectual ability, who 
managed his business so well that he became rich 
in spite of his strong taste for the expensive sport 
of horse-racing. 






36 RED EAGLE. 

Besides this, men usually have two parents, 
and Red Eagle was not an exception to this rule. 
If he was the son of a Scotch pedler from Geor- 
gia, he was also the son of an Indian woman, who 
belonged to the dominant family of the Wind ; 
that is to say, she was a princess, her rank among 
the Creeks corresponding as nearly as possible to 
that of a daughter of the royal house in a civi- 
lized monarchy. 

Red Eagle's connection with persons of distinc- 
tion did not end here. He was the nephew of the 
wife of Le Clerc Milfort, the Frenchmar men- 
tioned in a former chapter, who, after a twenty 
years' residence among the Creeks, returned to 
France and received a brigadier-general's commis- 
sion at the hands of Napoleon. Red Eagle was 
the nephew, through his mother, of Alexander Mc- 
Gillivray, a man of mixed Scotch, French, and In- 
dian blood, who by dint of his very great ability 
as a soldier, a ruler of the Creeks, and a wily, 
unscrupulous diplomatist, made a prominent 
place for himself in history. He was commis- 
sioned as a colonel in the British service ; later 
he became a commissary of subsistence in the 
Spanish army, with the rank and pay of colonel ; 
and finally he received from Washington an ap- 
pointment as brigadier-general, with full pay. 



RED EAGLE'S BIRTH AND BOYHOOD. 39 

He is described by Mr. A. J. Pickett, in his His- 
tory of Alabama, as " a man of towering intellect 
and vast information, who ruled the Creek coun- 
try for a quarter of a century. ' ' Another writer 
says that Alexander McGillivray "became the 
great chief or emperor, as he styled himself, of 
all the confederate Muscogee tribes ;" and adds, 
44 He was a man of the highest intellectual abilities, 
ol considerable education, and of wonderful tal- 
ents for intrigue and diplomacy. This he ex- 
hibited conspicuously through the period of the 
American Revolution, in baffling alike the schemes 
of our countrymen, both Whig and Tory, of the 
Spaniards in Florida, of the British at Mobile, and 
of the French at New Orleans, and by using them 
simultaneously for his own purposes of political 
and commercial aggrandizement. A more wily 
Talleyrand never trod the red war paths of the 
frontiers or quaffed the deceptive black drink at 
sham councils or with deluded agents and emis- 
saries/ ' 

Reading these descriptions of the character 
and abilities of his uncle, knowing how shrewd 
a man his father was, and remembering that his 
mother was a member of that family of the Wind 
who had for generations managed to retain for 
themselves the foremost place in the councils and 



40 RED EAGLE. 

campaigns of their warlike race, we may fairly 
assume that Red Eagle came honestly by the 
genius for intrigue and lor command which 
brought distinction to him during the Creek war. 
He may fairly be supposed to have inherited 
those qualities of mind which fitted him to be a 
leader in that fierce struggle, and as a leader to 
hold his own surprisingly well against greatly 
superior numbers of good troops, commanded by 
Andrew Jackson himsell. 

When Charles Weatherford, the Scotch trader 
from Georgia, married the sister of General Alex- 
ander McGillivray, or Emperor Alexander Mc- 
Gillivray, as he preferred to be called, he ac- 
quired by that alliance a measure of influence 
among the Creeks which few men even of pure 
Muscogee blood could boast. This influence was 
strengthened as his shrewdness and the soundness 
of his judgment made themselves apparent in the 
councils of the nation. More especially he made 
himself dear to the hearts of the Creeks by his 
skill in managing their diplomatic relations with 
the Spanish authorities in Florida, and the Ameri- 
can agents. 

In all this, however, the wily Scotchman served 
himself while serving the nation, and he rapidly 
grew to be rich. He lived, literally as a prince, 



RED EAGLE'S BIRTH AND BOYHOOD. 41 



at his home on the eastern bank of the Alabama 
River, on the first high ground below the con- 
fluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers. 

Here he built for himself a home, and, still re- 
taining his interest in commerce, set up a trading 
house. His love of horse-racing has already been 
mentioned, and now that he was a man of wealth 
and consequence it was natural that he should in- 
dulge this taste to the full. He laid out a race- 
track near his trading house, and devoted a large 
share of his attention to the business of breeding 
fine horses. Even in thus indulging his passion 
for horse-racing, however, Charles Weatherford 
was shrewd enough to make the sport contribute 
to his prosperity in other ways than by means of 
profitable gambling. He so managed the races 
as to attract his neighbors, principally the Alaba- 
mas, to his place of business, and so secured to 
himself their trade, which would otherwise have 
gone to the traders on the opposite side of the 
river, in the village of Coosawda. 

Here William Weatherford was born, the son 
of the wealthiest man in that part of the country, 
and by inheritance a chief of the ruling family of 
the nation. He had for tutors no less competent 
men than his two uncles, Alexander McGillivray, 
and the accomplished Frenchman Le Clerc Mil- 



42 RED EAGLE. 

fort. Young Weatherford evinced the best ca- 
pacity for acquiring knowledge, but it was only- 
such knowledge as he wanted to acquire. Caring 
nothing about reading and writing, he refused to 
learn to read and write, and no persuasions would 
overcome his obstinacy in this particular. He 
took pains, however, to acquire the utmost com- 
mand of the English language, partly because it 
was useful to him as a means of communication 
with the Americans, and partly because he found 
that command of a civilized tongue gave him a 
greater force in speaking his native Creek lan- 
guage, and it was a part of his ambition to be dis- 
tinguished for eloquence in council. He learned 
French, also, but less perfectly, and acquired 
enough of Spanish to speak it in ordinary conver- 
sation. He travelled, too, for improvement, mak- 
ing several journeys while yet a boy to Mobile 
and Pensacola, picking up as he went whatever 
information there was to acquire. 

He thus became in an important sense an edu- 
cated man. He could not read or write, it is 
true ; but it is probable that Homer was equally 
ignorant, and not at all certain that Hannibal or 
Richard Coeur de Lion, great commanders as 
they were, were much better scholars. 

The chief function of education is to train the 



RED EAGLE'S BIRTH AND BOYHOOD. 43 

mind, and the chief difference between the edu- 
cated man and one who is not so is that the mind 
of the one has been trained into a state of high 
efficiency while that of the other has not. Read- 
ing and writing offer the shortest roads, the sim- 
plest means, to this end ; but they are not the only 
ones, and if Red Eagle had little or no knowledge 
of letters, he had nevertheless an active intellect, 
trained under excellent masters to a high degree 
of efficiency, and hence was, in the true sense of 
the term, a man of education. 

In his tastes and instincts this son of a Scotch- 
man was altogether an Indian. He devoted him- 
self earnestly to the work of acquiring the knowl- 
edge of woodcraft and the skill in the chase which 
his people held in highest esteem. He was a nota- 
ble huntsman, a fine swimmer, a tireless walker. 
He was a master marksman, alike with the bow 
and with the rifle. He was passionately fond of 
all athletic sports, too, and by his skill in them 
he won the admiration — almost the worship — of 
all the youth of his nation. He was the fleetest 
of foot of all the young men who ran races in the 
Creek villages, and his fondness for the sports of 
his people was so great that he was never absent 
from any gathering of the young men for contests 
of strength, activity, or skill, however distant the 



44 RED EAGLE. 

place of meeting might be. He was their chief 
by right of his accomplishments, as well as by in- 
heritance as the son of Sehoy the princess. Es- 
pecially in the great Creek game of throwing the 
ball — a game which closely resembled a battle be- 
tween hundreds of men on each side, and one in 
which success was achieved only by great per- 
sonal daring and endurance added to skill, bones 
being broken frequently in the rude collisions of 
the opposing forces, and men being killed and 
trampled under foot not infrequently — the young 
Red Eagle was an enthusiastic and successful 
player. 

While yet a little child, Red Eagle showed that 
he had inherited his father's love for horses, and 
his persistence in riding races, breaking unruly 
colts, and dashing madly over the roughest coun- 
try on the back of some one of his father's untamed 
animals, gave him the finest skill and most con- 
summate grace of a perfect horseman. An old 
Indian woman who knew the young chief in his 
youth, telling of his daring, his skill, and his 
grace as a horseman, said, " The squaws would 
quit hoeing corn, and smile and gaze upon him 
as he rode by the corn-patch. ,, 

All these things added to Red Eagle's popular- 
ity with the old and young of his nation, and the 



RED EAGLE'S BIRTH AND BOYHOOD. A * 



daring and enthusiasm which he showed in tne 
sports of his people were exercised frequently in 
their service. In the wars of the Creeks with 
neighboring nations, the Choctaws and the Chick- 
asaws, and in their campaigns on the borders of 
Tennessee, Red Eagle distinguished himself for 
courage, tireless activity, and great skill in war- 
fare, even before he had reached manhood, so that 
when his growth was fully gained he was already 
a man of the widest and most controlling in- 
fluence among the Creeks, by reason both of his 
birth and of his achievements. 

His popularity was enhanced doubtless by the 
beauty of his face and the comeliness of his per- 
son, for all the writers who have described Red 
Eagle, and all the men of that time who have given 
oral accounts of him, agree in telling us that he 
was a singularly handsome man, with brilliant 
eyes, well-cut features, shapely limbs, and impos- 
ing presence. 

That nothing which could help him to influence 
and power might be lacking, Red Eagle was gifted 
with eloquence at once stirring and persuasive. 
His natural gift had been cultivated carefully, 
and, as we have seen in a former chapter, he 
adroitly hoarded his power in this respect, taking 
care not to weaken the force of his oratory by 



46 RED EAGLE. 

making it cheap and common. He would not 
speak at all upon light occasions. While others 
harangued, he sat silent, permitting decisions to 
be made without expressing any opinion what- 
ever upon the matters in dispute. It was only 
when a great occasion aroused deep passions that 
Red Eagle spoke. Then his eloquence was over- 
whelming. He won his audience completely, and 
bent men easily to his will. He knew how to 
arouse their passions and to play upon them for his 
own purposes. Opposition gave way before the 
tide of his speech. His opponents in debate 
were won to his views or silenced by his over- 
whelming oratory ; and he who was his people's 
commander in the field was no less certainly their 
master in the council on all occasions which were 
important enough to stir him to exertion. He 
had vices, certainly, but they were the vices ot 
his time and country, and there is no sufficient 
evidence that he carried them to excess, while his 
retention of physical and intellectual vigor afford 
the strongest possible proof of the contrary. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 

We all know how trouble begins. Whether a 
big or a little quarrel is the thing about which we 
inquire, and whoever the parties to the dispute 
may be, the trouble may always be traced back 
to some small occurrences which led to larger 
ones, which in their turn provoked still greater, 
until finally the trouble came. 

We have seen that there was peace and justice 
between the Americans and the Creek Nation, and 
that the Creeks had every reason in their own in- 
terest to continue living upon friendly terms with 
the whites. A good many of them fully under- 
stood this, too, and sought to persuade others ot 
it ; and it is probable that when the first troubles 
came the great majority of the Creeks earnestly 
wished to keep the peace, and to make use of the 
means of advancement offered to them by the 
American Government and people. Unluckily, 
they were the victims of bad advice, and the old 
story followed : one thing led to another. 

It is not easy, in this case, to say precisely what 



48 RED EAGLE. 

the one thing was which led to another. That is 
to say, it is not easy to determine what was the 
first of the long chain of events which led the 
prosperous and improving Creeks into dissensions, 
and thence into the war out of which f hey came 
a broken and disheartened remnant of a once 
powerful nation ; but tracing the matter as far 
back as it is necessary to carry the inquiry, we 
discover that a public road was one of the earliest 
causes of the trouble. 

The Creeks were made masters of their own 
country by the Treaty of 1790, and their absolute 
title to their lands was respected by the United 
States Government, which defended them rigor- 
ously against encroachments upon their domain. 
That government, having become possessed of a 
wide tract of territory lying west of the Creek 
Nation, toward which the tide of emigration was 
rapidly turning, wished to provide a more direct 
and better road than any that existed, and with 
that end in view sought permission of the Creeks 
to run the new Federal Road, as it was called, by 
a direct route through the Creek territory. The 
principal chiefs, beginning to learn some of the 
natural laws that govern commerce, saw that the 
passage of a good road through the heart of the 
nation would necessarily benefit them, and make 



THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 49 

their commerce with the outer world easier and 
more profitable. Accordingly these chiefs gave 
the Creek Nation's consent, and the road was 
made. Over this the people quarrelled among 
themselves, dividing, as wiser people are apt to 
do, into two fiercely antagonistic parties. Those 
of them who objected to the thoroughfare were 
seriously alarmed by the great numbers of emi- 
grants who were constantly passing through their 
country to the region beyond. They said that 
they would soon be walled up between white set- 
tlements on every side. The land on the Tom- 
bigbee River was already becoming peopled to 
such an extent that the hope, which many of the 
Creeks had secretly cherished, of driving the 
whites away from the banks of that river and re- 
covering the territory to themselves must soon 
be abandoned, and they held, therefore, that in 
granting the right of way for the road the chiefs 
had betrayed the nation's interests. 

There never yet was a quarrel which somebody 
did not find it to his interest to stimulate, and in 
this case the Spanish settlers, or squatters as they 
would have been called if they had lived thirty 
or forty years later, did all they could to in- 
crease the bitterness of the Creeks toward those 
chiefs who were disposed to be friendly with the 



50 RED EAGLE. 

Americans, and toward the Americans. Thesfc 
Spaniards still insisted that the territory in which 
they lived, and from which they were gradually 
driven away, belonged of right to Spain, and 
they saw with great jealousy the rapid peopling 
of that territory with Americans. The agents of 
the British, with whom the United States was on 
the point of going to war, added their voice to 
the quarrel, stimulating the Spanish and the In- 
dians alike to hostility. It was Very clearly seen 
by these agents that an Indian war, especially a 
war with the powerful Creeks, would greatly 
weaken this country for its contest with Great 
Britain. Emissaries of the British infested the 
Creek country, stirring up strife and sowing the 
seeds of future hostility among them. The 
Spanish in Florida, although our government 
was at peace with Spain, willingly became the 
agents for the British in this work, and secret 
messages were constantly sent through them 
promising arms, ammunition, and aid to the 
Creeks in the event of a war. 

All these things gave great anxiety to Colonel 
Hawkins, the agent who had charge of the 
Creeks, but the trouble was not yet in a shape 
in which he could deal vigorously with it. He 
called a council, and did all that he could to con* 



THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 5 1 

vince the Indians of the government's kindly 
disposition. The friendly chiefs assured him of 
their constancy, and their assurance lulled his 
suspicions somewhat. He knew these chiefs to 
be sincere, but neither he nor they knew to what 
extent their influence with the nation had been 
weakened. 

Then came Tecumseh, who, in the spring of 
the year 1811, arrived in the Creek country, ac- 
companied by about thirty of his warriors. He 
came with a double mission : as the agent of the 
British he was charged with the duty of prepar- 
ing the tribes of the South to join in the approach- 
ing war, as soon as a state of war should be de- 
clared ; as Tecumseh he came to execute his own 
purpose, namely, the formation of a great offen- 
sive and defensive alliance between the tribes of 
the North and those of the South, against the 
American nation and people. 

Tecumseh did not come as a stranger to the 
Creeks. The fame of his exploits in the North 
had reached them, and he was known to them 
even more favorably in another way. Nearly 
twenty-five years before, Tecumseh, then a 
young man, had dwelt among the Creeks for 
about two years, and the stories of his feats as a 
hunter had lived after him as a tradition. Hence 



52 RED EAGLE. 

when he came again in 1811 he was a sort oi 
hero of romance to the younger Creek warriors, 
a great man of whose deeds they had heard 
stories during their childhood. 

On his way to the South, Tecumseh tarried 
awhile with the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, 
trying to win them to his scheme, but without 
success. In Florida, he made easy converts of 
the warlike Seminoles ; and returning thence he 
visited the Creeks, arriving in October. While 
Colonel Hawkins was holding the Grand Council 
at Tookabatcha, of which we have spoken, and 
was trying to placate the Creeks, Tecumseh, fol- 
lowed by his warriors, dressed in their most im- 
pressive savage costumes, consisting of very little 
else than buffalo tails and other ornaments, 
marched into the meeting. Marching solemnly 
round and round the central square of the town, 
Tecumseh, when he had sufficiently impressed 
the lookers-on with a proper sense of his dignity, 
went through the most solemn ceremonies of 
friendship with his hosts. Greeting the chiefs in 
the most cordial fashion, he and his followers ex- 
changed tobacco with them — a proceeding which 
attested their fellowship in the strongest possible 
way. 

In the main the Creeks received Tecumseh 



THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 53 

cordially, returning his protestations of brother- 
hood in kind ; but one chief, Captain Isaacs, 
whose fidelity to his obligations as a friend of the 
whites was proved afterward on the battle-field, 
rejected the overtures of the men from the North. 
He shook his head when asked to shake hands ; 
he refused to exchange tobacco ; and, with the 
frankness of a brave man convinced of h:s duty, 
he told Tecumseh to his face that he was a bad 
man, and added, " You are no greater than I 
am." 

Tecumseh had come to the council for the pur- 
pose of using it for his own ends, but while 
Colonel Hawkins remained he made no effort to 
put his plan into execution. Colonel Hawkins 
could have thwarted him, in part at least, if the 
wily Indian had openly avowed the object of his 
visit ; but Tecumseh was too shrewd to do that. 
Colonel Hawkins prolonged the council from day 
to day, but still Tecumseh kept silence. Each 
day he would say, " The sun has gone too far to- 
day ; I will make my talk to-morrow/ ' But the 
to-morrow of the promise did not come while 
Colonel Hawkins remained, and finally, worn out 
with the delay, that officer brought his conference 
with the chiefs to an end and departed. 

Then Tecumseh opened his lips. Calling the 



54 RED EAGLE. 

people together, he made them a speech, setting 
forth his views and urging them upon the Creeks. 
He told them that the red men had made a fatal 
mistake in adopting the ways of the whites and 
becoming friendly with them. He exhorted 
them to return at once to their former state 
of savagery ; to abandon the ploughs and looms 
and arms of the white men ; to cast off the 
garments which the whites had taught them to 
wear ; to return to the condition and customs of 
their ancestors, and to be ready at command to be- 
come the enemies of the whites. The work they 
were learning to do in the fields, he said, was un- 
worthy of free red men. It degraded them, and 
made them mere slaves. He warned them that 
the whites would take the greater part of their 
country, cut down its forests and turn them into 
cornfields, build towns, and make the rivers mud- 
dy with the washings of their furrows, and then, 
when they were strong enough, would reduce the 
Indians to slavery like that of the negroes. There 
is every reason to believe that Tecumseh was con- 
vinced of the truth of all this. He was con- 
vinced, too, that the whites had no right to live 
on this continent. He told the Creeks, as he had 
told General Harrison, that the Great Spirit had 
given this land to the red men. He said the 



THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 55 

Great Spirit had provided the skins of beasts for 
the red men's clothing, and that these only should 
they wear. Then he came to the subject of the 
British alliance, telling the Creeks that the King 
of England was about to make a great war in be- 
half of his children the red men, for the purpose 
of driving all the Americans off the continent, and 
that he would heap favors upon all the Indians 
who should help him to do this. 

A prophet who accompanied Tecumseh fol- 
lowed him with a speech, in which he reiterated 
what his chief had said, but gave it as a message 
from the Great Spirit ; still further to encourage 
the war spirit among them, this teacher by au- 
thority promised a miracle in behalf of the Creeks. 
He assured them that if they should join in the 
war they would do so at no personal risk ; that 
not one of them should be hurt by the enemy ; 
that the Great Spirit would encircle them wher- 
ever they went with impassable mires, in which 
the Americans would be utterly destroyed, with 
no power or opportunity to harm the divinely 
protected Indians. 

All this was well calculated to stir the already 
moody and discontented Creeks to a feeling of 
hostility, and when the speech-making was over 
there was a strong party, probably more than a 



56 RED EAGLE. 

majority of the Creeks, ready and anxious to 
make immediate war upon the Americans. 
Colonel Hawkins's long labors in the interest of 
peace had been rendered fruitless, and the war 
party in the nation was more numerous and more 
firmly resolved upon mischief than ever. 

Tecumseh's labors were not yet finished, how- 
ever. As a shrewd politician works and argues 
and pleads and persuades in private as well as in 
his public addresses, so Tecumseh, who was a 
particularly shrewd politician, went all through 
the nation winning converts to his cause. He 
won many, but although he was received as an 
honored guest by the chief Tustinnuggee Thluc- 
co, or the Big Warrior, he could make no impres- 
sion upon that wise warrior's mind. It was not 
that Big Warrior was so firm a friend to the 
whites that nothing could arouse him to enmity. 
He had his grudges, and was by no means in love 
with things as they were ; but he foresaw, as Te- 
cumseh did not, that the war, if it should come, 
would bring destruction to his nation. He esti- 
mated the strength of his foes more accurately 
than his fellows did, and was convinced that there 
was no hope of success in the war which Tecum- 
seh was trying to bring about. He was valorous 
enough, but he was also discreet, and he there 



THE BEGINNING OF TROUBLE. 57 

fore obstinately remained true to his allegiance. 
His obstinacy at last roused Tecumseh's ire, and 
it was to him that Tecumseh made his celebrated 
threat that when he reached Detroit he would 
stamp his foot on the ground and shake down all 
the houses in Tookabatcha — a threat which it is 
said that an earthquake afterward led the Creeks 
to believe he had carried out. The story of the 
earthquake is repeated by all the writers on the 
subject, but some of the accounts of it contradict 
facts and set dates at defiance ; and so, while it is 
not impossible and perhaps not improbable that 
an opportune earthquake did seem to make Te- 
cumseh's threat good, the story must be received 
with some caution, as the different versions of it 
contradict each other. So, for that matter, it is 
not safe to trust the records upon any point, with- 
out diligent examination and comparison. Thus 
the fact that the battle of Tippecanoe was fought 
during this Southern journey of Tecumseh makes 
it certain that the mission was accomplished in 
the year 181 1 ; yet Pickett, in his History of Ala- 
bama, gives 1 812 as the year, and several other 
writers follow him. Again, some of the writers 
to whom we must look for the facts of this part 
of American history confound Tecumseh's two 
years' sojourn among the Creeks about the year 



58 RED EAGLE. 

1787 with his visit in 181 1, saying that that visit 
lasted two years — a statement which would make 
great confusion in the mind of any one familiar 
with the history of events in the North in which 
Tecumseh bore a part. A careful comparison of 
dates shows that Tecumseh started to the South 
in the spring of the year 181 1, and returned to 
the North soon after the battle of Tippecanoe was 
fought — that is to say, near the end of the same 
year. 



CHAPTER V. 

RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR— 
THE CIVIL WAR IN THE CREEK NATION. 

We have called Tecumseh a wily politician, and 
in whatever he undertook his methods were 
always those of the political manager. He was 
quick to discover the temper of individuals as well 
as of bodies of men, and he was especially shrewd 
in selecting his agents to work with him and for 
him. He was not long in picking out Red Eagle as 
the man of all others likely to draw the Creeks into 
the scheme of hostility. Red Eagle's tastes and 
temper, as we have already seen, were those of 
the savage. He was a rich man, and had all the 
means necessary to the enjoyment of those sports 
and pastimes which he delighted in ; but above 
all else he was an Indian. He looked upon the 
life of the white men with distaste, and saw with 
displeasure the tendency of his people, and more 
especially of his half-breed brothers, to adopt 
the civilization which he loathed. Moreover, he 
cherished a special hatred for the Americans — a 
hatred which his uncle and tutor, General Mc- 



60 RED EAGLE. 

Gillivray, had sedulously instilled into his mind 
in his boyhood ; and this detestation of the Ameri- 
cans had been strengthened by the British and 
Spanish at Mobile and Pensacola, during his fre- 
quent visits to those posts. His favorite boast 
was that there was ' no Yankee blood in his 
veins." 

Besides his prejudice, Red Eagle's judgment 
taught him to fear the encroachments of the 
Americans, and men are always quick to hate 
those whom they fear. Red Eagle saw with 
genuine alarm that the white men were rapidly 
multiplying in the Tombigbee country, and he 
knew that the Americans had made acquisitions 
of new territory which would still further invite 
American emigration into the neighborhood of 
the Creek Nation. All this he saw with alarm, be- 
cause he was convinced that it boded ill to his 
people. With many others he feared that the 
race which held black men in a state of slavery 
would reduce red men to a similar condition as 
soon as their own numbers in the country should 
be great enough to render resistance useless. 
Convinced of this, Red Eagle believed that it was 
the part of wisdom to make a fight for freedom 
before it should be forever too late. 

Tecumseh, finding in the young chief a man of 



RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR. 6l 

the highest influence in the nation, whose preju- 
dices, fears, and judgment combined to make 
him an advocate of war, took him at once into his 
councils, making him his confidant and principal 
fellow-worker. Red Eagle eagerly seconded Te- 
cumseh's efforts, and his influence won many, es- 
pecially of the young warriors, to the war party 
in the nation. His knowledge of the Creeks, too, 
enabled him to suggest methods of winning them 
which his visitor would not have thought of, 
probably. One of these was to work directly 
upon their imaginations, and to enlist their super- 
stition on the side of war through prophets of 
their own, who, by continuous prophesyings, 
could do much to counteract the influence of the 
older Creek chiefs, most of whom were attached 
to the Americans, and being well-to-do were op- 
posed to war, which might lose them their houses, 
lands, cattle, and negro slaves. The possession 
of property, even among partly savage men, is a 
strong conservative influence always. 

Acting upon Red Eagle's hint, Tecumseh di- 
rected his prophet to " inspire some Creeks with 
prophetic powers. The first man selected for 
this purpose was wisely chosen. He was a 
shrewd half-breed named Josiah Francis, a man 



62 RED EAGLE. 

whose great cunning and unscrupulousness fitted 
him admirably for the business of " prophet/* 

The prophet of the Shawnees took Francis to a 
cabin and shut him up alone for the space of ten 
days. During that time the inspiring was ac- 
complished by the Shawnee, who danced and 
howled around the cabin, and performed all man- 
ner of rude gesticulations. At the end of the ten 
days he brought the new prophet forth, telling 
the people that he was now blind, but that very 
soon his sight — which may be said to have been 
taken away to be sharpened — would be restored 
to him, so improved that he could see all things 
that were to occur in the future. 

Francis, of course, lent himself willingly to this 
imposture, and consented to be led about by the 
Shawnee prophet, stepping like a blind man who 
fears to stumble over obstacles. Suddenly he de- 
clared that he had received his vision, duly made 
over, with modern improvements and prophetic 
attachments. 

Francis used his new powers both directly and 
by proxy in the interest of the war party, creat- 
ing many other prophets to help him, among them 
Sinquista and High Head Jim ; and the diligence 
with which all these workers for war carried on 
their prophesyings, pleadings, and speech-making 



RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR. 63 

increased the numbers of the war party, and 
added to the ill-feeling, which was already in- 
tense, between the Creeks who wished to make 
war and those who sought to keep the peace. 
The Creek nation was ripe for a civil war — a war 
of factions among themselves ; it only needed a 
spark to create an explosion, and the spark was 
not long in coming, as we shall see. 

Tecumseh, having secured so good a substitute 
for himself in Red Eagle, felt that his own pres- 
ence was no longer needed in the Creek coun- 
try. He accordingly took his departure for the 
north by a circuitous route, in order that he 
might visit the tribes on the Missouri River and 
in Illinois, and stir them up to hostility. He 
took with him the Creek chief Little Warrior, 
and thirty men of the nation. These Creeks ac- 
companied him in all his wanderings until they 
reached Canada, where they remained a consid- 
erable time, receiving attentions of the most flat- 
tering kind from British officers and from the 
secret agents of the British. Upon their depart- 
ure for the return journey, they were provided 
with letters which directed the British agents at 
Pensacola to provide the Creeks with arms and 
ammunition in abundance. 

On their way back they committed an outrage 



64 RED EAGLE. 

which, although it had no direct bearing upon 
the quarrel among the Creeks at home, proved in 
the end to be the beginning of that civil war 
which grew into a war with the whites. In the 
Chickasaw country they murdered seven fam- 
ilies, and making a prisoner of a Mrs. Crawley, 
carried her with them to their own country. 
This outrageous conduct was at once reported 
by the Chickasaw agent to Colonel Hawkins, the 
agent for the Creeks, and he immediately de- 
manded the punishment of its perpetrators. 
Under the compact which existed between the 
Creeks and the government, the chiefs of the 
tribe were bound to comply with this demand, 
upon pain of bringing the responsibility for the 
misdeed upon the nation, and as we have said 
the majority of the chiefs were anxious to fulfil 
their duties and thus to preserve peace. Accord- 
ingly, a council of friendly chiefs determined to 
arrest Little Warrior's band and punish them. 
They sent two parties of warriors to do this, one 
under command of Chief Mcintosh, and the other 
led by Captain Isaacs. These forest policemen 
speedily accomplished their mission, pursuing 
and fighting the offenders until all of them were 
put to death. This was in the spring of 1812. 
Justice being satisfied, the Creeks might now 



RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR. 65 

have remained at peace with the whites if they 
had joined the older chiefs in wishing to do so ; 
but unfortunately that which placated the whites 
only served to incense the war party among the 
Creeks against both the whites and the peace- 
ful men of their own nation. Murders and other 
outrages occurred frequently. The men of the 
war party became truculent in their bearing, and 
matters were in a ferment throughout the nation. 
The prophets prophesied, and the orators made 
speeches denouncing the " peacefuls," as they 
called the Creeks who opposed war, as bitterly 
as they did the whites. The Alabamas were 
especially violent, probably in consequence of 
their close neighborhood with Red Eagle, whose 
influence over them was almost without limit. 
They committed outrages especially designed to 
force the beginning of war, among other things 
killing a mail-carrier, seizing the United States 
mail and carrying it to Pensacola, where they 
robbed the bags of their contents. 

Big Warrior, who had stood so firmly against 
Tecumseh's threats, still held out, but he was 
now thoroughly aroused. He invited the chiels 
of the war party to a council, but they scorned to 
listen to his pleas for a hearing. Failing to bring 
them to him, he sent a messenger to them with 



66 RED EAGLE. 

his ' ' talk, ' ' which was in these words : ' You 
are but a few Alabama people. You say that the 
Great Spirit visits you frequently ; that he comes 
in the sun, and speaks to you ; that the sun 
comes down just above your heads. Now we 
want to see and hear what you have seen and 
heard. Let us have the same proof, then we will 
believe. You have nothing to fear ; the people 
who did the killing on the Ohio are put to death, 
and the law is satisfied.' ' 

This was a perfectly sensible, logical, reason- 
able talk, and for that reason it angered the men 
to whom it was sent. Men in a passion always 
resent reason when it condemns them or stands 
in the way of their purposes. The Alabamas 
answered Big Warrior's sensible proposition by 
putting his messenger to death. Thus the civil 
war among the Creeks, for it had become that 
now, went on. The peaceful Indians remained 
true to their allegiance, and fought their hostile 
brethren when occasion required, although they 
did what they could to avoid collisions with them. 

In such a time as that even civilized men be- 
come disorderly, and the hostile Creeks grew daily 
more and more turbulent. They collected in 
parties and went upon marauding expeditions, 
sometimes sacking a plantation, sometimes mur- 



RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR. 67 

dering a party of emigrants, sometimes making a 
descent upon the dwellings of peaceful Creeks, 
and doing all manner of mischief. 

The long-threatened war between the United 
States and Great Britain had been formally 
declared in the year 1812, and it was now the 
spring of 181 3. The Americans at the beginning 
of the war had asserted their title to the town 
and harbor of Mobile, which, although a part of 
the territory ceded many years before to this 
country by the French, had until now been held 
by the Spanish. The affair was so well managed 
that the place was surrendered without bloodshed 
and occupied by the American lorces ; but its 
surrender served to increase the hostility of the 
Spanish in Florida, and although we were nomi- 
nally at peace with Spain, the Spanish authori- 
ties at Pensacola, who had already done much to 
stir up Indian hostilities, lent themselves readily 
to the schemes of the British. During the lat- 
ter part of August, 18 12, they went so far as 
to permit a British force to land at Pensacola, 
take possession of the fort there, and make the 
place a base of military operations against us. 

From the very beginning of the troubles the 
Indians had maintained communication with 
Pensacola, and parties of them went thither fre- 



68 RED EAGLE. 

quently to procure arms and ammunition, which 
were freely furnished. It was with one of these 
parties, on their return from Pensacola, that the 
first battle of the Creek war was fought. Of 
that we shall hear in another chapter. Meantime 
it is worth while to explain how the plans of the 
war party were discovered in time to save many 
lives. 

A friendly half-breed, McNac by name, was 
driven from his home by one of the petty 
marauding parties spoken of a few pages back, 
and his cattle were carried to Pensacola by the 
marauders, and sold. After hiding in the 
swamps for some time, McNac at last ventured 
out at night to visit his home and see precisely 
what damage had been done. He was unlucky 
enough to meet High Head Jim at the head of a 
party of hostile Indians, and as there was no 
chance of safety either in flight or fight, McNac 
resorted to diplomacy, which in this case, as in 
many others, meant vigorous lying. He declared 
that he had abandoned his peaceful proclivities, 
and had made up his mind to join the war party. 
McNac appears to have had something like a 
genius for lying, as he succeeded in imposing his 
fabrications upon High Head Jim, who, suspi- 
cious and treacherous as he was, believed Mc< 



RED EAGLE AS AN ADVOCATE OF WAR. 69 

Nac implicitly, and confided to him the plan of 
the hostile Creeks. This plan was to kill Big 
Warrior, Captain Isaacs, Mcintosh, Mad Drag- 
on's Son, and the other friendly chiefs, before go- 
ing finally upon the war-path, and, having thus 
deprived the friendly Creeks of their leaders, to 
compel them to join in the war upon the Ameri- 
cans. Then, High Head Jim said, the war 
would begin by simultaneous attacks upon the 
various settlements. Having exterminated the 
whites upon their borders, they were to march in 
three columns against the people of Tennessee, 
Georgia, and Mississippi, receiving assistance 
from the Choctaws and the Cherokees. 

McNac bore this information at once to the 
intended victims, and thus enabled them to secure 
their safety in various ways ; but the civil war 
increased in its fury. The hostile bands still 
confined themselves as yet chiefly to attacks upon 
the peaceful members of their own nation, de- 
stroying their houses, killing or driving off their 
cattle, and stealing whatever portable property 
they possessed. 

Colonel Hawkins still hoped for peace, rather 
unreasonably, it must be confessed, and avoided 
interference as far as possible ; but he extended 
protection to Big Warrior, and with the assist- 



JO RED EAGLE. 

ance of a force of friendly Creeks rescued that 
chieftain and escorted him to a place of safety. 

In such a state of affairs, of course, a collision 
between the whites and the Indians was inevi- 
table, and when- it came, as will be related in the 
next chapter, the Creek war of 1813 was begun. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE BATTLE OF BURNT CORN. 

In the month of July, 1813, Peter McQueen, 
High Head Jim, and the Prophet Francis, having 
collected a large amount of plunder in their de- 
scents upon the homes of peaceful Indians and the 
plantations of half-breeds, sought a market for 
their booty. Collecting their followers to the 
number of about three hundred men, they loaded 
a number of pack-horses, and set out for Pensa- 
cola, driving a herd of stolen cattle before them. 
It was their purpose to exchange these things at 
Pensacola for arms, ammunition, whiskey, and 
whatever else they wanted ; and combining pleas- 
ure with business, they amused themselves on the 
route by burning villages and committing mur- 
ders upon Indians who persisted in their friend- 
ship for the whites. 

Meantime the white people had at last become 
thoroughly alarmed. The news which McNac 
brought of his conversation with High Head Jim 
convinced even the most sceptical that a war of 
greater or smaller proportions was at hand, and 



72 RED EAGLE. 

it was the conviction of the wisest men among 
them that the best way to save themselves from 
impending destruction was to strike in time. 
The British had now begun seriously to threaten 
a descent upon the south-west, and it seemed to 
be more than probable that the savages were 
only delaying their general outbreak until their 
allies the British should appear somewhere upon 
the coast, and force the militia of the Tensaw and 
Tombigbee settlements to march away to meet 
them. Then the country would be defenceless, 
and the Indians could easily exterminate all that 
remained of the white population. 

The pioneers who lived in that part of the 
country were brave, hardy, and resolute men, and 
they no sooner saw their danger distinctly than 
they took up arms with which to defend them- 
selves. They resolved to assert their resolution 
by attacking not the Indian towns, but the roving 
parties of Indian outlaws who were bringing the 
war about. If they could crush these, punishing 
them effectually, they thought, the great body of 
the Creeks would think twice before deciding to 
make the contemplated war. 

Accordingly a summons was sent out for volun- 
teers. About two hundred men, or nearly that 
number, some of them white men, some half- 



THE BATTLE OF BURNT CORN. 73 

breeds, and some friendly Indians, promptly 
answered the call. Among theme was Captain 
Samuel Dale, better known in history as Sam 
Dale, the hero of the canoe fight, one of the 
strangest and most desperate affairs of the war, 
some account of which will be given in its proper 
place. 

This little army was commanded by Colonel 
Caller, assisted by one lieutenant-colonel, four 
majors, and more captains and lieutenants than 
have been counted. Deducting these from the 
total force, we are led to the conviction that 
there must have been an average of about one 
officer to every two men ; but even this enormous 
proportion of officers did not prevent the men 
from behaving badly in the presence of the 
enemy and getting sharply beaten, as will be re- 
lated presently. 

When the several companies composing this 
expedition were brought together, the line of 
march was taken toward Pensacola, with the pur- 
pose of encountering Peter McQueen and his 
force on their return. On the morning of July 
27th, 18 1 3, the advance scouts came in and re- 
ported that McQueen's force was encamped upon 
Burnt Corn Creek, just in advance of Caller's 



74 RED EAGLE. 

column, and that officer promptly determined U* 
attack them. 

Forming his men in line he advanced cautiously 
through the reeds until the Indian camp lay just 
below. Then, with a yell, the men dashed for- 
ward to the charge, and after a few moments' 
resistance the surprised and beaten Indians aban- 
doned their camp with its horses and its rich 
stores of ammunition and food, and fled precipi- 
tately to the creek, by which the camp was en- 
circled except upon the side from which the 
white men came. Dale, who was a born Indian 
fighter, Captain Dixon Bailey, and Captain 
Smoot — who were also resolute men and good 
officers, Bailey being an eduated half-breed — saw 
at a glance that to pursue the flying savages was 
to crush them utterly ; and they therefore led 
their men, some seventy-five or eighty in number, 
forward, and crowded the Indians as closely as 
possible. Had they been promptly supported, 
McQueen's force would have been utterly de- 
stroyed, and there might have been no Creek war 
or us to write and read about. Unluckily the 
other officers were less wise than Dale and Bailey 
andSmoot. When the Indians gave way and ran, 
leaving their camp with its pack-horses loaded 
with goods, the officers and men of the main 



THE BATTLE OF BURNT CORN. 75 

body supposed that their work was done. In- 
stead of joining in the pursuit, they broke their 
ranks, threw down their arms, and busied them- 
selves securing the plunder. 

Peter McQueen was a shrewd fellow in his 
way, and he was not long in discovering the 
weakness of the force which had followed him 
to the creek. Rallying his men he gave them 
battle, and began pressing them back. Colonel 
Caller, who was leading the advance, instead of 
ordering his main body to the front, as a more 
experienced officer would have done, determined 
to fall back upon them as a reserve. Dale, 
Smoot, and Bailey could have maintained their 
position while waiting for the reinforcements to 
come up, but when ordered to fall back upon the 
main body, their brave but untrained and inex- 
perienced men retreated rather hastily. The 
men of the main body, having broken ranks to 
plunder, were in no condition to resist panic, and 
seeing the advance companies retreating, with the 
yelling Indians at their heels, they fled precip- 
itately. Caller, Dale, Bailey, and Smoot tried 
to rally them, but succeeded only in getting 
eighty men into line. This small force, com- 
manded by their brave officers, made a desperate 
stand, and brought the advancing savages to a 



?6 RED EAGLE. 

halt. Dale was severely wounded, but ne fought 
on in spite of his suffering and his weakness. 
Finally, seeing that they were overmatched and 
that their comrades had abandoned them to their 
fate, the little band retreated, fighting as they 
went, until at last the Indians abandoned the 
pursuit. Some of the Americans went home, 
others became lost and were found, nearly dead 
with fatigue and starvation, about a fortnight 
later. 

Thus ended the battle of Burnt Corn. It was 
lost to the white men solely by the misconduct of 
officers and men, but that misconduct was the 
result of inexperience and a want of discipline, 
not of cowardice or any lack of manhood. 

The Indians were badly hurt. Their losses, 
though not known definitely, are known to have 
been greater than those of the whites, of whom 
only two were killed and fifteen wounded. They 
had lost their pack-horses, and nearly all the 
fruits of their journey to Pensacola, so that they 
were forced to return to that post to procure 
fresh supplies. 

The affair was a much more serious disaster to 
the whites, however, than at first appeared. The 
expedition had been undertaken for the purpose 
of destroying McQueen's party, and thereby in- 



THE BATTLE OF BURNT CORN. JJ 

timidating the war-inclined Creeks. In that it 
had utterly failed. The Creeks were victors, 
though they had suffered loss. Their victory en- 
couraged them, and their losses still further in- 
censed them. The war which before was threat- 
ened was now actually begun. The first battle 
had been fought, and others must follow of neces- 
sity. The Creeks believed themselves to be able 
to exterminate the whites, and they were now 
determined to do so. 

In this determination they were strengthened 
not merely by the general countenance given to 
them at Pensacola, but by very specific and 
urgent advice from the British and Spanish offi- 
cers there, who, as we learn from official doc- 
uments, urged the Creeks to make the war at 
once, saying : 

" If they [the Americans] prove too hard for 
you, send your women and children to Pensacola 
and we will send them to Havana ; and if you 
should be compelled to fly yourselves, and the 
Americans should prove too hard for both of us, 
there are vessels enough to take us all off 
together/' 



CHAPTER VII. 

RED EAGLE'S ATTEMPT TO ABANDON HIS 

PARTY. 

Red Eagle, as we have already related, was 
the most active and efficient leader of the war 
party during all the time of preparation. At last 
the war which he had so earnestly sought to bring 
about had come, but it had not come in the way 
in which he had hoped, and Red Eagle hesitated. 

In the first place the war had come too soon. 
Red Eagle was too shrewd and too well informed 
to believe the predictions of his prophets Sin- 
quista and Francis, who told the Creeks that 
if they would completely abandon those things 
which they had learned of the whites and become 
utter savages, not one of them should be killed in 
the war ; that the Great Spirit would rain down 
fire upon the whites, create quagmires in their 
path, cause the earth to open and swallow them, 
and draw charmed circles around the camps of 
the Creeks, into which no white man could come 
without immediately falling down dead. Like 
many another shrewd leader, Red Eagle was 



ATTEMPT TO ABANDON HIS PARTY. 79 

willing to make use of this sort of appeals to 
superstition, while he was himself unaffected by 
them. He saw clearly enough that the white 
men were strong, because he knew that their 
numbers and resources were not limited by what 
he could see. He knew that armies would come 
from other quarters of the country to aid the set- 
tlers on the Tombigbee River and in the Tensaw 
settlement. Therefore he did not wish to under- 
take what he knew would be a severe contest, 
single-handed. He wanted to wait until Tecum- 
seh, who had promised to return, should come ; 
he was disposed to wait also for the British to 
land a force somewhere on the coast before be- 
ginning the war. 

Moreover, his schemes and his advocacy 01 
war had been from the first founded upon his con- 
viction that the friendship of the Creeks and half- 
breeds in the lower towns for the whites would 
give way when they should see that the war was 
inevitable. He had sought to bring about a war 
in which the whole Creek nation should be united 
against the whites ; what he had brought about 
was a very different affair. He now saw that the 
friendliness of the people of the lower towns, 
who were his nearest friends and kinsmen, in- 
cluding his brother, Jack Weatherford, and his 



80 RED EAGLE. 

half-brother, David Tait, was much more firmly 
fixed than he had imagined. He had supposed 
that it was merely the indisposition of rich men 
to imperil their property by bringing on a state 
of war ; he now knew that it was a fixed purpose 
to remain at peace with the white men, and even 
to join them in fighting the Creeks whenever the 
war should come. If he had cherished a doubt 
of this so long, he had proof of it in the presence 
of some of these friends of his in the American 
force at the battle of Burnt Corn, whither they 
had gone as volunteers. 

All this put a totally different face upon mat- 
ters. Red Eagle was eager for a war between 
the Creeks and whites, but a war between a part 
of the Creeks on the one hand, and the rest of the 
Creeks with the whites on the other, a war in 
which he must fight his own brothers and his 
nearest friends, was a very different and much 
less attractive affair. 

There was still another cause of Red Eagle's 
hesitation at this time — perhaps a stronger cause 
than either of the others. He was in love, and 
his sweetheart was among the people whom he 
must fight if he fought at all. He was a rich 
planter, and lived at this time on a fine place near 
the Holy Ground, and being a young widower 



ATTEMPT TO ABANDON HIS PARTY. 8 1 

he had conceived a passionate fancy for one Lucy 
Cornells, a young girl of mixed Indian and white 
blood, who has been described by persons who 
knew her as very attractive and beautiful. How- 
ever that may be, it is certain that Red Eagle's 
devotion to her was profound. 

This girl's father, when McNac's discovery of 
the Indian plans spread consternation through 
the settlements, fled with his daughter to the 
Tensaw country and took refuge in Fort Mims ; 
and Red Eagle had thus a sweetheart added to 
the list of persons near and dear to him, whose 
lives he must put in danger if he went to war. 
Anticipating the events of this history somewhat, 
it may as well be added here that Red Eagle's 
love for this maiden prompted him, when he was 
about to attack Fort Mims, to give secret warn- 
ing to her father, as is believed upon evidence 
accepted at the time as satisfactory. Cornells 
left the fort before the attack, and although he 
remained with the whites and fought with them 
in the war, Red Eagle was permitted to carry off 
his daughter to the nation. 

Let us return to the time of which we write in 
this chapter. All these things were strong in- 
ducements to Red Eagle to abandon his warlike 
purposes, but it was now too late for him to stilf 



82 RED EAGLE. 

the storm he had raised. Had he now preached 
peace among his warlike followers, his life would 
not have been worth a day's purchase. 

He kept his own counsel, and in his perplexity 
determined, about the time of the battle of Burnt 
Corn, to seek the advice of his brother, Jack 
Weatherford, and his half-brother, David Tait. 
Making his way to their places on Little River, 
he laid the whole case before his relatives. They 
advised him secretly to remove his family, his 
negroes, and so much of his live-stock as might 
be, to their plantations, which lay within the 
friendly district, and, quitting the nation, to re- 
main quietly with them until the troubles should 
come to an end, taking no part in the war on 
either side. 

After reflecting upon the matter, Red Eagle 
determined to act upon this advice ; and thus the 
Creeks were very near losing the services of that 
chieftain whose genius alone enabled them to 
maintain their w^r with any hope of success. 
When Red Eagl? returned to his plantation to 
put this plan into operation, however, he found 
that it was now to/ late. Knowing at least some 
of the reasons thez chief had for abandoning his 
support of their canse, some of the hostile Creeks 
had visited his house in his absence, and had 



ATTEMPT TO ABANDON HIS PARTY. 83 

seized upon his children and his negroes, holding 
them as hostages for his fidelity. They plainly 
told him of their doubts of him, and threatened 
to kill his children if he should falter for a 
moment. 

There was nothing left for him to do but yield 
to his fate, and boldly lead his men to battle 
against the foes whom he cordially hated. His 
Rubicon was crossed, his die was cast, and there 
was no possibility of retreat. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE. 

If Weatherford was at last ready to enter upon 
the long-contemplated war, so too the white 
people at last began to understand that their 
hopes of a reconciliation of some kind with the 
Creeks were delusive, and they began to take 
measures for their defence. Even yet, however, 
they seem to have had no adequate conception of 
the real nature and extent of the storm that was 
brewing. Their measures of defence were not 
proportioned to the need, were not of the right 
kind, except in part, and were carried forward 
lazily, listlessly, and apparently with a deep- 
seated conviction that, after all, the making of 
preparation might be a useless waste of labor in 
anticipation of a danger which might never come. 

There can be little doubt that if these people 
had fully understood their own situation they 
could and would have saved themselves by adopt- 
ing a vigorous offensive policy from the outset. 
Colonel Caller's expedition to Burnt Corn was a 
type and example of what they ought to have 



CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE. 85 

attempted. They should have struck the first 
blows, and should have followed them up as 
rapidly as possible. If they had understood their 
own situation they would probably have done 
this. They would have organized the whole 
population into an army, and if they had done 
this they might almost certainly have conquered 
a peace with comparatively small loss to them- 
selves before Weatherford had time to bring his 
roving parties together for the contest. 

Instead of this, however, the only attempt that 
was made to meet hostility half-way — the Burnt 
Corn expedition — ended in failure, and the men 
who had undertaken it dispersed to their homes. 
It was now too late for a policy of offensive de- 
fence. The battle of Burnt Corn was followed 
by an immediate concentration of the hostile 
Creeks, and the most that could be done by the 
whites to avert the threatened destruction was to 
fortify certain central posts and send messengers 
for assistance. 

The method of fortifying was the same in all 
cases, with such variations of detail as the na- 
ture of the ground, the number of men engaged 
in the construction of the works, and the other 
circumstances of each case rendered necessary. 
In general plan the so-called forts were nearly 



86 RED EAGLE. 

square, the most elaborate of them being con- 
structed upon the plan of Fort Mims, which is 
represented on another page. Whatever their 
form was, they were made of timbers set on end 
in the ground, as close together as possible, form- 
ing a close and high wall, pierced with port-holes 
for the use of riflemen. Heavy gates were pro- 
vided, and within the inclosure strong block- 
houses were built, in which a stout resistance 
could be made even after the outer works should 
be carried. 

There were more than a score of these forts in 
different parts of the settlements. In that part 
of the peninsula formed by the Alabama and 
Tombigbee rivers which now constitutes Clarke 
County, Alabama, there were stockades built, 
which were known as Fort Glass, Fort Sinque- 
field, etc., each taking its name from the owner 
of the place fortified. 

Into these forts the people now began to flock 
in anticipation of a general outbreak ; and they 
were none too soon, as Weatherford had already 
collected his men in considerable numbers. The 
principal fort was on the plantation of one Samuel 
Mims, a rich Indian or man of mixed blood, who 
lived on the little lake called Tensaw, or Tensas, 
as it is now sometimes spelled on the maps, which 



CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE. 8/ 

lies within about a mile of the Alabama River, a 
few miles above the confluence of that river with 
the Tombigbee. Mims's place was near the high- 
road which led to Mims's ferry, and hence was 
a natural centre of the neighborhood. 

Mims and his neighbors, with the help of a 
number of half-breed refugees from the Creek 
nation, constructed there a large stockade fort- 
ress, and the people of the surrounding country, 
white, black, red, and mixed, congregated there 
for safety. 

Meantime the appearance of a British fleet oft 
the coast had awakened the government to the 
danger in which Mobile lay, and on the 28th of 
June, 181 3, Brigadier-General Ferdinand L. Clai- 
borne, a distinguished soldier who had won a 
fine reputation in the Indian wars of the North- 
west, was ordered, with what force he had, to 
march from the post of Baton Rouge to Fort 
Stoddard, a military station on the Mobile River, 
not far below the confluence of the Alabama and 
Tombigbee rivers. 

Upon receiving this order General Claiborne 
made application for the necessary funds and sup- 
plies, but the quartermaster could put no more 
than two hundred dollars into his army chest — 
a sum wholly inadequate to the purpose. But 



88 RED EAGLE. 

Claiborne was not a man to permit small obstacles 
to interfere with affairs of importance. He bor- 
rowed the necessary funds upon his personal 
credit, giving a mortgage upon his property as 
security, and boldly set out with his little army. 
It is worth while to note in passing that, in con- 
sequence of the loss of vouchers for his expendi- 
tures upon the expedition, General Claiborne's 
patriotic act cost him the whole amount bor- 
rowed, his property being sold after his death, as 
we learn from a note in Pickett's History of 
Alabama, to satisfy the mortgage. 

Arriving at Fort Stoddard with his army of 
seven hundred men on the thirtieth day of July, 
General Claiborne at once sought the fullest and 
most trustworthy information to be had with re- 
spect to the condition of the country, the forces 
and designs of the Indians, and the strength and 
situation of the various forts. 

Having thus made himself master of the con- 
ditions of the problem which he was set to solve, 
he distributed his forces and the volunteers who 
were at command, among the various stockade 
posts in such a way as to give the best protection 
he could to every part of the country. 

To Fort Mims he sent Major Beasley, with one 
hundred and seventy-five men, who, with seventy 



CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE. 89 

militiamen already there, swelled the force at that 
post to two hundred and forty -five fighting men. 
Major Beasley, upon taking command, organized 
his raw troops into something resembling a bat- 
talion, and strengthened the fort by erecting a 
second line of picketing outside the original gates. 

Believing the post to be strong enough to spare 
a part of the force under his command, Major 
Beasley sent detachments to various other and 
weaker posts, acting upon the principle of pro- 
tecting all points, which had governed General 
Claiborne. 

Besides the troops, who were simply all the 
men in the fort, every man capable of shooting 
a gun being enrolled as a soldier, there were 
women and children at Fort Mims, who had fled 
thither from the country for protection, so that 
the total number of persons there exceeded five 
hundred ; the exact number is differently stated 
by different writers, but the most trustworthy 
account, drawn from several original sources, 
places the population of the place at five hundred 
and fifty-three souls. The lives of all these 
people were committed to the keeping of Major 
Beasley, who was clothed with ample authority, 
and free from embarrassing dictation or interfer- 
ence of any kind. His fort was a strong one, 



90 RED EAGLE. 

and in sending away some of his men to assist the 
garrisons of other posts he himself testified that 
the force which remained was sufficient for the 
need. His failure to use these means effectually 
for the protection of the lives over which he was 
set as guardian was clearly inexcusable, and al- 
though he bravely sacrificed his own life in an 
attempt to retrieve his fault, he could do nothing 
to undo its terrible consequences. His fault was 
not cowardice, but a lack of caution, an utter and 
inexcusable lack of that prudence and foresight 
which are as indispensable in a commander as 
personal courage itself. 

It appears that alarms were frequent in the 
fort, as was to be expected in a place full of 
women and children, credulous negroes, and 
excited militiamen. These alarms Beasley re- 
ported to General Claiborne, and in doing so he 
probably gave that capable and experienced 
officer some hint of his own lack of prudence. 
At any rate, General Claiborne thought it neces- 
sary to issue a general order to Major Beasley, 
directing him to strengthen his works, use caution 
in the conduct of affairs, and neglect no means of 
making the safety of the fort certain. The order 
ended with this significant sentence : " To re- 
spect an enemy and prepare in the best possible 



CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE 91 

way to meet him, is the certain means to insure 
success. " All the work done by Major Beasley 
to strengthen the works was done in obedience 
to special orders from Claiborne, and even what 
he specifically ordered done appears to have been 
done only in part. He directed Major Beasley, 
for one thing, to build two additional block- 
houses, but that officer contented himself with 
beginning to build one, which was never finished. 

With matters in Fort Mims, and the results of 
Major Beasley' s management there, we shall have 
to do in another chapter. We have first to look 
at the general situation of affairs as they stood 
during August, 18 13, before Weatherford — for by 
that name, rather than Red Eagle, he is known 
to the history of what followed — struck his first 
tremendous blow. 

Weatherford had collected his men in the 
upper towns, and was now moving down the 
river, managing his advance very skilfully, after 
the manner of regularly educated military men. 
In small affairs the Indian general followed the 
tactics of his race, depending upon cunning and 
silent creeping for the concealment of his move- 
ments, but he was too able an officer to fall into 
the mistake of supposing that an army could be 
advanced in this way for a long distance in 



92 RED EAGLE. 

secret. He knew that his movements would be 
watched very closely and promptly reported. 
He therefore resorted to strategy — or rather to 
sound methods of grand tactics — as a means of 
concealing, not the fact that he was advancing, 
but the real direction and objective point of his 
advance. He moved southward, taking care to 
make demonstrations upon his flank which were 
calculated to deceive his enemy. He threatened 
the settlements in the peninsula, and constantly 
kept up a front of observation in a direction dif- 
ferent from that in which his main body was 
actually moving. In this way he managed to ad- 
vance to McGirth's plantation, on the Alabama 
River, in the neighborhood of the place where 
the town of Claiborne now stands, without re^ 
vealing the purpose of his advance, and as this 
halting point was one at which his presence 
seemed to threaten an attack upon Fort Glass, 
Fort Sinquefield, and the other posts in what is 
now Clarke County, his real purpose was still 
effectually concealed. 

Meantime General Claiborne was not disposed 
to lie still and permit his wily adversary to deter- 
mine the course of the campaign. We said in the 
beginning of this chapter that by a timely resort 
to offensive measures the settlers might have 



CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE. 93 

verted a general war. It was now General 
Claiborne's opinion that with the troops at com- 
mand a policy of this kind offered even yet the 
best prospect of success. Even before he had 
finished his defensive preparations he planned an 
offensive campaign, which he was confident of his 
ability to execute, while he was equally confident 
that its execution would save a very much severer 
effort in future. 

On the 2d of August, 181 3, he wrote to his com- 
manding general, explaining the situation, and 
adding these words : 

' ' If you will authorize my entering the Creek 
nation, I will do so in ten days after the junction 
of the Seventh Regiment, and if I am not disap- 
pointed, will give to our frontiers peace, and to 
the government any portion of the Creek country 
they please. Some force ought to enter the 
nation before they systematize and are fully pre- 
pared for war. With one thousand men and 
your authority to march immediately, I pledge 
myself to burn any town in the Creek nation. 
Three months hence it might be difficult for three 
thousand to effect what can be done with a third 
of the number at present. They gain strength, 
and their munitions of war enlarge every day. ' ' 

How accurately General Claiborne estimated 



94 RED eagli; 

the difficulties which delay would produce will 
be abundantly seen as we follow the course of the 
campaign. There can be little reasonable doubt 
that the blow which this gallant and enterprising 
officer wished to strike then would have saved 
many hundreds of lives on both sides, if he had 
been permitted to carry his plan into effect ; but 
there was a difficulty in the way — the Creeks had 
not yet openly attacked the white settlements 
beyond their border, and until they did so the 
commanding general had no authority to permit 
his troops to invade the nation. 



CHAPTER IX. 

RED EAGLE BEFORE FORT MIMS 

Now that it was determined that General 
Claiborne should not invade the Creek country 
and crush Weatherford before that chieftain's 
forces should be fully gathered and fully armed, 
there was nothing for General Claiborne to do 
but wait the attack of his Indian adversary with 
what patience he could, taking care to neglect no 
precaution which might help to secure safety. 
He visited all the forts one after another, in- 
spected them, and gave minute and careful in- 
structions for their strengthening, everywhere 
cautioning their commanders to beware of sur- 
prise, and to avoid the danger of falling into care- 
less habits. He knew the Indians well, and knew 
that they would seek with great care to make 
their first attack unexpectedly, and also that they 
would bring as heavy a force as possible to bear 
upon the point of attack. He knew the temper 
of the militiamen too, and seems to have speci- 
ally feared that they would be lulled into a dan- 



96 RED EAGLE. 

gerous feeling of security by delay and by re- 
peated false alarms. 

Against all of these dangers this thoroughly 
capable commander continually cautioned his sub- 
ordinate officers to whom he committed the com- 
mand of the several forts. Had his warnings 
been duly heeded, a result far different from that 
which we shall have to record would have fol- 
lowed. 

Having delivered his orders, General Claiborne 
went to the most exposed point, a small fort 
about sixty miles further into the Indian country, 
confidently believing that Red Eagle would make 
his first attack there, with a view of freeing the 
country of white men before making a decided 
advance against any of the forts near the conflu- 
ence of the two rivers. In this he erred, as the 
event showed, but the error was one which no 
foresight or judgment could have avoided. Red 
Eagle was a bold and a shrewd warrior, and 
when he was free to choose his time and place of 
attack, as he was at this time, it was simply im- 
possible to conjecture with accuracy where or 
when he would strike. He was like the light- 
ning, dealing his blows without a hint, in advance, 
of their object. General Claiborne having no 
means of ascertaining what his adversary would 



RED EAGLE BEFORE FORT MIMS. g? 

do, and no chance to guess, simply went to the 
front as a brave commander should. 

Meantime Major Beasley soon began to neglect 
proper precautions. He left the new blockhouse 
and the new line of picketing unfinished, although 
he had idle men in plenty who could have com- 
pleted them with very little effort. The accounts 
which have been given of the life in the fort indi- 
cate that the commander was utterly wanting in 
the first qualification of an officer for command 
— namely, a due regard for discipline. He had 
raw troops under his command — troops whose 
efficiency as soldiers would have been more than 
doubled during those days of inaction and wait- 
ing if daily or twice daily drills had been ordered 
and anything like discipline or military order 
maintained. That a commander intrusted with 
the charge of so important a fort, especially with 
the lives of so many helpless women and children 
committed to his care, should have neglected so 
good an opportunity to convert his raw recruits 
into drilled and disciplined soldiers, would 
scarcely be credible if the fact were not fully at- 
tested. 

Instead of improving the precious days of wait- 
ing in this way, Major Beasley wholly relaxed 
the reins of discipline. The men gave themselves 



98 RED EAGLE. 

up to roystering, card-playing, and uproarious 
fun-making. 

About this time a negro, whom Weatherford 
had captured near McGirth's plantation, escaped, 
and, making his way to Fort Mims, informed 
Major Beasley of the whereabouts of the Indian 
force, telling him also that the Indian chieftain 
had made careful inquiries about this particular 
fort, its strength, the number of persons in it, 
and other details, his anxiety about which indi- 
cated his purpose to attack the post. Major 
Beasley sent out scouting parties ; but as they 
discovered no Indians in the neighborhood he 
appears immediately to have relapsed into his 
former state of listlessness. He did not respect 
his enemy, as Claiborne had so earnestly warned 
him to do. The men, calling the negro from 
McGirth's plantation a liar, returned to their 
frolics and their idleness. 

Red Eagle, wiser than his enemy, respected 
him, and advanced so cautiously that he actually 
placed his army within striking distance of the 
fort without Beasley' s knowledge, and concealed 
his men so adroitly that Beasley' s scouting par- 
ties failed to discover them. Beasley was as 
brave a man as Red Eagle, but Red Eagle had 
the other qualities of a soldier — sagacity, caution, 



RED EAGLE BEFORE FORT MIMS. 99 

tireless watchfulness — which Beasley lacked ; in 
a contest between the two as commanders, Red 
Eagle was Beasley' s master. One day, while 
Red Eagle was thus hovering about the fort, 
watching it as a cat watches its prey, two 
negroes, who had been guarding some cattle, ran 
in great terror to the fort, and reported that they 
had seen Indians in the immediate neighborhood. 
Major Beasley at once sent a body of horsemen 
under command of Captain Middleton to ascer- 
tain the facts of the case. Captain Middleton, 
accompanied by the negroes, went to the spot 
where they said they had seen the savages ; find- 
ing no Indians there, Captain Middleton, who 
appears to have thought that Indians are like 
trees, staying in one place, returned to the fort 
and reported that a false alarm had been given. 
The poor negroes were denounced as liars, and 
one of them was flogged for having given a false 
alarm. The other was saved for a while by the 
intercession of his master, but he was afterward 
arraigned again, his master's consent having been 
gained by Major Beasley's threat to expel him 
and his family from the fort if he persisted in his 
refusal ; and it is upon record that when the fort 
was attacked the negro was standing tied, and 
awaiting his flogging. 



IOO RED EAGLE 

This incident is mentioned here in illustration 
of the unaccountable folly of Major Beasley. 
The writers who have recorded the facts of this 
officer's behavior have touched them as lightly as 
possible, sparing him probably because he fought 
manfully and fell at his post at last ; but it is im- 
possible to regard his conduct with any thing like 
respect or even patience. His carelessness was 
a crime, and history must condemn it as such. 
Charged with the duty of defending an import- 
ant post, he neglected the most essential measures 
of defence ; intrusted with the lives of more than 
five hundred persons, he carelessly, criminally, 
permitted them to be butchered. We have 
already seen that he neglected discipline in the 
fort ; he neglected also to surround the fort, as 
he should have done, with a cordon of picket- 
guards, who might have been so placed that 
ample warning would have been given of the 
approach of the enemy. Instead of that, he 
actually subjected the negroes who gave warning 
to ignominious punishment, and, most incredible 
thing of all, permitted the gates of the fort to stand 
open until the accumulation of sand at their base 
rendered it impossible to shut them promptly , 

The alarm given by the negroes was given on 
the 29th day of August. The next morning the 



RED EAGLE BEFORE FORT MIMS. IOI 

negro who had been flogged was again sent out 
to guard the cattle, and his companion was de- 
tained to receive his punishment. 

Meantime Red Eagle lay within a few hundred 
yards of the fort, at the head of a thousand war- 
riors. While Major Beasley was using his 
authority to compel the negro's master to consent 
to the infliction of the penalty, Red Eagle and his 
men were quietly watching the fort, looking in at 
the open gate and making ready to destroy the 
garrison. The negro who had been whipped 
again saw the Indians, he being where a picket- 
guard ought to have been ; but he was afraid to 
report the fact lest he should be whipped again, 

and so between his fear of the Indians on the 
one hand and of Major Beasley's peculiar notions 

of discipline on the other, the poor fellow de- 
termined to flee to another fort, two or three 
miles east of Fort Mims. No alarm was given, 
therefore. Nobody in the fort suspected Red 
Eagle's presence or prepared to meet his assault. 
Nobody shut the gate. Nobody did any thing, in 
short, which ought to have been done, or any 
thing which indicated that this was a fort, or that 
its commander knew that a war existed or was 
likely to exist anywhere on earth. Worst of all, 
Red Eagle lay there watching his prey like a 



102 RED EAGLE. 

tiger, and seeing just how matters stood. The 
able commander of the red men knew his business 
and attended to it. His plan was formed, his 
men were ready, and he only awaited the coming 
of the right moment to spring upon his unsus- 
pecting prey. It was nearly noon, and it was the 
most critical hour of the war. 



CHAPTER X. 

THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. 

The accounts of what followed, which are 
given in the various books that treat the subject, 
are for the most part very meagre, and upon one 
or two points of minor importance they conflict 
with each other. Luckily, we have one account 
which is much more minute than any other, and 
at the same time is entirely trustworthy. This 
account is found in Mr. A. J. Pickett's History 
of Alabama, a work remarkable for the diligence 
of research upon which it is founded, the author 
having been at great pains to gather details from 
the survivors of the various historical events of 
which he writes. Mr. Pickett had access to the 
private papers of General Claiborne, and to 
several survivors of the Fort Mims affair, and 
from these sources he gathered a mass of particu- 
lars which no other writer upon the subject had 
within reach. In writing here of the affair, we 
must depend mainly upon Mr. Pickett's pages for 
all matters of detail. 

We left Red Eagle at the head of his men, 



104 RED EAGLE. 

within a short distance of the fort, quietly con- 
templating it. His prey was apparently within 
his grasp and his men were ready, but still Red 
Eagle waited, repressing the eagerness of his fol- 
lowers sternly. The people in the fort were 
singing, playing games, and occupying them- 
selves in every way but the soldierly one. They 
were not on the alert — they were completely off 
their guard. Apparently the time had come to 
strike, but Red Eagle knew his business, and 
waited. He knew that to take a stockade fort- 
ress without the aid of artillery he must surprise 
the garrison completely, and this was what he 
sought to do by delay. 

Noon came, and with it came the drum for din- 
ner. That was the signal Red Eagle had been 
waiting for. It was not enough that the garrison 
should be listlessly off guard. Red Eagle wished 
them to be occupied with something else, and 
now they were going to dinner. Giving them 
time enough collect for that purpose, the Indian 
commander advanced his line, doing so quietly, 
contrary to the Indian habit. He was de- 
termined to make the surprise as complete as 
possible. In this way the Indian line, running 
rapidly forward, reached a point within thirty 
yards of the open gates before their approach 



THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. IC>5 

was discovered by anybody within. Then the 
few men who happened to be near enough made 
an attempt to close the gate ; but it was too late, 
even if the accumulated sand at its foot had not 
prevented. The Indians rushed in pell-mell, and 
almost in the instant of discovering their presence 
Major Beasley learned that they were already 
within the outer lines of his defensive works. 

Luckily there was a second line of picketing at 
this point, partly completed, which prevented the 
immediate passage of the Indians to all parts of 
the fort, and gave the whites a defensive work 
from which to fight their foes. Major Beasley 
was at last awake to the reality of the danger of 
which Claiborne had warned him repeatedly, his 
last warning having come in a letter which Beas- 
ley had received only the day before, and to 
which he had replied that he was prepared to 
repel the attack of any force which might come 
against his fortress. If he had scorned this 
danger culpably, and had neglected to provide 
against it as he should have done, he at least 
did what a brave man could to repel it, now 
that it had come. He was among the first to 
confront the enemy, and among the first to fall, 
mortally wounded. He rejected all offers of 
assistance and refused to be carried into the 



106 RED EAGLE. 

interior of the fort, preferring to remain where 
he was to animate the troops by his presence and 
to direct their operations. He continued thus to 
command them until the breath left his body. 

The fighting was terrible. It was not two 
bodies of troops struggling for possession of some 
strategic point, but a horde of savages battling 
with a devoted band of white men in a struggle 
the only issue of which was death. The savages 
fought not to conquer but to kill the whites, every 
one, women and children as well as men ; and the 
whites fought with the desperation of doomed 
men whose only chance of life was in victory. It 
was hand-to-hand fighting, too. It was fighting 
with knives and tomahawks and clubbed guns. 
Men grappled with each other, to relinquish their 
hold only in death. 

Several Indian prophets were among the first 
of the savages to fall, and for a time their death 
spread consternation among their followers. 
These prophets had confidently told the Indians 
that their sacred bodies were invulnerable ; that 
the bullets of white men would split upon them, 
doing no harm. When they went down before 
the first volley, therefore, the utter failure of 
their prophecy caused the Indians to lose faith in 
the cause, and they were ready like children to 



THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. IO/ 

abandon it in their fright. Red Eagle was a man 
of different mettle. He had used these wretched 
false prophets to aid him in stirring the enthusi- 
asm of the Creeks, but he had never believed 
their silly pretences. With such a commander 
the Creeks soon recovered their courage, and the 
fight went on. 

Although Weatherford had gained a great 
advantage by his tactics of surprise and sudden 
onset, his task was still a very arduous one. He 
had possession of the outer gates, but the whites 
were still intrenched, and he must dislodge them 
- — an undertaking which subjected him to heavy 
loss of men. Everybody within the fort who 
could shoot a gun or strike a blow with axe or 
club was engaged in the fight. Weatherford, 
like the general of real genius that he was, sent 
some of his men to threaten the other sides of the 
fort, thereby compelling the whites to distribute 
their force all around the inclosure, and thus to 
weaken the defence at the main point of attack. 
Captain Middleton had charge of the eastern 
side, and fell at his post. Captain Jack fought 
desperately on the southern face, and Lieutenant 
Randon on the west. Fortunately — if we may 
call any thing fortunate about an affair which 
ended in utter misfortune — the northern face of 



108 RED EAGLE. 

the fort, against which Weatherford hurled his 
men in greatest numbers and with greatest des- 
peration, was defended by Captain Dixon Bailey, 
a man of mixed blood, who, it will be remem- 
bered, distinguished himself in the battle of Burnt 
Corn, and who seems to have had some of the 
qualities of an able commander. He saw and 
tried to make use of one chance of success. He 
knew and told his men that the force of an Indian 
attack was greatest in its beginning ; that unless 
success crowned their efforts Indians were apt 
to weary of their work after a little while. He 
urged his followers, therefore, to fight with de- 
termination and with hope. He urged every 
non-combatant who could do so to join in the 
defence, and even some of the women did so. 
His judgment of the Indian character was right, 
and it was presently vindicated by the conduct of 
the savages, who relaxed their efforts to take the 
fort, and began making off with what plunder 
they could secure. But Red Eagle was there ; 
and his presence was a factor for which Captain 
Bailey had not made due allowance. Riding 
after the retreating bands he quickly drove them 
back, and stimulated his forces to renewed exer- 
tions of the most desperate character. 

Then Captain Bailey saw that his hope had 



THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. IO9 

been made vain by the resolution of this com- 
mander and by his genius for controlling men. 
It was now three o'clock, and the battle had 
lasted three hours. Captain Bailey seeing no 
chance for its cessation by the failure of savage 
determination, resolved to abandon the defences, 
and marching boldly out, attempt to cut a way 
through Red Eagle's hosts to Fort Pierce, a few 
miles distant. From this attempt he was re- 
strained only by force. 

The savages were now steadily gaining ground. 
One point after another was abandoned by the 
whites, whose numbers were rapidly diminishing. 
The savages fell as fast as the whites did, or even 
faster, but as they greatly outnumbered their 
entrenched foes they could afford this. Deduct- 
ing the women and children from the whole num- 
ber of people in the fort, it will be seen that the 
savages — whose force was estimated variously at 
from one thousand to fifteen hundred fighting 
men — outnumbered the fighting men of the fort 
at least three to one, and perhaps even as greatly 
as six or seven to one. With the fall of each 
white man, therefore, the relative superiority of 
the Indians was increased, even though two or 
three of the assailants should fall at the same 
time. 



IIO RED EAGLE. 

Little by little the fort yielded. From one 
defensive point to another the various bands of 
white men were driven, fighting as they went, 
and contesting every inch of the assailants' ad- 
vance. Two brothers of Captain Dixon Bailey, 
James and Daniel Bailey, went with some other 
men into Mims's house, and piercing the roof 
with portholes did excellent work upon bodies of 
savages who were protected by barriers of vari- 
ous kinds against the fire of men on the ground. 
To silence their fire some of the Indians shot 
burning arrows into the shingles of the house and 
succeeded in setting it on fire. They also fired 
several other buildings, and the poor people who 
still remained alive were now driven to their last 
place of refuge, a small inclosure around the 
loom house, called in the fort the bastion. From 
every quarter the warning cry ' To the 
bastion !" went up, and very soon the small in- 
closure was so full of people that there was 
scarcely room for any one to move. Meantime 
the fire was gaining on every hand. Around the 
burning houses demoniac savages danced and 
shrieked and howled, while the women and chil- 
dren within the burning buildings could do noth- 
ing but wring their hands and commit themselves 



THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. Ill 

to heaven while awaiting certain and horrible de- 
struction. 

Red Eagle was a soldier, not a butcher ; and 
now that his victory was secure he sought to stop 
the bloodshed and spare the lives of the helpless 
people who remained ; he called upon his war- 
riors to desist and to receive the survivors as 
prisoners, but the yelling savages would not listen 
to him. He attempted to assert his authority 
and compel them to stop the carnage, but the 
authority which he was able to wield in setting 
these savages on, failed utterly when he tried to 
call them off. When he thus sought to save the 
lives of white men and women and children, his 
followers remembered that he had not long before 
tried to withdraw altogether from the war, and 
with loud shrieks of anger they now turned upon 
him, threatening to put him to death if he should 
further plead for mercy. He could do nothing 
but submit, and turn away in horror from the 
sight of the brutal slaughter which he had made 
possible. Mounting his superb black horse he 
rode away, resolved to have at least no personal 
share in the horrible butchery. 

The few remaining people in the fort were now 
shut up in a slaughter-pen. A few of them cut 
a hole through the outer picketing and made a 



112 RED EAGLE. 

dash for life. Of these about twenty escaped in 
different directions, and in one way or another 
managed after many hardships to reach other 
forts. All the rest of the people in the fort were 
butchered, except a few negroes kept by the 
savages as slaves, and one half-breed family, of 
whom we shall hear more presently. 

The persons who escaped by flight were Dr. 
Thomas G. Holmes, a negro woman named 
Hester, a friendly Indian named Socca, Lieuten- 
ant Peter Randon, Josiah Fletcher, Sergeant 
Matthews, Martin Rigdon, Samuel Smith, a half- 
breed, Joseph Perry, Jesse Steadham, Edward 
Steadham, John Horen, Lieutenant W. R. Cham- 
bers, two men named Mourrice and Jones, and 
some others whose names have not come down 
to us. 

Thus ended the battle of Fort Mims, in some 
respects the most remarkable battle between 
Indians and white men of which history any- 
where tells us. It had lasted for five hours 
without cessation, a most unusual thing in Indian 
warfare, which consists chiefly of sudden onsets 
that are not long persisted in if stoutly resisted. 
At Fort Mims the assault was kept up, in the face 
of desperate resistance, from noon until nearly 
sunset — a persistence due solely to the fact that 



THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMS. 11$ 

the savages were for once commanded by a real 
soldier, who possessed the qualities of an able and 
determined general. The Indians here, as every- 
where else, were disposed after a while, as has 
been said, to relinquish their purpose and content 
themselves with what they had accomplished in 
the way of destruction, but, as we have seen, 
Red Eagle sternly drove them back into battle, 
and succeeded in carrying the fort. If there 
were nothing else in his career to prove his title 
to respect as a really able military man, his man 
agement of this Fort Mims affair would suffi 
ciently establish his claim. 



CHAPTER XL 

ROMANTIC INCIDENTS OF THE FORT 
MIMS AFFAIR. 

It was Dr. Thomas G. Holmes who planned 
the sortie by which the persons named in the last 
chapter made their escape. He cut the hole 
through the picketing and headed the desperate 
charge, which was opposed by a thick line of sav- 
ages who, anticipating some such attempt, had 
placed themselves in position along a fence for 
the purpose of making escape impossible. It is 
indeed a marvel that anybody should have suc- 
ceeded in breaking through their line and reach- 
ing the woods beyond. Dr. Holmes had his 
clothes riddled with bullets as he ran, but he 
managed to reach the thick woods unhurt, and 
there concealed himself in the hole made by the 
uprooting of a large tree. Remaining thus hid- 
den until night, he was not discovered by any of 
the bands of Indians who beat the bushes in every 
direction, bent upon leaving no white man of 
friendly Indian alive. After night he had in- 
tended to make his escape under cover of dark- 



INCIDENTS OF THE FORT MIMS AFFAIR. 115 

ness from the neighborhood, but the light from 
burning buildings prevented this until midnight, 
when, by careful creeping, he made his way with- 
out discovery, among the camp-fires of the sleep- 
ing savages, who now rested from their bloody 
toil. As Dr. Holmes could not swim, it was 
impossible for him to cross the river to the forts 
and settlements there, and hence he wandered 
about in the swamp for five days, living upon 
roots and other such things, until finally, almost 
famished, he emerged from the cane-brakes and 
sought the highlands, really caring very little in 
his desperation whether he should fall into the 
hands of friends or foes. Coming upon some 
horses which were tied, and finding that they 
belonged to white men who were somewhere 
near, he fired his gun to attract their attention ; 
but unluckily it alarmed them, and they fled to 
the river and hid themselves, remaining there for 
two days and nights. Left thus alone, Holmes 
went to a house in the neighborhood, and 
succeeded in catching some chickens, which in his 
ravenous hunger he ate raw. He was finally 
discovered by a white man, the owner of the 
place, and taken to a place of safety. Many 
years afterward he related the story of his ad- 



Il6 RED EAGLE. 

ventures to Mr. Pickett, from whose pages wc 
have condensed it. 

Lieutenant Chambliss was twice severely 
wounded in his flight, but reached the friendly 
woods at last and concealed himself in a heap of 
logs, meaning to make his way to a place of safety 
as soon as night should fall. About dark, how- 
ever, a roving band of the savages surrounded 
the log heap, and to the dismay of poor Cham- 
bliss, set fire to it. His position was terrible. 
The fire rapidly ate into the pile, and to remain 
there was to be roasted alive, while any attempt 
to come out would be met, of course, by imme- 
diate destruction with knife or tomahawk. The 
fire was now scorching him, but he lay still, en- 
during it as long as it was possible to suffer in 
silence. Just as it became absolutely necessary 
for him to withdraw, he was delighted to see the 
Indians, who had now lighted their pipes, walking 
away. Silently, in order that the savages might 
not hear him, he crept out of the burning pile 
and concealed himself more effectually elsewhere. 
Wounded and famishing he wandered about for 
awhile, managing at last to reach Mount Vernon. 

The most romantic incident of this terrible 
affair remains to be told. Zachariah McGirth, 



INCIDENTS OF THE FORT MIMS AFFAIR. II7 

with his half-breed wife and his children, was one 
of the inmates of Fort Mims until the day of the 
massacre. On the morning of that day, a few 
hours before the attack was made, he left the 
fort, intending to visit his plantation at a point 
higher up on the Alabama River. Leaving his 
family in the fort he went to the river, accom- 
panied by some negroes, and began his journey 
in a boat. He had gone but a few miles when 
the sound of the firing at the fort reached his, 
ears, and he thus learned that the attack had 
come. Anxious about the fate of his wife and 
children, he turned back, and secreting himself in 
the woods, passed the long afternoon in a state of 
the most terrible suspense. When the sound of 
musketry at last died away, the great volumes of 
smoke revealed to him the fact — horrible in its 
significance to him — that the savages had tri- 
umphed. Desperate now with distress, he hid 
the negroes and boldly went to the scene of the 
slaughter, not caring whether tie Indians had left 
or not. Finding no savages there, but seeing 
heaps of the slain everywhere, he summoned his 
negroes and began a search for the bodies of his 
wife and children. They were nowhere to be 
found, and McGirth was forced to conclude that 



Il8 RED EAGLE. 

his family were among those who had been 
burned in the buildings. 

As a matter of fact, McGirth's wife and chil- 
dren were the half-breed family who had been 
spared, as related in the preceding chapter. 
There was a young warrior among Weatherford's 
men who, many years before, when he was an 
orphan and hungry, had been tenderly cared for 
by McGirth's wife, and during the horrible 
slaughter at Fort Mims this young warrior hap- 
pened to recognize the woman who had be- 
friended him in his time of sorest need. To save 
her and her children he had to tell his comrades 
that he wished to make them his slaves, and 
under this pretence he carried them to his home 
in the nation. 

McGirth knew nothing of this, of course, and 
as he had very tenderly loved his family, he now 
became entirely reckless of danger, not caring to 
live, but being desperately bent upon doing all 
that he could for the destruction of the Creeks, 
who, as he believed, had bereft him of his wife 
and his children. He became the most daring 
scout and express rider in the American service, 
making the most perilous journeys, shrinking from 
no danger, and many times serving the Ameri- 
can cause when nobody else could be found to 



INCIDENTS OF THE FORT MIMS AFFAIR. 1 19 

perform the important duties which he under- 
took. One day, several months after the massa- 
cre at Fort Mims, McGirth was in Mobile, when 
some one came to him with a message, saying 
that a party of poor Indians who had made their 
way down the river from the hostile country 
wished to see him. Answering the summons he 
was ushered into the presence of his wife and 
seven children, whom he had thought of for 
months, as among the victims of the savages at 
Fort Mims. It was as if they had suddenly 
arisen from the dead. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE DOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD 
AND AFFAIRS ON THE PENINSULA. 

It was a part of Weatherford's tactics to pre- 
vent the concentration of his enemies as far as 
that was possible, and to keep the whole country 
round about in such a state of apprehension that 
no troops or militiamen could be spared from 
one stockade fort for the assistance of another. 
Accordingly, when he advanced to the assault on 
Fort Mims he sent the prophet Francis with a 
force of Creeks into the country which lies in the 
fork of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers, and 
which in our day constitutes Clarke County. In 
this part of the country there were several stock- 
ade forts erected, one in each neighborhood, by 
the settlers, as a precautionary measure, when 
the disturbed state of the country first aroused 
serious apprehensions. Fort Sinquefield, named, 
as all these fortresses were, after the owner of 
the place on which it was built, stood a few miles 
north-east of the village of Grove Hill, which is 
now the county seat of Clarke County. Fort 



DOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD. 121 

White was further to the west, and Fort Glass was 
about fifteen miles to the south, near the spot on 
which the present village of Suggsville stands. 

When the battle of Burnt Corn brought actual 
war into being, most of the settlers removed with 
their families into these forts and prepared to 
defend themselves. When General Claiborne 
arrived with his seven hundred men he sent some 
small reinforcements to these posts, under com- 
mand of Colonel Carson, who rebuilding Fort 
Glass, christened it Fort Madison, and made it 
his headquarters and the head-quarters of the 
district round about. 

It was the mission of the prophet Francis to 
harass this part of the country, and on the next 
day but one after the massacre at Fort Mims, 
Francis struck his first blow within two miles of 
Fort Sinquefield. Notwithstanding the general 
alarm, Abner James and Ransom Kimball, with 
their families, numbering seventeen souls in all, 
remained at Kimball's house, intending within a 
day or two to remove to the fort. Francis at- 
tacked the house and killed twelve of the seven- 
teen persons. The other five escaped in various 
ways. One of those who escaped was Isham 
Kimball, a youth sixteen years of age, who sur- 
vived the war, became a public officer in his 



122 RED EAGLE. 

county, and was living there as late as the yeai 
1857 ; from his account and that of Mrs. Merrill, 
a married daughter of Abner James, who also 
was living in Clarke County in 1857, the original 
recorders of this bit of history derived their in- 
formation with respect to details. 

Mrs. Merrill's adventures were very strange 
and romantic, and as we shall not again have 
occasion to write of her, it may not be amiss to 
interrupt the regular course of this narrative and 
tell what happened to her. At the time of the 
massacre at Kimball's house, she, with her infant 
child in her arms, was knocked down, scalped, 
and left as one dead among the slain. She lay 
senseless for many hours, but during the night 
she revived, and with a mother's instinct began 
to search among the dead bodies of her kinsmen 
for her babe. She was overjoyed to find that it 
still breathed, although some member of the sav- 
age band had made an effort to scalp it, cutting 
its head all round, but failing — probably because 
the hair was so short — to finish the horrible opera- 
tion. The poor mother, wellnigh dead though 
she was, made haste to give her babe the breast, 
and had the gratification of seeing it revive 
rapidly in consequence. Then, taking it in her 
arms, she made an effort to reach Fort Sinque- 



OOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD. 123 

field, about two miles distant. Finding at last 
that her strength was failing rapidly, and that she 
could carry the child no longer, she secreted it 
and used the little remaining strength she had in 
crawling to the stockade and entreating some one 
there to rescue her child. This of course was 
quickly done, and notwithstanding the severity 
of her injuries both she and the child recovered 
under good treatment. 

But the strangest, or at any rate the most 
romantic, part of the story is yet to be hold. At 
the time of these occurrences Mrs. Merrill's hus- 
band was absent, serving as a volunteer under 
General Claiborne. The news of the butchery, 
including the positive information that Mrs. Mer- 
rill and her child were slain, was carried to the 
post where Merrill was serving, and he heard 
nothing of her wonderful escape. During one 
of the battles which followed each other rapidly 
that autumn, Merrill, before his anxious wife 
found any means of communicating with him, was 
terribly wounded and left for dead on the battle- 
field, and the report of his death was borne to 
his wife. Recovering his consciousness after his 
comrades had left the field , Merrill fell in with 
some Tennessee volunteers, and was sent with 
their wounded to Tennessee, where, after long 



124 RED EAGLE. 

nursing, he was finally restored to health. After 
several years had passed Mrs. Merrill married 
again, without even a suspicion that her first hus- 
band was living — believing indeed that she knew 
him to be dead. She was living happily with her 
second husband and with a large family grow- 
ing up about her, when one evening a family 
who were emigrating from Tennessee to Texas 
stopped at her house and asked for entertainment 
for a night. They were hospitably received after 
the generous custom of the time and country, but 
they had scarcely settled themselves as guests 
before the head of the emigrating family and the 
wife of the host recognized each other. The one 
was Merrill and the other was his wife, and both 
had married again, each believing the other to be 
dead. After some consultation it was decided 
that, as each had acted in perfectly good faith, 
and as both the families were happy as they 
were, it would be the part of wisdom to let mat- 
ters stand, and to live their new lives without 
trying to recover the old. 

Let us now return to the regular order of 
events. When the tidings of the massacre at 
Kimball's house reached Fort Madison, Colonel 
Carson sent a detachment of ten men to the spot, 
and they at once carried the bodies of the dead 



DOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD. 12$ 

persons to Fort Sinquefield for burial. On the 
third of September the whole body of people in 
Fort Sinquefield, with that inexplicable careless- 
ness which so often marked the conduct of the 
whites at this time, left the fort, unarmed, and 
went out to a valley some fifty yards away, to 
attend the burial services over the bodies of their 
friends. The wily prophet was awaiting pre- 
cisely such an opportunity as this, and while the 
men were filling the grave, he charged over a 
neighboring hill, and tried to put his force be- 
tween the unarmed garrison and the gate of the 
fort. Luckily he had somewhat further to run 
than the fort people had, and so the men of the 
place managed to gain the gate ; but, alas ! the 
women and children were nearly all outside, and 
Francis's warriors were between them and the 
entrance to the fort. Their plight appeared to 
be a hopeless one, and it would have been so but 
for the courage and the presence of mind of one 
young man, whose name is given by Mr. Pickett 
as Isaac Heaton, but who is called Isaac Haden 
by Mr. A. B- Meek, a very careful writer, and 
one particularly well informed about this part of 
the field- The latter name is adopted here, as pro- 
bably the correct one. This young man Haden 
was fond of field sports, and kept a large pack 



J26 RED EAGLE. 

of hounds, trained to chase and seize any living 
thing upon which their master might set them. 
At the critical moment, young Haden, mounted 
upon a good horse and accompanied by his sixty 
dogs, arrived at the gate from a cattle driving ex- 
pedition. In an instant he saw the situation of 
affairs, and with a promptitude which showed re- 
markable presence of mind, he resolved upon a 
daring attempt to rescue the women and children. 
With the whoop of the huntsman this gallant fel- 
low set spurs to his horse, and charged the In- 
dians with his trained pack of ferocious hounds. 
The suddenness of the onset and the novelty of 
the attack threw the savages into complete confu- 
sion. The fierce dogs seized the naked savages 
and tore them furiously, and for several minutes 
their attention was entirely absorbed in an effort 
to beat the brutes off. Meanwhile the men of 
the fort reinforced the dogs with all their might, 
and thus a road was kept open for the retreat of 
the women and children, every one of whom, ex- 
cept a Mrs. Phillips, who was killed and scalped, 
escaped within the gates. Young Haden nar- 
rowly escaped death as the price of his heroism 
— for it was heroism oi the highest sort. His 
horse was killed under him, and when he was at 
last safe within the fort, it was found that five 



DOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD. 1 27 

bullets had passed through his clothes, but the 
brave fellow was not hurt. 

Francis speedily recovered from his tempor- 
ary perplexity, and rallying his men he made a 
furious assault upon the fort ; but the gates were 
now shut, and the resolute men behind the pick- 
ets were skilled marksmen, who delivered their 
fire with deadly precision. The savages were 
repulsed and the fort's company for the time 
saved, with the loss of but one man and one boy, 
who, with Mrs. Phillips killed outside the gates, 
made the total number of the slain in this assault 
only three persons. 

The wiser members of the fort's company per- 
ceived, however, that the place was not strong 
enough to be successfully defended against a 
really determined attack by an adequate force ; 
and accordingly, after some discussion it was re 
solved to evacuate the place and retire to Fort 
Madison, before the second and more determined 
attack, which Francis was sure to make, should 
render it too late. That night the whole com- 
pany of Sinquefield silently withdrew, and after 
a perilous march of fifteen miles through a coun- 
try infested with savages, reached their destina- 
tion in safety. 

About this time four men went from Fort Mad- 



128 RED EAGLE. 

ison to some fields in the neighborhood for sup- 
plies of green vegetables, and while gathering 
these they were attacked and two of them were 
shot. Colonel Carson having satisfied himself 
that the peninsula which he was set to guard was 
full of Indians, and believing that Red Eagle 
with the victors of Fort Mims would direct his 
next blow at Fort Madison, resolved to call upon 
General Claiborne, who was now at Fort Stod- 
dard, for assistance. A particularly bold young 
man, of whom we shall hear more after a while, 
by name Jeremiah Austill — or Jerry Austill, as 
he was always called — volunteered to undertake 
the dangerous duty of carrying Colonel Carson's 
despatch. Mounting his horse about nightfall, 
he said good-by to friends who had little hope 
of seeing him again, and rode away. After an 
all night's journey the brave young fellow ar- 
rived at General Claiborne's head-quarters, and 
told the general whence he had come, greatly to 
the surprise and admiration of that officer, who 
highly commended his courage and devotion to 
the common cause. 

General Claiborne was in great perplexity, 
however. The Fort Mims massacre and the rap- 
idly following depredations in other directions 
had produced a genuine panic among the set- 



DOG CHARGE AT PORT SINQUEFIELD. 1 29 

tiers who now poured into the forts, crowding 
them to overflowing ; and in the state of alarm 
which prevailed everywhere, the commanders of 
all the forts were convinced that their fighting 
forces wxre insufficient to defend the posts in- 
trusted to their charge. When young Austill 
arrived, therefore, with Colonel Carson's appli- 
cation for reinforcements, it was only one of a 
dozen or a score of similar demands, and with the 
meagre force at his disposal General Claiborne 
was wholly unable to satisfy the requirements of 
his subordinates. In his perplexity he saw but 
one method of solving the problem, and that was 
to order the evacuation of some of the forts and 
the concentration of the fighting men at fewer 
points. To this course there was the serious ob- 
jection, that the stockade posts were already in- 
conveniently and unwholesomely overcrowded, 
and a good deal of sickness existed as a conse- 
quence ; but there was no other way of meeting 
the exigencies of the situation. General Clai- 
borne therefore sent young Austill back to Fort 
Madison with a message which has been variously 
represented in different accounts of the affair. 
It appears, however, from General Claiborne's 
manuscripts, that the message, as it was given to 
Austill, was to the effect that as there were no 



I3O RED EAGLE. 

troops to spare for the reinforcement of Fort 
Madison, and as St. Stephen's was strategically 
a more important post, Colonel Carson should 
evacuate Fort Madison and retire with his garri- 
son and the inmates of his fort to St. Stephen's, 
if in his judgment that course was wisest in the 
circumstances. In other words, General Clai- 
borne wished Colonel Carson to use his discretion, 
after learning that no troops could be sent to his 
assistance ; but either because the message was 
ambiguous in itself, or because young Austill 
delivered it inaccurately, Colonel Carson under- 
stood that he was peremptorily ordered to evacu- 
ate his fort, and the order as thus understood 
gave great dissatisfaction to everybody con- 
cerned. The people loudly complained that Gen- 
eral Claiborne was abandoning their part of the 
country to its fate. Colonel Carson, of course, 
had no choice but to obey the order as he under- 
stood it, but those of the settlers who were not 
regularly enlisted soldiers were free to do as they 
pleased, and under the lead of Captain Evan Au- 
still, the father of Jeremiah Austill, and himself 
a very resolute man, fifty men of the neighbor- 
hood according to one account, eighty according 
to another, with their families, determined to re- 
main at Fort Madison. All the rest of the peo- 



DOG CHARGE AT FORT SINQUEFIELD. 131 

pie in the fort, about four hundred in number, 
marched to St. Stephen's. The little band who 
remained were very vigilant, and managed to pro- 
tect themselves effectually, until after a time Col- 
onel Carson was instructed to return and regarri- 
son the fort. Colonel Carson had scarcely reached 
St. Stephen's, indeed, before a second despatch 
came from General Claiborne, speaking of the 
former message as discretionary, and urging Car- 
son not to abandon the fort "unless it is clear 
that you cannot hold it." Among the gallant 
little company who remained at Fort Madison 
was Sam Dale, who, it will be remembered, led 
the advance at Burnt Corn, and whom we shall 
see again. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PUSHMATAHAW AND HIS WARRIORS. 

There was great anxiety felt from the begin- 
ning of the war lest the Creeks should succeed 
in drawing the Chickasaws and Choctaws into 
the conflict as allies. At that stage of affairs at 
which we have now arrived this fear had become 
a very nightmare. The few troops at Claiborne's 
command, together with the militia of the coun- 
try, were barely sufficient to hold the forts, and 
even this inadequate force was liable at any time 
to be reduced by the withdrawal of the soldiers 
to assist in repelling an attack of the British, 
whose fleet now constantly threatened the coast ; 
and if the forces of the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
should be added to Red Eagle's strength, the 
plight of the whites would indeed be pitiable. 

About this time a Choctaw chief of influence 
with his people, by name Pushmatahaw, arrived 
at St. Stephen's, and declared that he could in- 
duce a considerable number of the Choctaw 
warriors to enlist in the American service, if per- 
mission were given to him to recruit among them. 



PUSHMATAHAW AND HIS WARRIORS. 1 33 

Eagerly grasping at this hope, Colonel George S- 
Gaines * went with the chief to Mobile to secure 
the desired authority from General Flournoy, 
who was now in command of the South-western 
Department. 

That officer, for some reason which is not ap- 
parent, declined to accept the proffered services 
of the Choctaws, and Colonel Gaines and his 
companion returned with heavy hearts to St. 
Stephen's, where the news they brought created 
the profoundest dissatisfaction. Before the 
friendly chief had taken his departure, however, 
a courier from General Flournoy arrived, bring- 
ing an order which directed Colonel Gaines to 
accept the chief's offer of assistance, and to ac- 
company him to the Choctaw Nation to enlist the 
men. 

With a single white companion Colonel Gaines 
went with Pushmatahaw to the nation, where, 
gathering the Choctaws into a council, the chief 
made them a speech, saying that Tecumseh, who 
had suggested this war, was a bad man. He 
added : 



* Colonel Gaines was still living in the year 1866 at State Line, 
Mississippi. The author met him in that year engaged, old and 
feeble as he was, in a charitable work that involved considerable 
labor. 



134 RE D EAGLE. 

11 He came through our country, but did not 
turn our heads. He went among the Muscogees, 
and got many of them to join him. You know 
the Tensaw people. They were our friends. 
They played ball with us. They sheltered and 
fed us when we went to Pensacola. Where are 
they now ? Their bodies are rotting at Sam 
Mims's place. The people at St. Stephen's are 
also our friends. The Muscogees intend to kill 
them too. They want soldiers to defend them. 
You can all do as you please. You are free men. 
I dictate to none of you ; but I shall join the St. 
Stephen's people. If you have a mind to follow 
me, I will lead you to glory and to victory/' 

Pushmatahaw finished this speech with his 
drawn sword in his hand. When he paused, one 
of the hitherto silent warriors stood up and, 
striking his breast with his open palm, after the 
manner of the Choctaws on specially solemn oc- 
casions, said, " I am a man ; I will follow you ;" 
whereupon his fellows imitated his example, and 
thus a considerable force of men, who might have 
been added to Weatherford's strength but for the 
friendliness of Pushmatahaw, became active 
friends of the whites. 

But a new factor of very much greater value 
was now about to enter into the problem and 



PUSHMATAHAW AND HIS WARRIORS. 1 35 

totally change its conditions. Andrew Jackson, 
the sternest and most energetic of Indian fighters, 
was coming with his Tennessee volunteers to 
reverse the situation of affairs. The Creeks, who 
were now hunting the whites like wild beasts, 
were presently to become the hunted party, with 
Andrew Jackson upon their track. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 

Bad news travels rapidly, and the news of the 
terrible massacre at Fort Mims was soon known 
in all parts of the South and West. There were 
neither railroads nor steamboats in those days, 
and between the Tensaw settlement and the rest 
of the country there were not even stage-coaches 
running, or mail-riders on horseback. It took 
more than a month for the swiftest messenger 
from Southern Alabama to reach New York, and 
nearly as long to reach Washington City ; but 
when Red Eagle had shown of what mettle he 
was made, General Claiborne, who in his double 
capacity as Governor of Louisiana and general in 
the field was doubly interested, became greatly 
alarmed, and that with good reason. The British 
were threatening the coast, and Weatherford 
now appeared to threaten Mobile. The situa- 
tion was, indeed, an alarming one. It was pretty 
clear that Weatherford was already acting in con- 
cert, more or less direct, with the enemy with- 
out ; and if he should take the town of Mobile, as 



JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 1 37 

he was probably able to do, securing a base of 
operations for a British force, he might easily 
turn back and utterly destroy the settlements, 
while the few troops within reach should be en- 
gaged with the British. 

In this perilous situation of affairs it was use- 
less for General Claiborne, or his superior officer, 
General Flournoy, to appeal to the government 
at Washington for aid. Even if the troops of the 
Government had not been fully occupied already 
in other parts of the country, the distance was so 
great that any assistance which the general gov- 
ernment might be able to render must of neces- 
sity come too late to be of any avail. It would 
take a month for the messenger asking for help 
to reach Washington, another month for a force 
to be gathered, and perhaps two months more for 
it to reach the exposed point. Three or four 
months at least, and probably a greater time, must 
pass before help could come from that quarter, 
and it might as well have taken a hundred years, 
so far as all practical purposes were concerned. 

The only resource, therefore, was an appeal to 
the people of the surrounding States. Messen- 
gers were sent in hot haste to South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Tennessee, carrying despatches 
which simply set forth the facts and the danger, 



1^8 RED EAGLE. 



j 



and asked for help. The response was quick and 
generous. Georgians and South Carolinians be- 
gan at once to organize forces, which soon after- 
ward invaded the Creek country. But the most 
efficient aid was to come from Tennessee, a State 
which had already shown itself quick to answer 
to every demand made upon it. It had furnished 
its full quotas of men to the national army ; and 
less than a year before the time of which we now 
write, it had sent a full division of volunteers 
under Jackson to reinforce the army at New 
Orleans. This division had been ordered to dis- 
band while at Natchez, when they were without 
money or provisions with which to reach their 
homes, but Jackson had resolutely disobeyed the 
order, and instead of disbanding his division had 
marched it back to Tennessee in a body. 

There had been loud murmurs at the treatment 
these volunteers had received, but when the news 
came that the people of the Tensaw country 
were suffering brutal butchery at the hands of 
savages, and that Mobile was threatened, Ten- 
nessee hushed her murmurs, and promptly re- 
sponded to the call. 

On the 1 8th day of September, the people of 
Nashville assembled in a public meeting to con- 
sider the news which had just been received. 



JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 1 39 

General Jackson lay upon his bed, weak, emaci- 
ated, and racked with pain from a wound re- 
ceived in a street fight ; but everybody felt that 
his counsel in matters of this kind was essential. 
Indeed, it was known that upon the question of his 
ability to lead the forces that were to be raised 
their success in raising forces at all must in a 
great measure depend. The meeting, therefore, 
did no business on the first day, except to express 
its members' determination to render assistance 
to their brethren in the South, and to appoint a 
committee, headed by Colonel (afterward General) 
Coffee, to consult with the Governor of the State 
and with General Jackson, and to report the result. 

This committee went to Jackson's chamber and 
told him the story of Fort Mims, and of the need 
there was for him to lead the Tennessee volun- 
teers. They assured him also that if they could 
give his name to the people as the leader who 
would head them, the volunteers would flock to 
the standard of the State at once. 

Jackson replied that he was recovering, al- 
though he was still confined to his bed, and that 
he thought he should be well enough to mount 
his horse by the time the troops could be got 
ready to march. In that event he promised to. 
take command. 



140 RED EAGLE. 

With this news the committee went to the cler- 
gyman who was chairman of the public meeting, 
and that patriotic man, dismissing all thought of 
his regular church services, called the meeting 
together again the next morning, which happened 
to be Sunday. The voice of the meeting and of 
the people of the State was unanimous. Mr. 
Parton, in his Life of Andrew Jackson, writes : 

" The news of the massacre produced every- 
where in Tennessee the most profound impres- 
sion. Pity for the distressed Alabamians, fears 
for the safety of their own borders, rage against 
the Creeks, so long the recipients of the gover- 
mental bounty, united to inflame the minds of 
the people. But one feeling pervaded the state. 
With one vow it was decreed that the entire re- 
sources and the whole available force of Tennessee 
should be hurled upon the savage foe, to avenge 
the massacre and deliver the southern country/' 

There was unfortunately no law of the State 
under which anybody was authorized to call out 
the needed men, and although Governor Blount 
was ready to approve and actively to encourage 
the gathering of Tennessee's strength and its use 
in this way, he had no legal authority to promise 
pay or support to the troops. This defect was 
repaired by the Legislature within a week. That 



JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 141 

body passed a bill authorizing the Governor to 
enlist three thousand five hundred men for this 
service, voting three hundred thousand dollars 
for expenses, and pledging the State to support 
and pay the men, if the general government 
should refuse or neglect to accept the force as a 
part of its volunteer army. 

Meantime, from his sick bed, and without wait- 
ing for the processes of law, General Jackson 
called for volunteers. He published an address, 
in which he said to his Tennesseeans : 

"The horrid butcheries perpetratiug on our 
defenceless fellow-citizens near Fort Stoddard 
cannot fail to excite in every bosom a spirit of re- 
venge. The subjoined letter of our worthy Gov- 
ernor shows that the general government has de- 
posited no authority in this quarter to afford 
aid to the unhappy sufferers. It is wished that 
volunteers should go forward, relying on the jus- 
tice of the general government for ultimate re- 
muneration. It surely never would be said that 
the brave Tennesseeans wanted other inducements 
than patriotism and humanity to rush to the aid 
of our bleeding neighbors, their friends and rela- 
tions. I feel confident that the dull calculations 
of sneaking prudence will not prevent you from 
immediately stepping forth on this occasion, so 



142 RED EAGLE. 

worthy the arm of every brave soldier and good 
citizen. I regret that indisposition, which from 
present appearances is not likely to continue 
long, may prevent me from leading the van ; but 
indulge the grateful hope of sharing with you the 
dangers and glory of prostrating these hell- 
hounds, who are capable of such barbarities. ' ' 

Jackson was in a hurry. Every day at such a 
time was precious, and hence he was determined 
to waste no time coddling his worn and wounded 
body. He issued his addresses and his orders 
from his sick-bed ; concerted measures with 
General John Cocke, who was to command the 
troops from the eastern half of the State, and 
made arrangements for provisions. On the 26th 
day of September, just one week after the Sun- 
day when the public meeting had been held, he 
sent Coffee forward with the advance of his army 
a body of horsemen numbering somewhat more 
than five hundred. Coffee received volunteers 
at every cross-road, and by the time he arrived 
at Fayetteville, Alabama, the appointed place of 
rendezvous, his five hundred men had increased 
to one thousand three hundred. 

Jackson had to be helped on his horse when he 
set out to join the army he had raised so speedily. 
His arm was still encased in the surgeon's wrap- 



JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 143 

pings, and carried in a sling. He could put but 
one arm into his coat-sleeve, and he was so weak 
that it was with difficulty that he could ride at 
all ; but there was that in his composition which 
had already gained for him his nickname, " Old 
Hickory ;" it was the tough hickory of his nature 
which supplied the place of physical strength, 
and enabled him to march. Everywhere he is- 
sued his proclamations and addresses, couched in 
strong, vigorous, though not always graceful, 
English : a practice for which he has been laughed 
at sometimes, but one which was wise, neverthe- 
less. He knew his Tennesseeans, and adapted his 
measures to their character. They were an im- 
pulsive race of men, full of warm blood, which 
was easily stirred by such appeals as Jackson 
made to them, though they would not have been 
moved by a colder species of address. 

Having secured his men, Jackson's next care 
was to convert them as rapidly as possible into 
soldiers, and accordingly his next appeal was 
directed to this end. Finding that he would not 
be able to reach Fayetteville at the exact time 
appointed for the rendezvous, he sent an officer 
forward with the following address, which was 
read to the troops : 

" We are about to furnish these savages a les- 



144 RED EAGLE. 

son of admonition. We are about to teach them 
that our long forbearance has not proceeded from 
an insensibility to wrongs or an inability to re- 
dress them. They stand in need of such warn- 
ing. In proportion as we have borne with their 
insults and submitted to their outrages, they 
have multiplied in number and increased in atro- 
city. But the measure of their offences is at length 
filled. The blood of our women and children 
recently spilt at Fort Mims calls for our ven- 
geance ; it must not call in vain. Our borders 
must no longer be disturbed by the war-whoop 
of these savages and the cries of their suffering 
victims. The torch that has been lighted up must 
be made to blaze in the heart of their own coun- 
try. It is time they should be made to leel the 
weight of a power which, because it was merci- 
ful, they believed to be impotent. But how shall 
a war so long forborne, and so loudly called for 
by retributive justice, be waged ? Shall we imi- 
tate the example of our enemies in the disorder 
of their movements and the savageness of their 
dispositions ? Is it worthy the character of 
American soldiers, who take up arms to redress 
the wrongs of our injured country, to assume no 
better models than those furnished them by bar- 
barians ? No, fellow-soldiers, great as are the 



JACKSON IS HELPED INTO HIS SADDLE. 145. 

grievances that have called us from our homes, 
we must not permit disorderly passions to tarnish 
the reputation we shall carry along with us. We 
must and will be victorious ; but we must con- 
quer as men who owe nothing to chance, and 
who in the midst of victory can still be mindful 
of what is due to humanity ! We will commence 
the campaign by an inviolable attention to disci- 
pline and subordination. Without a strict observ- 
ance of these, victory must ever be uncertain, and 
ought hardly to be exulted in even when gained. 
To what but the entire disregard of order and 
subordination are we to ascribe the disasters 
which have attended our arms in the north dur- 
ing the present war ? How glorious will it be to 
remove the blots which have tarnished the fair 
character bequeathed us by the fathers of our 
Revolution ! The bosom of your general is full 
of hope. He knows the ardor which animates 
you, and already exults in the triumph which 
your strict observance of discipline and good 
order will render certain. ' ' 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE MARCH INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 

Coffee had pushed on with his cavalry bri- 
gade to Huntsville, Alabama, thirty-two miles 
beyond Fayetteville, without waiting for Jackson. 
At Fayetteville, Jackson found the army to whom 
he had issued his proclamation, but their num- 
bers were much smaller than he had hoped — not 
exceeding a thousand men ; and it would have 
been necessary, probably, to wait for recruits to 
come in, if there had been no other cause for 
waiting. Every thing had to be done, and day 
and night Jackson was busy with details pertain- 
ing to the organization, the drilling, and the dis- 
ciplining of the troops ; for this volunteer general 
knew, as few volunteers do, how greatly disci- 
pline and drill increase the strength of an armed 
force. 

Luckily he had time for this, somewhat unex- 
pectedly. He had supposed that the victorious 
Creeks would march upon Mobile, and his haste 
was largely due to his anxiety to attack them in 
rear, and thus save the important seaport and 



INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 147 

prevent a junction of the Creeks with the British. 
Soon after his arrival at Fayetteville, however, 
which was on the 7th of October, Jackson received 
a despatch from General Coffee, sajang that in- 
stead of marching upon Mobile the Creeks were 
moving northward in two columns, threatening 
Georgia and Tennessee. 

Why Red Eagle pursued this course was long 
a puzzle to students of the campaign. He 
was so manifestly a man of quick and accurate 
perceptions in military matters, that he must have 
seen how entirely Mobile was within his grasp, 
and how great an advantage it would be to him 
to capture or destroy the town ; and when he 
neglected such an opportunity it was not easy to 
guess why he did so. The mystery was solved 
when a letter was found in his own house a 
month or so later, dated September 29th, 18 13, 
from Manxique, the Spanish Governor of Florida. 
This letter was addressed to the chiefs of the 
Creek nation, and was in these words : 

" Gentlemen : I received the letter that you 
wrote me in the month of August, by which, and 
with great satisfaction, I was informed of the ad- 
vantages which your brave warriors obtained over 
your enemies. I represented, as I promised you, 



I48 RED EAGLE. 

to the Captain-General of the Havana, the request 
which, the last time I took you by the hand, you 
made me of arms and ammunitions ; but until now 
I cannot yet have an answer. But I am in 
hopes that he will send me the effects which I 
requested, and as soon as I receive them I 
shall inform you. I am very thankful for your 
generous offers to procure to me the provisions 
and warriors necessary in order to retake the port 
of Mobile, and you ask me at the same time if we 
have given up Mobile to the Americans : to which 
I answer, for the present I cannot profit of your 
generous offer, not being at war with the Ameri- 
cans, who did not take Mobile by force, since they 
purchased it from the miserable officer, destitute 
of honor, who commanded there, and delivered it 
without authority. By which reasons the sale 
and delivery of that place is entirely void and 
null, and I hope that the Americans will restore it 
again to us, because nobody can dispose of thing 
that is not his own property ; in consequence of 
which the Spaniards have not lost their right to 
it. And I hope you will not put in execution the 
project you tell me of, to burn the town, since 
these houses and properties do not belong to the 
Americans, but to true Spaniards. To the bear- 
ers of your letter I have ordered some small pres- 



INTO THE ENEMY S COUNTRY. 149 

ents to be given, and I remain forever your good 
father and friend, Manxique. ' ' 

It is a pleasure to reflect, that about a year 
later, Jackson, acting on his own responsibility, 
marched to Pensacola and humiliated the succes- 
sor of this especial rascal, who wrote about honor 
in a letter in which he was encouraging and plan- 
ning to furnish arms and ammunition to savages 
who were butchering the people of a nation with 
whom his own country was at peace. 

The letter explains Weatherford's course. He 
was acting from the first in concert with this 
Spanish governor, from whom he was drawing 
his arms and ammunition ; and while he wanted 
to burn Mobile, he knew that he must first ask 
Manxique's permission. Accordingly, he must 
have sent a letter to that ally on the very day of 
the massacre at Fort Mims, or on the next day at 
latest. That massacre began at noon and ended 
at five o'clock on the 30th day of August ; and 
Manxique speaks of the letter reporting the victory 
as ' ' the letter that you wrote me in the month of 
August.' ' It is thus clear that Weatherford's 
military instincts were neither asleep nor at fault 
when he finished that bloody day's work ; that 
he saw both the possibility and the advantage of 



150 RED EAGLE. 

destroying Mobile, and at once asked permission 
to do so. The letter denying that permission to 
him was dated September 29th ; and, as he was 
marching upon Tennessee and Georgia early in 
October, it is apparent that he had only waited 
for the arrival of the Spanish governor's reply, 
before renewing his campaign. While he hoped 
for permission to destroy the seaport town, he 
waited ; the moment he knew that he must not 
do that, he began his northward and eastward 
march, to strike his enemies in another quarter. 
His failure to march upon Mobile has been cited 
by some writers to prove that Weatherford was 
after all only an Indian, without real military 
capacity ; in the light of all the facts, as they are 
revealed by the letter quoted, his proceedings 
prove precisely the reverse. We are indebted for 
the sparing of Mobile, not to incompetency on 
Weatherford' s part, but to the greed of the Span- 
iard, who hesitated to permit the destruction of 
property which he hoped to get possession of by 
other means. 

When Coffee's report of the advance of the 
Creeks came, the news greatly relieved Jackson 
of anxiety. It freed him from apprehension con- 
cerning Mobile ; it promised to save him from a 
long and wearying march through a wilderness, 



INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNNRY. 151 

and to enable him to meet the enemy sooner than 
would otherwise have been possible ; and his chief 
desire now was to hurl his army with crushing 
force against the Creeks, to make unceasing war 
upon them, and to break their power as speedily 
as possible. He was so elated at the prospect of 
an early encounter with them, that he wrote in a 
playful vein to Coffee, saying : ' ' It is surely high 
gratification to learn that the Creeks are so atten- 
tive to my situation as to save me the pain of 
travelling. I must not be outdone in politeness, 
and will therefore endeavor to meet them on mid- 
dle ground."* 

A good deal remained to be done, and arrange- 
ments were not yet complete for the procuring of 
provisions. Coffee was at Huntsville, and was 
watching for the enemy. On the 1 ith of October, 
Coffee reported the Indian advance, and Jackson 
marched on the instant, arriving at Huntsville 
that evening. At Huntsville it was necessary to 
await the arrival of provisions for the army. Sup- 
plies from East Tennessee had been sent down 
the river, but a failure of water in the shallow 
stream detained them on the way. Jackson 
marched to Ditto's landing to await their coming ; 
but they came not, and relief seemed to be impos- 

* Parton's " Life of Jackson." 



152 RED EAGLE. 

sible. Jackson was in a sore strait. He wanted 
to advance, but was without provisions or an im- 
mediate prospect of getting any. He ordered 
Coffee with his cavalry to scour the Indian coun- 
try for supplies, while with the main army he 
made a toilsome march, over a mountainous coun- 
try, to Thompson's Creek, about twenty miles 
higher up the river, for the double purpose of 
meeting the expected provisions there, and of 
putting himself in the way of marching the more 
quickly to the relief of a body of friendly Indians 
who occupied a fort at the Ten Islands, on the 
Coosa River. 

Meantime, Jackson sent messengers in every 
direction, urging everybody in any sort of author- 
ity to hurry the supplies forward. At Thomp- 
son's Creek he built a fort, as a base of supplies 
for the campaign. His plight was desperate, but 
he would not stay where he was or fall back. 
With food or without it, he meant to march into 
the Indian country and dare starvation as he braved 
the other perils of war. It is related of him that 
at one time during the campaign, when the men 
>vere without provisions, one of them saw him 
eating something, and mutinously demanded a 
share of the food. 

" Certainly/' replied Jackson, thrusting his 



INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 153 

hand into his pocket and offering the man some 
acorns. He was literally living on acorns while 
marching and fighting night and day. 

The state of affairs when Jackson was about 
leaving Fort Deposit, on Thompson's Creek, 
where he tarried but a single day, may be inferred 
from a letter written by Major John Reid, of the 
general's staff, from which we copy some pas- 
sages. The whole letter is printed in Parton's 
Life of Jackson. 

" At this place we have remained a day for 
the purpose of establishing a depot for provi- 
sions ; but where these provisions are to come 
from God Almighty only knows. We had ex- 
pected supplies from East Tennessee, but they 
have not arrived, and I am fearful never will. 
I speak seriously when I declare I expect we 
shall soon have to eat our horses, and perhaps 
this is the best use we can put a great many of 
them to. 

" The hostile Creeks, as we learnt yesterday 
from the Path Killer, are assembling in great 
numbers within fifteen miles from Turkey Town. 
Chenully, who is posted with the friendly Creeks 
in the neighborhood of that place, it is feared will 
be destroyed before we can arrive to their relief. 
In three days we shall probably have a fight. The 



154 RED EAGLE. 

general swears he will neither sound a retreat nor 
survive a defeat. . . . We shall leave this 
place with less than two days* provisions." 

It seems almost incredible that a general should 
venture to advance into an enemy's country, be- 
ginning the march with only provisions enough 
to last his force for a day or two, and with no 
assurance, scarcely even a hope, that provisions 
were likely to follow him ; but this is what Jack- 
son did. 

Coffee joined him on the march, bringing with 
him a few hundreds of bushels of corn, and report- 
ing that he had destroyed some Indian towns, but 
had encountered none of the Indians. The corn 
was a mere handful among the men and horses of 
the army, but cries for help were coming every 
hour from the friendly Indians, whose situation 
at the Ten Islands was desperate, and Jackson 
marched forward, trusting to chance for supplies. 
He meant to fight first and find something to eat 
afterward. 

As has been said, the army remained but one 
day at Fort Deposit, and during that day con- 
structed a fortress ; but Jackson found time in 
which to write an address to his men, whom he 
was now about to lead upon a campaign in which 
they would encounter famine and hardships of the 



INTO THE ENEMY S COUNTRY. 1 55 

sorest kind, as well as the savage enemy. They 
needed all the courage that enthusiasm in the 
cause could give them, and the address was de- 
signed to key them up, so to speak, to the pitch 
of their commander's temper. The address read 
as follows : 

" You have, fellow-soldiers, at length penetrat- 
ed the country of your enemies. It is not to be 
believed that they will abandon the soil that em- 
bosoms the bones of their forefathers without 
furnishing you an opportunity of signalizing your 
valor. Wise men do not expect, brave men will 
not desire it. It was not to travel unmolested 
through a barren wilderness that you quitted 
your families and homes, and submitted to so 
many privations : it was to revenge the cruleties 
committed upon your defenceless frontiers by the 
inhuman Creeks, instigated by their no less inhu- 
man allies ; you shall not be disappointed. 

" If the enemy flee before us we will overtake 
and chastise him ; we will teach him how dread- 
ful, when once aroused, is the resentment of free- 
men. But it is not by boasting that punishment 
is to be inflicted or victory obtained. The same 
resolution that prompted us to take up arms must 
inspire us in battle. Men thus animated and 
thus resolved, barbarians can never conquer ; and 



156 RED EAGLE. 

it is an enemy barbarous in the extreme that we 
have now to face. Their reliance will be on the 
damage they can do you while you are asleep and 
unprepared for action ; their hopes shall fail them 
in the hour of experiment. Soldiers who know 
their duty and are ambitious to perform it are not 
to be taken by surprise. Our sentinels will never 
sleep, nor our soldiers be unprepared for action ; 
yet while it is enjoined upon the sentinels vigi- 
lantly to watch the approach of the foe, they are 
at the same time commanded not to fire at shad- 
ows. Imaginary dangers must not deprive them 
of entire self-possession. Our soldiers will lie 
with their arms in their hands ; and the moment 
an alarm is given they will move to their respec- 
tive positions without noise and without confu- 
sion. They will thus be enabled to hear the orders 
of their officers, and to obey them with prompti- 
tude. 

" Great reliance will be placed by the enemy, 
on the consternation they may be able to spread 
through our ranks by the hideous yells with which 
they commence their battles ; but brave men will 
laugh at such efforts to alarm them. It is not by 
bello wings and screams that the wounds of death 
are inflicted. You will teach these noisy assail- 
ants how weak are their weapons of warfare, by 



INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 1 57 

opposing them with the bayonet. What Indian 
ever withstood its charge ? What army of any 
nation ever withstood it long ? 

" Yes, soldiers, the order for a charge will be 
the signal for victory. In that moment your en- 
emy will be seen flying in every direction before 
you. But in the moment of action coolness and 
deliberation must be regarded ; your fire made 
with precision and aim ; and when ordered to 
charge with the bayonet you must proceed to the 
assault with a quick and firm step, without trepi- 
dation or alarm. Then shall you behold the com- 
pletion of your hopes, in the discomfiture of your 
enemy. Your general, whose duty as well as in- 
clination is to watch over your safety, will not, to 
gratify any wishes of his own, rush you unneces- 
sarily into danger. He knows, however, that it 
is not in assailing an enemy that men are de- 
stroyed ; it is when retreating and in confusion. 
Aware of this, he will be prompted as much by 
a regard for your lives as your honor. He la- 
ments that he has been compelled, even incident- 
ally, to hint at a retreat when speaking to freemen 
and to soldiers. Never until you forget all that 
is due to yourselves and your country will you 
have any practical understanding of that word. 
Shall an enemy wholly unacquainted with military 



158 RED EAGLE. 

evolutions, and who rely more for victory on their 
grim visages and hideous yells than upon their 
bravery or their weapons — shall such an enemy 
ever drive before them the well-trained youths of 
our country, whose bosoms pant for glory, and a 
desire to avenge the wrongs they have received ? 
Your general will not live to behold such a spec- 
tacle ; rather would he rush into the thickest of 
the enemy and submit himself to their scalping- 
knives. But he has no fears of such a result. He 
knows the valor of the men he commands, and 
how certainly that valor, regulated as it will be, 
will lead to victory. With his soldiers he will 
face all dangers, and with them participate in the 
glory of conquest." 

Nothing could have been better fitted than this 
address was to serve the end for which it was 
designed. Jackson knew his Tennesseeans, both 
in their temper and in their habits ; and he adroitly 
managed to warn them against the consequences 
of those faults which were most prominent in 
their characters, while seeming merely to appeal 
in a stimulating fashion to their pride of courage. 
He knew, as they did not, how trying the hard- 
ships of a campaign in a wilderness with insuffici- 
ent supplies are ; he knew how prone raw troops 



INTO THE ENEMY S COUNTRY. 1 59 

are to fall into confusion and panic in the excite- 
ment of a sudden attack ; and against all these 
things he did what could be done to brace them 
by an adroit appeal to their pride of race and of 
personal courage. If some of his expressions 
seem to suggest any thing like contempt of the 
Creeks as foes, they were meant merely to arouse 
the pride of his own men, and indicated no dispo- 
sition on his part not to " respect his enemy/ ' as 
Claiborne said. On the contrary, he showed the 
profoundest respect for his enemy by his extreme 
solicitude about the condition and the conduct of 
his own men. 

The marching was now as nearly continuous 
as was possible in the circumstances. Frequent 
pauses had to be made, in order that provisions 
might be gathered from the surrounding country, 
but as soon as there was food in camp the march 
was resumed. 

On the 28th of October, a detachment under 
command of Colonel Dyer left the main body, 
and the next day attacked the Indian village of 
Littefutchee, surprising it before daylight in the 
morning, destroying it, and bringing in twenty- 
nine prisoners as the first-fruits of the campaign. 

This was the beginning of a series of battles 



l6o RED EAGLE. 

which followed each other in as rapid succession 
as the starving condition of the army permitted. 
Jackson was now in the enemy's country, and 
within striking distance of his strategic points. 
How vigorously and persistently he struck, we 
shall see in the chapters which follow. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE BATTLE OF TALLUSHATCHEE. 

On the second day of November, Jackson 
learned that a considerable force of the enemy 
was gathered at Tallushatchee, an Indian town 
about ten miles from the Ten Islands. He had 
no sooner received this information than he or- 
dered Coffee with about nine hundred men to 
attack the post. 

Coffee marched on the moment, taking with 
him a company of friendly Indians, mostly Che- 
rokees, under Richard Brown. To prevent er- 
rors the Indians in the expedition wore white 
feathers and deer-tails on their heads. 

The expedition crossed the river a few miles 
above the Ten Islands, and advanced during the 
night, arriving in the immediate neighborhood of 
the town about daybreak on the 3d of November. 
The purpose was not merely to defeat but to de- 
stroy the Indian force, and therefore, instead of 
dashing at once into the town, Coffee divided his 
force in half, sending Colonel Allcorn with the 
cavalry to the right, while he himself, in com- 



1 62 RED EAGLE. 

pany with Colonel Cannon, marched to the left 
around the place, keeping at a sufficient distance 
to avoid alarming the Indians. 

When the heads of the two columns met, the 
town was entirely surrounded. Notwithstanding 
the caution with which this movement was exe- 
cuted, the Indians discovered the presence of the 
enemy when the troops were half a mile distant. 
They beat their drums and yelled in savage fash- 
ion, but remained on the defensive, awaiting the 
attack. 

About sunrise, every thing being in readiness, 
General Coffee sent two companies forward into 
the town, without breaking his circular align- 
ment, instructing the officers in command of them 
to make an assault and bring on the action. The 
manoeuvre was altogether successful. As soon 
as the two companies made their attack, the In- 
dians, confident that this was the whole of the 
assaulting column, rushed out of their houses and 
other hiding-places, and charged their assailants 
with great vigor. The companies of whites there- 
upon began falling back and the Creeks pursued 
them hotly. When the main line was reached, it 
delivered a volley into the midst of the advancing 
savages, and immediately charged them, driving 
them back in confusion to the shelter of their 



THE BATTLE OF TALLUSHATCHEE. 1 63 

houses. Here the Creeks fought with the utmost 
desperation, refusing quarter, obstinately resisting 
when resistance was manifestly in vain, and choos- 
ing to die where they stood, rather than yield 
even to Coffee's overwhelming numbers. 

General Coffee said in his report of the affair : 
" The enemy retreated, firing, until they got 
around and in their buildings, where they made 
all the resistance that an overpowered soldier 
could do. They fought as long as one existed ; 
but their destruction was very soon completed. 
Our men rushed up to the doors of the houses, 
and in a few minutes killed the last warrior of 
them. The enemy fought with savage fury, and 
met death with all its horrors, without shrinking 
or complaining ; not one asked to be spared, but 
[they] fought as long as they could stand or sit. 
In consequence of their flying to their houses and 
mixing with their families, our men, in killing the 
males, without intention killed and wounded a 
few of the squaws and children, which was re- 
gretted by every officer and soldier of the detach- 
ment, but which could not be avoided/ ' 

Coffee counted one hundred and eighty-six dead 
bodies of Indians, and, as many of them fell in the 
grass and high weeds, where their bodies were 
not easily found, he expressed the opinion in his 



164 RED EAGLE. 

report that the number of killed did not fall short 
of two hundred, while his own loss was five men 
killed and forty-one wounded, most of the wounds 
being slight and none of them mortal. For the 
first time in the history of Indian warfare, the fight- 
ing force of the savages in this battle was utterly 
destroyed, not a single warrior escaping alive. 

There were eighty-four prisoners taken, all of 
them being women and children. Not only Gen- 
eral Coffee, but his officers and men also, would 
gladly have ended the fight as soon as victory 
was theirs, sparing the warriors who had survived 
the first onset, and they constantly offered quarter 
not only to bodies of men who were fighting to- 
gether, but to single individuals who were mani- 
festly at their mercy, and to wounded warriors ; 
but their offers of mercy were indignantly rejected 
in every case, and they therefore had no choice 
but to convert the battle into a massacre more com- 
plete than that which had occurred at Fort Mims, 
except that the women and children were spared ; 
but this time the butchery was forced upon the 
victors against their will, while at Fort Mims the 
triumphant savages had willingly indulged in in- 
discriminate slaughter. 

Coffee at once took up his return march and 
rejoined Jackson, who sent a brief despatch re* 



THE BATTLE OF TALLUSHATCHEE. l6$ 

porting the affair to Governor Blount, praising- 
Coffee and his men in the strongest terms, and 
ending with that plaintive plea for food for his 
army, which was now constantly on his lips. ' If 
we had a sufficient supply of provisions/' he 
wrote, "we should in a very short time accom- 
plish the object of the expedition. ' ' 

The most encouraging thing about this affair 
was the good conduct of the men. They mani- 
fested so little of the spirit of raw and undiscip- 
lined troops ; they fought with so much coolness 
and steadiness, and went through the battle show- 
ing so few signs of that excitement which com- 
monly impairs the efficiency of inexperienced 
soldiers, that their commander felt a confidence 
in them which justified him in attempting more 
than he would otherwise have dared in the cir- 
cumstances. 

Mr. Parton, in his Life of Andrew Jackson, 
preserves a story which grew out of this battle, 
and which so strongly illustrates the softer side 
of a stern soldier's character, that we may be par- 
doned for breaking the narrative to copy it here. 
* On the bloody field of Tallushatchee was 
found a slain mother still embracing her living 
infant. The child was brought into camp with 
the other prisoners, and Jackson, anxious to save 



1 66 RED EAGLE. 

it, endeavored to induce some of the Indian 
women to give it nourishment. ' No/ said they, 
1 all his relatives are dead ; kill him too. ' This 
reply appealed to the heart of the general. He 
caused the child to be taken to his own hut, where 
among the few remaining stores was found a little 
brown sugar. This, mingled with water, served 
to keep the child alive until it could be sent to 
Huntsville, where it was nursed at Jackson's ex- 
pense until the end of the campaign, and then 
taken to the Hermitage. Mrs. Jackson received 
it cordially, and the boy grew up in the family, 
treated by the general and his kind wife as a son 
and a favorite. Lincoyer was the name given 
him by the general. He grew to be a finely formed 
and robust youth, and received the education 
usually given to the planters' sons in the neigh- 
borhood. Yet it appears he remained an Indian 
to the last, delighting to roam the fields and 
woods, and decorate his hair and clothes with 
gay feathers, and given to strong yearnings for 
his native wilds." 

The boy did not live to reach manhood, how- 
ever. In his seventeenth year he fell a victim to 
pulmonary consumption, and when he died his 
benefactor mourned him as bitterly as if he had 
been indeed his son. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. 

Where was General Cocke with the troops 
from East Tennessee all this time ? It will be re- 
membered that he was to muster twenty -five hun- 
dred men in his half of the state, while Jackson 
gathered a like number in the west, and marching 
southward the two were to form a junction in the 
Creek country. Meantime General Cocke had 
undertaken to procure in East Tennessee supplies 
for the whole force. The supplies, as we know, 
had not come, and Jackson had marched without 
them. Now he expected General Cocke daily, 
with his force and his supplies ; but they came 
not, and Jackson was greatly disappointed. 

The fact was that General Cocke had been de- 
layed by precisely the same lack of breadstuffs 
that had embarrassed General Jackson. He had 
collected supplies, indeed, and ordered them for- 
ward by way of the river, but for lack of water 
they had not come, and at last, like Jackson, he 
began his march without them. He started south 
from Knoxville on the 13th of October, and after 



1 68 RED EAGLE. 

a considerable delay on the route, abandoned all 
hope of receiving the supplies, and depended 
thereafter upon such aid as the friendly Cherokees 
could give him in the way of furnishing provi- 
sions. General White had marched separately 
with his brigade, and when he joined General 
Cocke his men were in a starving condition. 

While marching in a column separate from 
Jackson's, General Cocke was an independent 
commander. If he should join Jackson, whose 
commission was older than his own, the East 
Tennessee commander must become subordinate 
to the authority of Jackson. The fact that he did 
not form the contemplated union of forces, but 
acted separately, and the additional fact that his 
separate action led to a blunder which added 
greatly to the horrors of the war, caused Jackson 
great annoyance, and subjected General Cocke to 
the severest criticism. He was accused of an un- 
due and culpable jealousy of Jackson, of self-seek- 
ing, and of perverse disobedience of orders. To 
all of this we shall come presently. The matter is 
mentioned now merely because it is necessary to 
know this much about it in order that we may 
properly understand the events to be immediately 
narrated. 

As soon as Coffee's command returned from 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. 1 69 

the Tallushatchee expedition, General Jackson 
resumed his march over a mountainous country 
toward the Ten Islands. Upon arriving at that 
point on the Coosa River, he began the construc- 
tion of a fort as a centre of operations, and a de- 
fensive post at which his supplies — whenever he 
should happen to have any thing of that kind — 
could be protected by a comparatively small 
force. He adopted the usual method of fortify- 
ing against Indian assaults — inclosing a large 
space within a line of strong timber pickets, and 
building block-houses, storehouses, and other 
needed structures within. Here he was disposed 
to await the arrival of General Cocke, hoping that 
that officer would bring provisions of some sort 
with him, as the force at Fort Strother — that was 
the name given to the works at the Ten Islands — 
was now almost destitute of food and forage. 

When Cocke was within three days' march of 
Fort Strother, his advance-guard, about one 
thousand strong, under command of General 
White, was within a very short distance, and 
General White sent forward a courier from Tur- 
key Town reporting his arrival at that point, and 
asking for orders. 

About this time there came into Jackson's camp 
a messenger, who brought news of a very impor- 



I70 RED EAGLE. 

tant nature. He came from a little fort thirty 
miles away, at the Indian town of Talladega, on 
the spot where the modern town of Talladega 
stands. In that fort a handful of friendly Indians, 
about one hundred and fifty in number, had gath- 
ered to escape butchery at the hands of their hos- 
tile brethren. Here they were closely besieged 
by an Indian force one thousand strong, who, 
contrary to their usual practice, made no assault, 
but sought to starve out the little garrison. They 
surrounded the fort and maintained an unbroken 
siege line, confident that the plight and even the 
existence of the beleaguered fort were unknown to 
the whites, and confident, therefore, that no relief 
could be sent to them. They knew, too, that the 
supply of water, as well as of food, in the fort 
was very scant, and hence they had only to await 
the sure operation of starvation and thirst to do 
their work for them. 

The messenger who came to Jackson to pray 
for the deliverance of the little band from their 
pitiable situation is described by some writers 
as an Indian, by others as a chief, and by still 
another he is said to have been a Scotchman who 
had lived for many years among the Indians as 
one of themselves. The last-named writer has 
evidently confused this case with another. Who- 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. 171 

ever and whatever he was, this man had escaped 
from the fort by a characteristic Indian stratagem. 
He had covered himself with a swine's skin, and 
wandered about like a hog in search of roots. In 
this way he managed to work his way at night 
through the lines of the besiegers, and when once 
beyond them he travelled as rapidly as possible 
toward Jackson's camp, and reported the state of 
affairs. 

He arrived on the 7th of November, and Jack- 
son at once began casting about for ways and 
means. He scarcely dared to march with his 
scanty supplies of food, and he scarcely dared to 
leave his post with an insufficient force to defend 
it ; but he must rescue that band of friendly Indi- 
ans at all hazards and at any cost. Their hard 
situation appealed to his pity ; the cruelty of their 
foes appealed to the stronger stuff in his compo- 
sition, arousing his anger and his disposition to 
wreak a righteous vengeance. There were rea- 
sons of polity, too, to move him to activity in 
their behalf. If they should be left to their fate, 
the discouragement of the friendly Indians every- 
where would be great, and might be calamitous. 

Jackson quickly considered all of these things 
and formed his resolution. General White was 
at Turkey Town at the head of about a thousand 



172 RED EAGLE. 

men. Jackson resolved to ord( 1 him to marcn 
immediately upon Fort Strother, and to hold the 
place while the main army should be absent. 
There was great danger in leaving the post un- 
guarded even for a brief time, but the occasion 
was so pressing that the resolute commander de- 
termined to take the risk, hoping that White 
would arrive in time to prevent disaster at the fort. 

Having sent his order to White, he began his 
preparations for an immediate march with the 
whole effective force at the post. 

Between midnight and one o'clock the next 
morning, November 8th, the column began its 
march, two thousand strong, eight hundred being 
mounted men. The task of fording the Coosa 
occupied the hours until the dawn of day, the 
horses of the cavalrymen being used for the trans- 
portation ol the iniantry across the stream. 

A march oi twenty-four miles consumed the 
day, and not long before dark General Jackson 
halted his men within six miles of the enemy, in 
order that they might rest. It was his purpose 
to resume the march after midnight, and attack 
the enemy early in the morning. 

Thus far all had gone well, but here something 
like calamity overtook the commander in the 
shape of extremely bad news. A courier arrived 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. 1 73 

bringing a despatch from General White, in which 
that officer informed Jackson that he could not 
obey the order given him to advance and protect 
Fort Strother, because of positive orders from 
his immediate superior, General Cocke, com- 
manding him to return and rejoin the East Ten- 
nessee division of the army. 

The state of facts which now confronted Jack- 
son was most appalling. He was a long day's 
march from his fortified camp, with an impending 
battle on his hands ; while his camp, to which alone 
he could retire when his present task should be 
done, was lying open and helpless, at the mercy 
of any band of Indians which might choose to 
attack it ! Worse still, Jackson knew that the 
food supplies at the camp were exhausted, and as 
General White was not to come up with the pro- 
visions which he had promised to bring with him, 
Jackson saw T that after fighting the Indians in his 
front he should be obliged to march his exhausted 
and hungry army back to a post where there was 
nothing for them to eat. His was a terrible 
dilemma, neither horn of which offered him hope. 
He expressed his anger with General Cocke and 
General White in forcible terms ; but that did him 
no good, and the offending officers were not pres- 
ent to profit by the rebuke. 



174 RED EAGLE. 

The Indians in his front probably had some 
provisions, enough at least for a meal, and Jackson 
determined to secure these at any rate, and at the 
same time to accomplish the purpose of his expe- 
dition. 

Putting his army in motion very early in the 
morning he approached the Talladega town. 
When within half a mile of the foe he formed his 
line of battle, dividing the cavalry and placing 
half of it upon each wing. The advance was 
made slowly in the centre, so that the wings 
might gradually encircle the enemy, a movement 
much more difficult here than it had been at 
Tallushatchee, because of the greater numbers of 
the enemy, and because of their distribution over 
a wider area. For these reasons the plan of battle 
was less perfectly carried out on this occasion 
than on the former one, but it proved effective 
notwithstanding the difficulties which prevented 
its perfect execution. 

At the proper moment a small body of troops 
was thrown forward from the centre to bring on 
the. action. This force made a spirited attack, 
firing several successive volleys into the ranks of 
the surprised Indians, before a determined resist- 
ance was made to their attack. Then the Creeks 
charged upon them in force, and in accordance 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. T 75 

with the instructions they had received, the offi- 
cers commanding the advance withdrew toward 
the main line, falling back in good order and at a 
moderate speed. We cannot do better than let 
General Jackson tell the rest of the story. In his 
report of the affair he said : 

11 The enemy pursued, and the front line was 
now ordered to advance and meet him ; but, 
owing to some misunderstanding, a few compa- 
nies of militia, who composed part of it, com- 
menced a retreat. At this moment a corps of 
cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dyer, 
which I had kept as a reserve, was ordered to 
dismount and fill up the vacancy occasioned by 
the retreat. This order was executed with a 
great deal of promptitude and effect. The militia 
seeing this, speedily rallied ; and the fire became 
general along the front line, and on that part of 
the wings which was contiguous. The enemy, 
unable to stand it, began to retreat, but were met 
at every turn and repulsed in every direction. 
The right wing chased them, with a most destruc- 
tive fire, to the mountains, a distance of about 
three miles, and, had I not been compelled, by 
the faux pas of the militia in the outset of the bat- 
tle, to dismount my reserve, I believe not a man 
of them would have escaped. The victory, how- 



176 RED EAGLE. 

ever, was very decisive : two hundred and ninety 
of the enemy were left dead, and there can be no 
doubt but many more were killed who were not 
found. Wherever they ran they left behind 
traces of blood, and it is believed that very few 
will return to their villages in as sound a condi- 
tion as they left them. 

14 In the engagement we lost fifteen killed and 
eighty-five wounded ; two of them have since 
died. All the officers acted with the utmost 
bravery, and so did all the privates, except that 
part of the militia who retreated at the commence- 
ment of the battle ; and they hastened to atone 
for their error. Taking the whole together, they 
have realized the high expectations I had formed 
of them, and have fairly entitled themselves to the 
gratitude of their country/ p 

Jackson's loss in wounded included General 
Pillow, Colonel Lauderdale, Major Boyd, and 
Lieutenant Barton ; but of these only Lieutenant 
Barton died of his wounds. The friendly Indians 
rescued numbered one hundred and sixty men, 
with their women and children. 

In writing that two hundred and ninety of the 
enemy were found dead, General Jackson dealt 
in round numbers. General Coffee, who seemed 
always to have an exacting curiosity in such mat- 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. I 7/ 

ters, said in a letter which was written soon after 
the battle : " We have counted two hundred and 
ninety-nine Indians dead on the ground, and it is 
believed that many have not been found that 
were killed dead ; but the battle-ground was so 
very large we had not time to hunt them up. It 
is believed that very few got clear without a 
wound. " 

General Coffee said also in this letter, which 
is preserved in the archives of the Tennessee His- 
torical Society, that ' ' the force of the enemy 
was a little upwards of one thousand warriors, 
picked men, sent forward to destroy our army/' 
By dint of adding to the numbers of Indians 
known to have been killed in the two battles thus 
far fought as many more as he believed to have 
been killed, and assuming that the wounded equal- 
led the killed in numbers, General Coffee arrived 
at the conclusion that the battles of Tallushatchee 
and Talladega had left the fighting force of the 
Creeks " a thousand men weaker' ' than when the 
campaign began. The calculation was scarcely 
a fair one, however ; assumptions respecting dead 
men not found are necessarily unsafe, and as there 
were no wounded men at all left alive at Tallus- 
hatchee, the calculation respecting wounded 
men was of course founded upon an erroneous 



178 RED EAGLE. 

assumption, to say nothing of the fact that the 
only men wounded and not killed at Talladega 
were so slightly wounded that they succeeded in 
getting away, and hence could scarcely be ac- 
counted lost to the Creeks. 

It is easy to pardon the enthusiastic general 
his slight overestimate of the damage inflicted 
upon the enemy, whom he was so earnestly anx- 
ious to defeat. The damage was great, certainly, 
and the success thus far attained had been secured 
at small cost in the matter of the lives of the 
white troops. 

The object for which Jackson had marched 
from Fort Strother to Talladega was fully accom- 
plished. The hostile Creeks in that quarter had 
been routed with heavy loss, and the little band 
of beleaguered friendly Indians were released from 
their dangerous and trying situation ; but Jack- 
son^ army was hungry, and there was a pros- 
pect that actual starvation would presently 
overtake it. The little food that was found at 
Talladega was distributed among the men, suffic- 
ing to satisfy their immediate needs. 

The pressing necessity of the hour now was to 
return with all possible haste to Fort Strother, 
which must not be left in its defenceless state a mo- 
ment longer than was absolutely necessary ; but 



THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA. 1 79 

an instantaneous beginning of the return march 
was wholly out of the question. The men had 
begun their toilsome journey at midnight between 
the 7th and 8th of November, Aad marched all 
day on the 8th, and, after a few hours' rest, had 
begun to march again a little after midnight, to 
go into battle early on the morning of the 9th. 
Now that the battle was done, they were utterly 
worn out, and must rest. Accordingly, the army 
went into camp for the night, after they had bur- 
ied their dead comrades. The next day the 
return march was begun, and on the nth of 
November the weary army arrived at their en- 
campment. 

The fort was unharmed, but it was destitute of 
provisions, and for a time it was with great diffi- 
culty that Jackson prevented a mutiny among the 
troops, whose only food was the meagre supply 
gleaned from the surrounding wilderness. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT AND ITS CON- 
SEQUENCES. 

It is necessary now to explain the circumstan 
ces which left Fort Strother without the garrison 
under General White, which General Jackson 
had provided for its defence during his absence, 
and to show to what consequences this failure of 
the East Tennessee commander to co-operate with 
General Jackson presently led. The writers up- 
on these historical events differ very widely in 
their judgment of the case, and most of them se- 
verely censure General Cocke, attributing his con- 
duct to an unworthy jealousy. His rank was the 
same as that of General Jackson ; but, as was said 
in a former chapter, Jackson's commission was 
the older one, and hence if Cocke had joined his 
* * ranking officer, ' ' Jackson would have been in 
command of the whole force. It was alleged at 
the time and afterward that both the East Ten- 
nessee troops and their commander were jealous 
of Jackson and his army, and envious of that 
army's success. To this unworthy motive Gene- 



GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT. l8l 

ral Cocke's conduct has generally been attributed. 
Mr. Pickett, in his History of Alabama, gives an 
account of the matter, which is substantially the 
same as those given by Drake in his Book of 
the Indians, and by most other writers. 

In that account he says, without doubt or quali- 
fication, that the want of concert between the 
two divisions of the army grew " out of a jealousy 
of the former [the East Tennessee division], and 
a strong desire to share some of the glory which 
the latter had already acquired in the few battles 
they had fought. ' ' 

Mr. Parton, in his Life of Andrew Jackson, 
gives a different version of the affair, attributing 
General Cocke's course to his earnestness in the 
cause, and his knowledge of certain facts which 
were unknown to General Jackson. To that we 
shall come presently ; but while General Cocke's 
statement, upon which Mr. Parton founds his opi- 
nion, is certainly entitled to consideration, it must 
not be forgotten that General Cocke was under at 
least implied orders to join Jackson — orders which 
he was bound as a soldier to obey, whatever his 
judgment may have dictated ; that whatever he 
may have known, there were two or three things 
which he did not know ; that one of these things 
unknown to him — namely, the departure of Jack- 



1 82 RED EAGLE. 

son from Fort Strother — made his obedience to 
orders very necessary to the successful execution 
of Jackson's plans ; and that his want of knowl- 
edge of another fact led to the perpetration of a 
fearful outrage — the driving of Indians who were 
disposed to become peaceful into fierce hostility, 
and the increase of the ferocity of the war. It 
was General Cocke's business to obey his orders, 
expressed or necessarily implied. For reasons 
which he thought good, he neglected to do so, 
and great evil resulted. 

On the march southward Cocke's army had 
destroyed two or three deserted Indian villages, 
but had had no encounter with the enemy. When 
General Cocke arrived within a few days' march of 
Fort Strother he detached General White and sent 
him to Turkey Town. Thence White marched 
to Tallushatchee, intending to attack the place, 
but he arrived there after Coffee had destroyed 
the force gathered at that point, although his 
visit was on the same day. As he was marching 
to join Jackson, it does not very clearly appear 
why General White did not follow Coffee to the 
camp of the main body. He returned to Turkey 
Town instead, and from that point reported to 
Jackson, as we have seen, just as the army was 
about to march upon Talladega. He was at once 



GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT. 183 

ordered to advance and replace Jackson's force 
at the fort, but before he could execute the order 
he received the instructions from General Cocke 
already referred to, directing him to turn back 
and join the East Tennessee division at the mouth 
of the Chattooga River. Believing that in a case 
of conflicting orders it was his duty to obey that 
which came from his immediate superior, Gene- 
ral White obeyed Cocke rather than Jackson. 

Cocke had determined upon a separate opera- 
tion against the Hillabees, and sending White to 
one of the Hillabee towns, that officer surprised 
and destroyed it on the 18th of November, killing 
sixty of the Hillabees and taking two hundred and 
fifty prisoners, mostly women and children. Pick- 
ett says, " The Hillabees, it is asserted, made not 
the slightest resistance. At all events, not a drop 
of Tennessee blood was spilt/ ' 

The unfortunate feature of this affair was that 
to the Indians it wore the appearance of the basest 
and crudest treachery. These Hillabees had 
been great sufferers at Jackson's hands in the bat- 
tle of Talladega, and becoming convinced by the 
result of that battle that resistance was useless, 
they determined to surrender and make peace. 
They sent Robert Grayson, an old Scotchman 
who had lived among them for many years, to 



1 84 RED EAGLE. 

Jackson's camp to sue for peace, proposing to 
lay down their arms, and to comply with what- 
ever terms Jackson might impose upon them. As 
the object ol the war was not to kill the Creeks 
in wantonness, but to secure peace and good con- 
duct at their hands, Jackson properly regarded 
the proposed surrender of the Hillabee tribe as 
the richest fruit of the campaign. Accordingly, 
he sent Grayson back to them with a lecture, and 
an acceptance of their capitulation. He said to 
them : " Upon those who are disposed to become 
friendly, I neither wish nor intend to make war ; 
but they must afford evidences of the sincerity of 
their professions. The prisoners and property 
they have taken from us and the friendly Creeks 
must be restored. The instigators of the war and 
the murderers of our citizens must be surren- 
dered." 

While Jackson was yet rejoicing in the belief 
that his hard-fought battle at Talladega and the 
hardships endured upon that expedition had ac- 
complished so much more than the mere defeat 
of the enemy there, his work was utterly undone 
by the ill-timed and unfortunate expedition of 
White against the Hillabees. These people knew 
nothing of the divided councils of the Tennessee 
army, and when White came down upon one of 



GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT. 1 85 

their towns, while their messenger was still ab- 
sent upon his errand of peace, they naturally sup- 
posed that their assailants were Jackson's men, 
and that he had sent them as his relentless mes- 
sengers to answer the Hillabee prayer for peace 
with the merciless stroke of the sword. Con- 
vinced that Jackson was implacable, and that no 
hope remained to them, the Hillabees fled from 
all their towns and joined the hostile forces, 
wherever bodies of them could be found. Drake 
says, in the Book of the Indians : 

" The Indians thought they had been attacked 
by General Jackson's army, and that therefore 
they were now to expect nothing but extermina- 
tion ; and this was thought to be the reason why 
they fought with such desperation afterwards. 
And truly they had reason for their fears ; they 
knew none but Jackson, and supposed now that 
nothing short of their total destruction would sat- 
isfy him, as their conduct exemplified on every 
occasion. They knew they had asked peace on 
any terms, and their immediate answer was the 
sword and bayonet. ' ' 

In acting as he did, without first consulting with 
General Jackson and learning both the exact situ- 
ation of affairs and the nature of his superior offi- 
cer's purposes, General Cocke did wrong in a 



1 86 RED EAGLE. 

military sense. Of this there seems to be no 
room whatever for doubt or question, and as 
his wrong-doing led to disastrous results, it was 
altogether natural that both General Jackson 
and the historians should severely censure the 
offending officer, as they did ; General Jackson 
being violently exasperated, as well he might be, 
when he learned the full results of the blunder. 

In saying as we do, that General Cocke was 
clearly culpable for acting as he did, we do not ne- 
cessarily imply that his course was dictated by the 
jealousy and envy to which it has been attributed, 
or indeed by unworthy motives of any kind. 
His motives may, perhaps, have been perfectly 
unselfish ; his conduct the result merely of bad 
judgment, or of inaccurate notions of military 
duty ; but to establish these facts is only to palli- 
ate, not to excuse his offence. It is unjust, how- 
ever, in any discussion of these matters, to neglect 
the defence which General Cocke made of his 
conduct. 

That defence was made in the autumn of the 
year 1852, in a letter published in the National 
Intelligencer, and was prompted by the publication 
of certain criticisms upon General Cocke's con- 
duct. In the letter he says : 

" About the 1st of October I rendezvoused my 



GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT. 1 8/ 

troops at Knoxville, and they mustered into ser- 
vice ; and on the twelfth day after, I took up the 
line of march. I encamped with my command 
on the banks of the Coosa, which was the dividing- 
line between the Cherokee and Creek Indians, 
where I was compelled to halt for want of provi- 
sions for my own command ; and at no time after I 
left Knoxville had I more than five days* rations 
for my army. At this point I waited for supplies 
from the contractor, but owing to the low water 
they did not arrive, and I was compelled to pro- 
cure supplies from the Cherokees as best I could. 
General White joined me with his brigade in a 
starving condition upon the second day after my 
arrival on the Coosa. ' ' 

Mr. Parton offers the following comment upon 
this part of the letter and upon the situation : 

" It thus appears that while General Jackson 
was anxiously looking for supplies from General 
Cocke, General Cocke himself was as destitute as 
General Jackson. A junction of the two armies 
would have had the sole effect of doubling Jack- 
son's embarrassments, inasmuch as he would have 
had five thousand men to feed in the wilderness 
instead of twenty -five hundred, and would have 
required twenty wagon-loads of provisions daily 
instead of ten. General Cocke knew this ; knew 



1 88 RED EAGLE. 

that Jackson's anxiety for a junction had arisen 
from an expectation that the East Tennesseeans 
would bring supplies with them ; did not know 
that Jackson's dash at Talladega had left Fort 
Strother unprotected — did not know any thing 
about the Hillabees' suing for peace, and Jack- 
son's favorable reply to them." 

This, we say, is at most only a palliation of the 
offence. General Cocke did not know, as Mr. Par- 
ton says, that Jackson's anxiety for a union of the 
two armies was due to his expectation that the 
East Tennesseeans would bring supplies with 
them, because that was not the fact. He did expect 
them to bring provisions, but his anxiety for a 
junction was not altogether on that account. He 
wanted White's men for a garrison for Fort Stro- 
ther, and hence General Cocke only believed that 
which Mr. Parton assumes that he knew. Again, 
if the junction had been made, and the doubling 
of the number of men had embarrassed Jackson, 
it would have been easy for him to separate the 
forces again. Moreover, after the Hillabee expe- 
dition was ended, General Cocke was ready and 
willing to join Jackson, while the scarcity of pro- 
visions remained ; if his reason for not forming 
the junction was good in the one case, it was good 
also in the other. Indeed, General Cocke has 



GENERAL COCKE'S CONDUCT. 1 89 

himself contradicted the plea which Mr. Parton 
makes in his behalf. While General White was 
still absent on the Hillabee expedition, General 
Cocke wrote a letter to Jackson, in which he said : 

4 ' I entertain the opinion that to make the pres- 
ent campaign as successful as it ought to be, it is 
essential that the whole force from Tennessee 
should act in concert. I have despatched all my 
mounted men, whose horses were fit for duty, on 
the Hillabee towns, to destroy them. I expect 
their return in a few days. I send the bearer to 
you for the sake of intelligence as to your intended 
operations, and for the sake of assuring you that 
I will most heartily agree to any plan that will be 
productive of the most good." 

From the fact that he thus arranged to put him- 
self within the range of Jackson's authority as 
soon as his Hillabee campaign should be ended, 
the inference is inevitable that General Cocke ne- 
glected to make the contemplated earlier junction 
in order that he might carry out this little scheme 
of his own. Inasmuch as a court-martial, com- 
posed of officers who, General Cocke says, were 
his bitterest enemies and Jackson's closest friends, 
fully acquitted the accused officer of guilt, it is 
only fair to the memory ol a brave and conscien- 
tious soldier to believe that he acted for the good 



190 RED EAGLE. 

of the cause ; that his anxiety to deal a blow at the 
Hillabees was prompted by a desire to serve the 
ends of the campaign, not by unworthy jealousy 
of Jackson ; but beyond this it does not appear to 
be possible to go. We may properly acquit Gen- 
eral Cocke of petty envy, and of conscious insub- 
ordination, but it is impossible not to see that 
his course was ill-judged as well as calamitous in 
its results, and it is impossible also to blame Jack- 
son for his displeasure with his subordinate. The 
most that General Cocke establishes in his de- 
fence, which is elaborate, is that he acted in ac- 
cordance with the unanimous opinion of his field 
officers ; that he conscientiously believed that his 
course was the best one to be pursued in the cir- 
cumstances, and that it was dictated solely by his 
earnest desire to serve the cause. The most that 
is proved against him appears to be, that he acted 
with smaller regard to strict military rules than 
an officer of his rank should have done. He was 
guilty of a blunder, not of a crime. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE CANOE FIGHT. 

With the affairs already described, Jackson's 
campaign came to a halt by reason of his want of 
supplies, and on account of mutinous conduct 
upon the part of his men. For many weeks the 
Tennessee army did nothing, but remained at Fort 
Strother, while the war went on in other parts 
of the field. For the present, therefore, we leave 
Jackson, to follow the course of affairs elsewhere. 

The autumn having brought with it the neces- 
sity of gathering what remained of the crops in 
that part of the country which lies on the Ala- 
bama and Tombigbee rivers, the settlers there 
did what they could to clear the country of prowl- 
ing bands of Indians. They sent out bodies of 
armed men in different directions, and under 
protection of such forces as they could muster, 
began gathering the ripened corn. 

The danger of famine, if the corn should be al- 
lowed to perish in the fields, seems also to have 
aroused General Flournoy from his dream of strict 
adherence to law and treaty in his treatment of 



I9 2 RED EAGLE. 

the Creeks. His predecessor, General Floyd, 
had refused, it will be remembered, to permit 
General Claiborne to invade the Creek Nation 
early in the war, when that officer confidently 
believed that he could speedily conquer a peace 
by pursuing that course. Flournoy now re- 
ceded from the position then taken, so far at 
least as to order Claiborne to advance with his 
army and protect the citizens while they should 
gather their crops. He still ordered no resolute 
invasion of the Creek territory, for the purpose 
of transferring the seat of war to the soil of the 
enemy, and putting an end to the strife ; but he 
ordered Claiborne to drive the Indians from the 
frontier, and even to follow them so far as the 
towns which lay near the border, instructing him 
to kill, burn, and destroy all their negroes, 
horses, cattle, and other property, that cannot 
conveniently be brought to the depots/' 

General Flournoy, like General Floyd, appears 
to have been somewhat too highly civilized for the 
business in which he was engaged. Knowing, as he 
did, that Claiborne was fighting savages who had 
violated every usage and principle of civilized war- 
fare, who were prowling about in the white settle- 
ments murdering every white man, woman, and 
child whom they could find, and who had com- 



THE CANOE FIGHT. 193 

mitted the most horrible wholesale butchery at 
Fort Mims ; knowing all this, and knowing too that 
an army from Tennessee was already invading the 
Creek country from the north, General Flournoy 
appears to have given Claiborne this half-hearted 
and closely -limited permission to fight the Creeks 
upon their own terms and their own soil with great 
reluctance and with apologetic misgivings. He 
set forth his conviction that even the little which 
he was now permitting Claiborne to do toward 
making the war real on the white side was not 
in accordance with the usages of civilized nations 
at war ; but excused himself for his departure from 
those usages by citing the conduct of the enemy 
in justification of it. A stronger man than Gene- 
ral Flournoy would have seen that the Creeks 
had turned complete savages, that they had begun 
a savage warfare for the extermination of the 
whites, and that such a war could be brought to 
an end only by the destruction of the white 
people whom he was set to protect, or by the 
prompt, resolute, and complete subjugation of 
the Creeks. Seeing this, such an officer would 
have seen that the Creeks could be conquered 
only by the invasion of their territory with fire 
and sword, and with no respect whatever for 
those rights which were theirs in peace, but which 



194 RED EAGLE. 

had been forfeited in the war. It seems incredi 
ble that General Flournoy, in such circumstances 
and with such an enemy to contend with, should 
have muddled his head and embarrassed his army 
with nice questions of the rights, duties, and us- 
ages of civilized warfare. This was so clearly not 
a civilized, but an especially savage war, that his 
hesitation, and the misgivings upon which that 
hesitation was founded, are wholly inexplicable. 

Claiborne was quick to use the small liberty 
given him to fight the Creeks, while the settlers, 
from their positions in the stockade forts, were 
already making frequent expeditions against vul- 
nerable points. 

Early in October, a body of twenty-five men, 
under Colonel William McGrew, went in pursuit 
of an Indian force, and attacked them resolutely 
on a little stream called Barshi Creek. The In- 
dians were in considerable force, and despite the 
courage and determination of the whites the 
Creeks got the best of the affair, killing Colonel 
McGrew and three of his men, and putting the 
rest of the force to flight. 

Much better success attended another expedi- 
tion, which was undertaken about this time, and 
which resulted in one of the most remarkable in- 
cidents of the war, a sort of naval battle on a 



THE CANOE FIGHT. I95 

very small scale, but one that was contested as 
heroically as the battle of the Nile itself. This 
was Captain Sam Dale's celebrated canoe fight, 
of which a writer has said : 

" There has seldom occurred in border war- 
fare a more romantic incident. . . . History 
has almost overlooked it, as too minute in its de- 
tails for her stately philosophy. Yet for singu- 
larity of event, novelty of position, boldness of 
design, and effective personal fortitude and prow- 
ess, it is unsurpassed, if equalled, by any thing in 
backwoods chronicles, however replete these may 
be with the adventures of pioneers, the sufferings 
of settlers, and the achievements of that class who 
seem almost to have combined the life and man- 
ners of the freebooter with the better virtues of 
social man. 

When Colonel McGrew's men returned after 
their unsuccessful conflict with the Creeks, the 
news they brought greatly incensed the people of 
Fort Madison, whose friends had fallen in that 
unlucky action. Believing that the main body of 
the Creeks was now south of the Alabama River, 
and fearing that they would destroy the buildings 
and the crops there, Captain Sam Dale, who had 
now nearly recovered from his severe wound re- 
ceived at the battle of Burnt Corn, organized an 



I96 RED EAGLE. 

expedition for the purpose of clearing the lower 
country, if possible, of the hostile bands. The 
force which volunteered for this service consisted 
of seventy-two men. Thirty of them constituted 
Captain Richard Jones's company of Mississippi 
yauger men. The remainder were men of the 
neighborhood, who volunteered for the expedi- 
tion. 

Among these volunteers were three whose 
participation in the canoe fight makes it neces- 
sary to introduce them particularly to the reader. 
One of them was a negro, whose name, Caesar, 
together with his good and gallant conduct on 
this occasion, are all that history has preserved 
with respect to him. Another was young Jere- 
miah Austill, the youth who carried despatches, 
as already related, between Colonel Carson and 
General Claiborne, when that service was most 
dangerous. The third was James Smith. We 
may best tell what is known of young Smith in 
the words of Mr. A. B. Meek, whose volume of 
sketches, from which we shall quote here, is un- 
fortunately out of print. Mr. Meek writes thus : 

" In Dale's command was a private soldier who 
already had a high reputation as an expert, dar- 
ing and powerful Indian fighter. Born in Geor- 
gia in 1787 this scion of the universal Smith 



THE CANOE FIGHT. I97 

family was now a very stout, finely-proportioned 
man, five feet eight inches high, weighing one 
hundred and sixty pounds. Residing near Fort 
Madison, he took refuge there at the outbreak of 
the war. His fearless and adventurous character 
may be indicated by an incident. One day he 
determined to visit his farm, about eight miles 
distant, to see what injury the Indians had done. 
Proceeding cautiously, he came to a house in 
which he heard a noise, and, stealing up to the 
door, he found two Indians engaged in bundling 
up tools and other articles to carry them off. Lev- 
elling his gun at them he made them come out of 
the house and march before him toward the fort. 
In a thicket of woods the Indians suddenly sepa- 
rated, one on each hand, and ran. Smith fired at 
one of them and killed him, and, dropping his 
rifle, pursued the other, and, catching him, 
knocked him down with a light-wood * knot and 
beat out his brains. . . . This, and similar 
deeds of daring and prowess, gave to James 
Smith a high position among his frontier friends, 
and neighbors. " 

Mr. Meek writes more fully of young Austill. 

* " Light- wood " is a term used in the South to signify richly 
resinous pine, of the kind sometimes called " pitch-pine" in other 
parts of the country. 



198 RED EAGLE 

He describes him as a youth nineteen years of 
age, dark, tall, sinewy, and full of youthful dar- 
ing. The stories of his courageous performances 
were many, and during the war he won the spec- 
ial commendation of his superiors on many occa- 
sions for his bravery and his devotion to duty. 

Dale marched from Fort Madison on the nth 
of November, with Tandy Walker, a noted fron- 
tiersman, for his guide. Marching to the south- 
east, the column crossed the Alabama River at a 
point about thirty miles above Mims's ferry, and 
about twenty miles below the site of the present 
town of Claiborne. 

Dale was thoroughly well acquainted with the 
habits of the Indians, among whom indeed he had 
lived frequently for long periods. He was there- 
fore keenly alive to the necessity of unremitting 
vigilance, and, determined to suffer no surprise, 
he refused to permit any of his men to sleep dur- 
ing the night after his passage to the south-east 
bank of the river. During the next day he ad- 
vanced up the river very cautiously, sending Au- 
stin, with six men, in two canoes which he had 
found, while the rest of the force marched through 
the woods on the bank. 

At a place called Peggy Bailey's bluff the first 
signs of the presence of Indians were discovered. 



THE CANOE FIGHT. 1 99 

Following the trail well in advance of his men, 
Dale discovered ten Indians at breakfast. The 
first intimation these Indians had of the presence 
of white men on that side of- the river came to 
them in the shape of a bullet from Dale's rifle, 
which killed one of the party, and caused the rest 
of them to abandon their provision pack, and 
flee precipitately through the woods. 

Securing the abandoned provisions, Dale 
marched on a mile or two, but finding no further 
traces of Indians, he determined to recross the 
river and scour the country on the other side. 

The work of crossing was necessarily slow. 
Only two canoes were to be had, and the river 
was nearly a fourth of a mile wide, but little by 
little the force was paddled across, until only 
about a dozen of the men remained with Dale on 
the eastern bank. These men were at breakfast 
when suddenly they were startled by a volley 
from the rifles of an Indian force. This force, as 
was afterward learned, was the advance party ol 
about three hundred warriors. Dale and his 
handful of men protected themselves as well as 
they could among the trees, and returned the fire. 
Had the savages known the weakness of their 
force, they might easily have destroyed the little 
party by making a determined dash ; but Dale and 



200 RED EAGLE. 

his men were so well concealed among the trees 
and in the bushes, that their enemies, in ignorance 
of their numbers, did not dare charge them. The 
nature ol the ground served also to favor Dale. 
The river here had what is called a double bank 
— that is to say, there were two plateaus, one 
above the other, each breaking rather suddenly 
at its edge. These banks, covered with dense 
undergrowth, served the purpose of rude natural 
breastworks. 

The first assault was made by about twenty- 
five or thirty of the savages, who were speedily 
joined by others, and Dale quickly saw that his 
position was an extremely critical one. The In- 
dians must soon discover from the infrequency of 
the fire from the bank that the force there was 
small, and it was certain that they would make a 
charge as soon as this should be discovered — a 
charge which the dozen men there could not 
possibly withstand. Dale's first thought was of 
escape across the river to the main body of his 
little company ; but this was clearly out of the 
question. There was but one canoe on his side 
of the river, so that to cross at all the little com- 
pany on the bank must separate, half of it going 
over at one trip and half at another. If half of 
them should embark, the Indians, seeing the 



THE CANOE FIGHT. 201 

canoe in the river with its cargo of fugitives 
would know at once that the band on the bank 
was unable to resist them, and hence would de- 
stroy the men left behind before the canoe could 
return to bring them away. 

Dale called to his men on the other side of the 
river to recross and render him assistance, but 
they seemed to be for the time fairly panic- 
stricken, so that none of them moved to answer 
the call. After a time their courage appeared 
to return, and eight of them manned a canoe and 
began the passage. When the man who led this 
detachment saw the great superiority of the In- 
dian force, he became panic-stricken again and 
ordered a retreat, so that even this little attempt 
to reinforce Dale's tremendously overmatched 
company failed to bring relief. 

Meantime a new danger appeared, coming this 
time upon the rear. A large canoe holding 
eleven Indian warriors shot out from the bank a 
little way up the river and paddled down to 
Dale's position. Here an attempt was made to 
land. Should this be accomplished, the fight 
must end at once in the destruction of the whole 
detachment on the river bank. To ward off this 
danger Dale was compelled to fight both ways — 
to the rear and to the front. He himself, with all 



202 RED EAGLE. 

of his men but three, kept up not a brisk, but a 
very destructive, fire in front, picking their men 
and shooting with all the precision of skilled 
marksmen ; while Smith, Austill, and one other 
man devoted their attention to the warriors in 
the canoe, preventing them from approaching the 
shore. 

Being kept thus at a distance, two of the most 
daring of the Indians in the canoe resolved to risk 
an attempt to swim ashore. Leaping overboard 
only their heads were exposed, of course ; but 
Smith succeeded in sending a bullet into even 
that small target, killing one of the swimmers in- 
stantly. The other reached the bank, where he 
was met by Austill, who unluckily tripped and 
fell into the water, and before he could regain 
his footing the savage had escaped. 

His escape brought matters to a head. Dale 
knew that this Indian had seen how small his 
force was, and that he would report its weakness, 
thereby making an immediate charge certain. 
He therefore resolved upon a desperate attempt. 
He called to his men, declaring his purpose to 
man the little canoe that remained with him, and 
attack the Indian canoe party. For this perilous 
service he asked who would volunteer. Smith, 
Austill, and the negro man Caesar at once offered 



THE CANOE FIGHT. 203, 

themselves ; and with this little force Dale speed- 
ily put his plan into execution. Cassar took the 
stern of the canoe as steersman, and the three 
white men grasped their paddles. 

The Indians had fired all their ammunition 
away, else it would have gone hard with Dale 
when his own and his comrades' guns failed to 
fire as they did, because the powder in their pans 
had become wet. When this fact was discovered 
the two canoes were near each other, and Dale 
had no thought of flinching from the hand-to- 
hand conflict which must ensue between himself 
and his three companions on the one hand, and 
the nine remaining Indians on the other. He 
ordered Caesar to bring the canoe alongside the 
enemy's boat, and to hold it firmly there. As this 
was done the Indians leaped to their feet, with 
their war-clubs and knives, ready for the combat. 
When the boats touched, Dale instantly leaped 
into that of his enemy, for the double purpose of 
crowding the enemy close together and giving 
his own companions abundant room in which to 
swing their clubbed guns. It was a mere question 
of brute strength between men determined to club 
each other to death. Austill was knocked down 
with a war-club once, but recovered himself. 
Dale advanced in the boat, knocking over one 



204 RED EAGLE. 

Indian after another with his rapid blows. A 
few minutes sufficed to bring the action to a close. 

It is said that the last of the Indians was a 
young warrior with whom Dale had lived and 
hunted as a friend before the outbreak of the war. 
This young Indian and his former friend now 
confronted each other in the boat. Dale recog- 
nized the man with whom he had sat at the camp- 
fire and passed long days in the hunt ; he hesi- 
tated, and was about to lower his raised weapon 
when the young savage, calling him by the name 
he had borne among the Indians, which meant 
" Big Sam," cried, " Sam Thlucco, you are a 
man, 1 am another — now for it !" He spoke in 
the Muscogee tongue, with which Dale was fa- 
miliar, and as he spoke he attempted to grapple 
with Dale, but the active white man was too quick 
of movement for him. Stepping back suddenly, 
he brained his Indian antagonist with a single 
blow, and the canoe-fight was ended. The nine 
Indians were corpses, and Dale had not lost a 
single man, although Austill was severely 
wounded in the head. 

There was perilous work yet to do, however. 
The brave men in the boat had no thought of 
abandoning their friends on the bank. Their own 
guns were broken, and they were under a severe 



THE CANOE FIGHT. 205 

fire from the savages on shore, but in spite of 
this they cleared the large canoe by throwing 
the dead Indians overboard, and, with the two 
boats, paddled back to the bank under a galling 
fire, and brought off the remainder of the party 
in safety. If they had not conquered, they had 
at least baffled the Indians, inflicting considerable 
loss upon them without suffering any loss in their 
turn. That night the expedition returned to Fort 
Madison. 

Dale was so typical a frontiersman, so perfect a 
model of the daring and wily warrior of the bor- 
der, that as long as he lived he was a man about 
whom the interest of curiosity hung. A writer 
who knew him well wrote of him thus : 

" In person General Dale was tall, erect, raw- 
boned, and muscular. In many respects, physical 
and moral, he resembled his antagonists of the 
woods. He had the square forehead, the high 
cheek-bones, the compressed lips, and in fact the 
physiognomy of an Indian, relieved, however, 
by a firm, benevolent, Saxon eye. Like the red 
man, too, his foot fell lightly upon the ground 
and turned neither to the right nor left. He was 
habitually taciturn ; his face grave ; he spoke 
slowly and in low tones, and he seldom laughed. 
I observed of him what I have often noted as 



206 RED EAGLE. 

peculiar to border men of high attributes — he 
entertained the strongest attachment for the In- 
dians, extolled their courage, their love of coun- 
try, and many of their domestic qualities ; and I 
have often seen the wretched remnant of the 
Choctaws camped around his plantation and sub- 
sisting on his crops. In peace they felt for him 
the strongest veneration ; he had been the friend 
both of Tecumseh and Weatherford ; and in war 
the name of ' Big Sam ' fell on the ear of the 
Seminole like that of Marius on the hordes of the 
Cimbri."* 

* From a sketch by General John H. F. Claiborne, published 
in the Natchez (Miss.) Free-Trader, on the occasion of Dale's 
death in the year 1841. 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE ADVANCE OF THE GEORGIANS— THE 
BATTLE OF AUTOSSE. 

When the call was made by General Claiborne 
upon Tennessee for assistance, a similarly earnest 
appeal was sent to Georgia, and the response 
from that State was equally prompt. The troops 
raised there were under command of General 
Floyd, who had been superseded in the command 
of the Department of the South-west by General 
Flournoy some months earlier. General Floyd 
was an energetic soldier, and he quickly found 
work to do. 

It will be remembered that as soon as Red 
Eagle learned that he would not be permitted to 
attack and burn Mobile he turned his attention 
to the country north and east of the Creek Na- 
tion, and sent two bodies of his warriors to ha- 
rass the borders, one force threatening Tennes- 
see and the other seeking to find some vulner- 
able point on the Georgia frontier. Jackson's 
advance with an overwhelming force and his vig- 
orous blows at Tallushatchee and Talladega com- 



208 RED EAGLE. 

pelled the Creeks to abandon their designs upon 
Tennessee and stand upon the defensive. They 
saw the full significance of his advance, and knew 
that he had come not merely to garrison forts, 
and protect settlers, but to carry the war to the 
heart of the Creek Nation, and to throttle the 
Creek power in its stronghold. This was what 
Claiborne wanted to do by a resolute movement 
from the south, and there can be little doubt that 
if he could have had permission to do so he 
would have saved the Tensaw and Tombigbee 
settlements from the worst of their sufferings, by 
making the Creeks the hunted rather than the 
hunters, precisely as Jackson saved the people of 
Tennessee by an aggressive policy. The other 
column, which threatened Georgia, was met in like 
manner by General Floyd, and with like results. 

Floyd's army consisted of nine hundred and 
fifty militiamen and four hundred friendly In- 
dians, part of them being Cowetas under com- 
mand of Major Mcintosh, one of the half-breeds 
whom High Head Jim had planned to kill as a 
preparation for the war, and the rest Tookabat- 
chas under Mad Dragon's Son. Floyd was bet- 
ter equipped than Jackson had been in his first 
battles, having some small pieces of artillery 
with him. 



THE ADVANCE OF THE GEORGIANS. 209 

Having learned that a large force of the Creeks 
was at High Head Jim's town, Autosse, on the 
south-east side of the Tallapoosa River, about 
twenty miles above the point at which that 
stream unites with the Coosa, General Floyd 
marched against them in the latter part of No- 
vember. McAfee, who is usually a very careful 
historian, gives the 28th of September as the 
date, but this is clearly wrong. Crossing the 
Ockmulgee, Flint, and Coosa rivers under the 
guidance of a Jewish trader named Abram Mor- 
decai, Floyd arrived in the neighborhood of Au- 
tosse early in the morning on the 29th of Novem- 
ber. 

His plan of battle was precisely the same as 
that which Coffee had adopted at Tallushatchee, 
and Jackson at Talladega — that is to say, he 
planned to surround the town and destroy the 
fighting force within ; but in this case the scheme 
miscarried. In the first place, Mcintosh and Mad 
Dragon's Son were ordered to cross the river 
and cut off retreat to the opposite shore, and they 
failed to do what was required of them. Whether 
this was due to the unforeseen difficulties of 
crossing, as the Indians alleged ; or to the reluc- 
tance of the Indians to swim the river on a cold, 
frosty morning, as some historians say; or to a 



2.10 RED EAGLE. 

failure of their courage, as was charged at the time 
— there are now no means of determining, and it 
is not important. It is enough to know that they 
did not cross the river as ordered, and hence 
when the attack was made the bank of the stream 
opposite the town was unguarded. 

This was not the only way, however, in which 
the original plan of attack was prevented. The 
real position and strength of the Indian force had 
been misapprehended, and when, early in the ac- 
tion, this was discovered, General Floyd was 
obliged to alter his disposition of troops accord- 
ingly. The advance was made as soon as there 
was sufficient light, on the morning of the 29th 
of November, with Booth's battalion on the 
right, Watson's on the left. The flanks were 
guarded by riflemen, and Thomas with his artil- 
lery accompanied Booth's battalion. Booth was 
instructed to march until he couid rest the head 
of his column upon the little creek at the mouth 
of which the town stood, while Watson was to 
stretch his column around to the left in a curve, 
resting its left flank upon the river just below the 
town. If this could have been done as intended, 
and the friendly Indians had occupied the oppo- 
site side of the river, the encircling of the place 
would have been complete ; but besides the fail* 



THE ADVANCE OF THE GEORGIANS. 211 

are of the Indians another difficulty stood in the 
way. Instead of one town there were two, the 
second lying about a quarter of a mile further 
down the river, immediately in rear of the posi- 
tion to which Watson had been ordered. 

To avoid the danger of an attack in the rear of 
his left flank, which might have resulted disas- 
trously, General Floyd sent Lieutenant Hendon 
with Merri weather's riflemen, three companies 
of infantry and two of dragoons to attack the 
lower town, while he threw the remainder of the 
army, now reinforced by the friendly Indians 
under Mad Dragon's Son and Mcintosh, against 
the larger upper town. 

The fighting began about sunrise, and speedily 
Decame extremely severe. The prophets had 
enchanted the place, making it sacred ground, 
and they had assured the warriors that any 
white force which should attack them would be 
utterly exterminated. In this belief the savages 
resisted the attack with terrible determination, 
contesting every inch of the ground which they 
believed to be sacred. 

Soon after the battle began, the artillery — an 
arm which was particularly dreaded by the 
Creeks with something of superstitious horror — 
was brought forward and unlimbered. Its rapid 



212 RED EAGLE. 

discharges soon turned the tide of battle, which 
until now had not gone against the Indians. 
When the Indians began to waver before the 
cannon-shot, Major Freeman with his squadron 
of cavalry charged and broke their lines. They 
were closely pressed by the infantry, while the 
friendly Indians who had now crossed the creek 
cut off retreat up the river, leaving the broken 
and flying Creeks no road of escape except across 
the river. At nine o' clock both towns were in 
flames, and there was no army in Floyd's front. 
He was victor in the action, and his success in 
attacking a sacred stronghold was certain to 
work great demoralization among the supersti- 
tious Creeks ; but prudence dictated a retreat 
nevertheless. The country round about was 
populous with Indians, and the force which 
fought at Autosse although broken was not de- 
stroyed. It was certain that if the army should 
remain in the neighborhood it would be con- 
stantly harassed, and perhaps beaten by the su- 
perior force which the Creeks could speedily 
muster. 

Besides all this, Floyd had only a scanty sup- 
ply of provisions, and his base of supplies was 
sixty miles away, on the Chattahoochie River. 
He determined, therefore, to begin his return 



THE ADVANCE OF THE GEORGIANS. 2IJ 

march as soon as he could bury his dead and ar- 
range for the care of his wounded, of whom he 
was himself one. 

The return march was perhaps hastened by the 
determination and spirit of the Indians, who, 
notwithstanding their defeat, attacked Floyd's 
rear within a mile of their burned town on the 
day of the battle. The attack was made with 
spirit, but the numbers of the Indians were not 
sufficient to enable them to maintain it long. 

In this battle of Autosse Floyd lost eleven 
white men killed and fifty-four wounded, besides 
some losses among his friendly Indians. Coffee 
not being there to count the dead Creeks, the 
exact number of the slain warriors of the enemy 
was not ascertained, but it was estimated at about 
two hundred. 



CHAPTER XXL 

HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS 
—THE BATTLE OF THE HOLY GROUND- 
RED EAGLE'S FAMOUS LEAP. 

General Claiborne construed as liberally 
as he dared the order from General Flournoy 
which permitted him to drive the Creeks across 
the border, and to pursue them as far as the 
neighboring towns. He adopted the frontier 
notion of nearness when deciding whether or not 
a particular town that he wanted to strike was 
sufficiently near the dividing line between the 
white settlements and the Creek Nation. 

His orders were to establish a fort at Weather- 
ford's Bluff, and to remain in that neighborhood 
until he should be joined by Jackson's army and 
the Georgia troops, who were now advancing 
under command of General Floyd. 

The force with which he advanced to execute 
this order was a motley one. There were three 
hundred volunteers, who were the main reliance 
of the commander. There was a small dragoon 
force, composed of good men. Pushmatahaw, 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 215 

the Choctaw warrior, with his followers accom- 
panied the expedition, and a small force of militia- 
men completed the little army. 

Arriving at Weatherford's Bluff on the 17th 
of November, Claiborne proceeded without delay 
to build a stockade fort inclosing nearly an acre 
of ground, within which he built three block- 
houses, while for defence against an assault from 
the river side of the encampment he established 
a battery on the bank. The work, when finished, 
was christened Fort Claiborne, and from it the 
present town of Claiborne on the same spot in- 
herited the commander's name. 

Here, on the 28th of November, Claiborne 
was reinforced by the Third Regiment of United 
States Infantry, under command of Colonel Rus- 
sell, and in order that concert of action might be 
secured, he wrote hence to General Jackson at 
the Ten Islands, reporting the situation of affair? 
on the southern side of the field, and informing 
the Tennessee commander, of whose starvation he 
had heard, that abundant supplies of food awaited 
his coming. 

His activity knew no bounds. He sent trust- 
worthy messengers to Pensacola to learn the sit- 
uation of affairs there, and ascertained through 
them that the British were there with a consid- 



2l6 RED EAGLE. 

erable fleet and abundant supplies both for the 
Indians and for their own troops, whose presence 
there threatened a descent upon Mobile or New 
Orleans. He wrote at once to Governor Blount, 
of Tennessee, informing him of these facts. He 
sent messengers also to Mount Vernon, instruct- 
ing Colonel Nixon, who commanded there, to 
garrison Fort Pierce, a little post a few miles 
from the ruins of Fort Minis, and suppress a 
recently awakened activity among the Indians 
in that quarter. 

The alertness of Claiborne's intelligence and 
his unwearied devotion to duty made him an es- 
pecially fit man for the important charge that was 
laid upon him. A close study of his career shows 
him to have been indeed so capable a man in mili- 
tary affairs, that we may fairly regret that his field 
of operations was too small and too remote from 
the centres of American life to permit him to se- 
cure the fame which he fairly earned. 

General Claiborne was not thinking of fame, 
however, but of making fierce war upon the 
Creeks and reducing them to subjection. He 
knew that Red Eagle with a strong force was at 
Econachaca, or the Holy Ground, and he deter- 
mined to attack him there. The Holy Ground 
was one hundred and ten miles from Fort Clai- 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 217 

borne, and it could not be, with any strictness of 
construction, considered a " neighboring' ' town ; 
but the order whicl restricted Claiborne's excur- 
sions into the Creek Nation to the neighboring 
towns was couched in terms which did not admit 
of precise definition, and as he really wanted to 
march to the Holy Ground, the gallant general 
determined to regard it as a place within his 
immediate neighborhood. He did not know, in 
truth, precisely where it was, and there were 
neither roads nor paths through the woods to 
guide him to it, but he believed, with Suwarrow, 
the Russian commander, that a general can al- 
ways find his enemy when he really wants to do 
%o, and in this case Claiborne very earnestly 
wished to find and to fight Weatherford. 

Accordingly he prepared to march. He was 
in poor condition for such an undertaking cer- 
tainly, his force being weak in numbers, ill as- 
sorted, and in fact rather unwilling to go. Nine 
of his captains, eight lieutenants, and five ensigns 
sent him a written remonstrance against what 
they believed to be the mad undertaking. These 
officers directed their commander's attention to 
several ugly facts with respect to his situation. 
They reminded him that the weather was cold 
and inclement ; that the troops were badly shod 



2l8 RED EAGLE. 

and insufficiently supplied with clothing ; that 
there was scarcely a possibility of feeding them 
regularly upon so long a march into the literally 
pathless forest ; and finally that the term of ser- 
vice for which many of the men had enlisted 
would soon come to an end. 

The remonstrance was earnest, but perfectly 
respectful. The officers who signed it assured 
General Claiborne that if he should adhere to his 
determination they would go with him without 
murmuring, and do their duty. As there was 
nothing set forth in the remonstrance which 
Claiborne did not know or had not duly consid- 
ered already, it made no change in his mind. He 
set his motley army in motion, determined to take 
all responsibility, dare all dangers, and endure 
all hardships for the sake of accomplishing the 
purpose which he had so long cherished, of carry- 
ing the war into the centre of the Creek Nation. 
How heavy the load of responsibility which he 
thus took upon himself was, and how firm his 
courage in assuming it must have been, we may 
understand when we reflect that defeat in his at- 
tempt would certainly have subjected him to a 
charge of criminal and reckless disobedience of 
orders in undertaking such an expedition at all. 
No such charge was ever preferred, because offi- 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 219 

cers are not usually haled before a court-martial 
for winning battles. 

The force with which he set out consisted of 
the Third Regiment of United States troops, un- 
der Colonel Russell ; a squadron of cavalry, com- 
manded by Major Cassels ; one battalion of mili- 
tia, led by Major Smoot, whom the reader will 
remember as one of the leaders at the battle of 
Burnt Corn ; Colonel Carson's Mississippi volun- 
teers, and Pushmatahaw's Choctaws, to the num- 
ber of one hundred and fifty, making a total of 
about one thousand men. Dale was a captain 
now in Smoot's command, and accompanied the 
expedition in that capacity. 

The march was begun early in December, 
through a country without roads, infested with 
Indians whose force could never be guessed, and 
in weather which was extremely unfavorable. 
Toilsomely the column advanced northeastward- 
ly, or nearly so, to a point eighty miles from 
Fort Claiborne, in what is now Butler County, 
Alabama. There Claiborne took the precaution 
to build a stockade fort, which he named Fort 
Deposit, and placed within it his baggage, his ar- 
tillery, his supply wagons, and his sick men. 

Leaving this fort with a garrison of one hun- 
dred men, Claiborne marched on toward the 



220 RED EAGLE. 

Holy Ground, which lay some thirty miles away. 
His men speedily consumed the three days' ra- 
tions of flour which they had drawn before begin- 
ning the march from Fort Deposit, and when the 
army arrived at the Indian stronghold its supply 
of pork, the only remaining article of food, was 
nearly exhausted. Whatever was to be done must 
be done quickly, in order that the troops might 
not starve before reaching Fort Deposit on the 
return march. 

The Holy Ground was a newly-established 
town, upon a spot chosen by Red Eagle because 
of its natural strength as a defensive position. 
It lay upon the eastern bank of the Alabama 
River, just below what is now Powell's Ferry, 
in the present Lowndes County, Alabama. The 
site of the town was a high bluff overlooking the 
river, and protected on Jthe land side by marshes 
and deep ravines. 

Here Red Eagle had gathered his forces in 
considerable strength, and hither had fled the 
remnants of various defeated bodies of Creeks, 
with their women and children. The prophets 
Sinquista and Josiah Francis, who were present, 
declared the soil to be sacred, and assured their 
comrades that no white troops would be permit- 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 221 

ted by the Great Spirit to cross the swamps and 
ravines which surrounded it. 

Red Eagle, having more faith in defensive 
works than in supernatural interferences at the 
behest of his prophets, whose characters he prob- 
ably understood pretty accurately, added to the 
natural strength of the place by picket and log 
fortifications, making it as difficult to assault suc- 
cessfully as he could. 

In this central camp of refuge there were as 
many as two hundred houses, and during the two 
or three months which had elapsed since the 
town was established many of the prisoners taken 
by the Indians in battle had been brought hither 
and murdered. When Claiborne advanced to 
attack the place, preparations were making in the 
public square for the burning of a number of un- 
fortunate captives, among whom were one white 
woman, Mrs. Sophia Durant, and several half- 
breeds. 

Claiborne arrived on the 23d of December, and 
made his dispositions for the assault without de- 
lay. He advanced in three columns, leading the 
centre in person. The Indians, as soon as they 
learned of Claiborne's approach, made prepara- 
tions for defence. They carried their women and 



222 RED EAGLE. 

children across the river and concealed them in 
the thick woods on the other side. 

The savages made the first attack, falling vio- 
lently upon the right column of Claiborne's force 
under Colonel Carson. The onset was repulsed 
after a brief engagement, the Indians becoming 
panic-stricken for some reason never explained, 
and retreating. Weatherford led the attack, and 
for a time contested the field very stubbornly ; 
but his men failing in courage in spite of all that 
he could do, he was powerless to maintain his 
ground. 

Major Cassels, who with his squadron of cav- 
alry had been ordered to occupy the river bank, 
failed to do so, and fell back instead upon Car- 
son's regiment ; and that gallant officer, seeing the 
gap thus produced, advanced his line and occu- 
pied the ground. Meantime, however, the mis- 
chief had been done. Cassels's failure had left a 
road of escape open to the Indians at the critical 
moment, and hundreds of them fled and swam 
the river to the thick woods on the other side. 

When the Indian line broke and the retreat be- 
gan, the nature of the ground, crossed as it was 
by ravines and dotted with marshes, made any 
thing like vigorous and systematic pursuit impos- 
sible. Perhaps their consciousness that escape by 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 223 

flight was easy helped to induce the Indians to 
abandon the struggle when they did. However 
that may be, they fled, and Weatherford could 
not rally them. Seeing himself left alone, with no 
followers to maintain the struggle, he was forced 
to choose between flight and capture. Flight, how- 
ever, was not now by any means easy. He was 
mounted upon a superb gray horse which carried 
him in his flight with the speed of the wind, but 
he was not long in discovering that Carson had 
closed the gap through which he had hoped to 
escape. His enemies were on every side of him 
but one, and on that side was the high bluff. 
The story of what he did, as it is commonly 
told, is a very marvellous one. A bluff about one 
hundred feet high at the Holy Ground is shown 
to travellers, who are told that Red Eagle, see- 
ing no other way of escape, boldly dashed spurs 
into his horse and forced him to make the fearful 
leap to the river below ! As the story is usually 
told in print it is somewhat less marvellous, but is 
still sufficiently so to serve the purposes of a pop- 
ular legend. It is that a ravine passed through 
the upper part of the bluff, reducing its height to 
about fifty feet, and that Red Eagle made a leap 
on his horse from that height. This version of 
the story is so gravely told in books that are not 



224 RED EAGLE. 

romances, that the author of the present volume 
once cited it in print in justification of an incident 
in a work of fiction, believing at the time that the 
legend was well authenticated. In examining 
authorities more carefully, as he was bound to do 
before writing of the incident in a serious work 
of this kind, he finds that the leap was much less 
wonderful than has been represented. Mr. Pick- 
ett, in his History of Alabama, gives us the fol- 
lowing account, which he assures us he had from 
Red Eagle's own lips : 

" Coursing with great rapidity along the banks 
of the Alabama, below the town, on a gray steed 
of unsurpassed strength and fleetness, which he 
had purchased a short time before the commence- 
ment of hostilities of Benjamin Baldwin, late of 
Macon County, [he] came at length to the ter- 
mination of a kind of ravine, where there was a 
perpendicular bluff ten or fifteen feet above the 
surface of the river. Over this with a mighty 
bound the horse pitched with the gallant chief, 
and both went out of sight beneath the waves. 
Presently they rose again, the rider having hold 
of the mane with one hand and his rifle firmly 
grasped in the other. Regaining his saddle, the 
noble animal swam with him to the Autauga 
side." 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 22$ 

The battle over, Claiborne found his loss to be 
one man killed and six others wounded. Thirty 
Indians were found dead on the ground. The 
number of their wounded is not known. Clai- 
borne destroyed the town, with every thing in it. 

The army was now reduced almost to starva- 
tion, their only food being a little corn, which they 
parched and ate as they could. An alarm having 
been given by a party of men who were sent 
up the river in pursuit of fugitives, however, 
Claiborne marched in that direction during the 
night of December 24th, and pitched his tent 
on Weatherford's plantation, where he ate his 
Christmas breakfast of parched corn. Having de- 
stroyed all the buildings in the neighborhood, 
Claiborne's work in this region was done, and he 
hastened back to Fort Deposit, where he fed his 
troops before beginning his return march to Fort 
Claiborne. The army had been nine days with- 
out meat. 

The term of service for which Carson's volun- 
teers had enlisted had now expired, and as soon 
as the column arrived at Fort Claiborne the meu 
were mustered out. In a letter to the Secre- 
tary of War, Claiborne reported that these men 
went home nearly naked, without shoes, and with 
their pay eight months in arrears. Their devo* 



226 RED EAGLE. 

tion to the cause, as it was shown in their cheer- 
fulness and good conduct during their toilsome 
march, was, in view of all the circumstances, 
highly honorable to them. 

Leaving Colonel Russell in command ol Fort 
Claiborne, General Claiborne returned to Mount 
Vernon, partly because he had fully accomplished 
all that his orders from Flournoy permitted him to 
do, and partly because the discharge of his Mis- 
sissippi volunteers had reduced his army to sixty 
men, and even these had but a month longer to 
serve ! 

Colonel Russell was no sooner lelt in command 
at Fort Claiborne than he instituted proceedings 
designed to fix the responsibility for the suffer- 
ings of the men during the campaign and for the 
blunder at the Holy Ground where it belonged. 
He ordered a court of inquiry in each case, but 
Major Cassels was permitted to escape censure 
on the ground that his guide had misled him. 
For the failure of the food supply the contractor 
was held responsible, as it was shown that Gen- 
eral Claiborne had given him strict orders to pro- 
vide abundant supplies for the expedition. 

In order that the story of the Fort Claiborne 
army may be finished here before returning to 
the Ten Islands and following Jackson through 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 227 

his more important part of the campaign, we may 
depart for the moment from the chronological 
order of events to tell the story of an unsuccess- 
ful attempt which Colonel Russell made to in- 
vade the Creek Nation from Fort Claiborne, in 
the February following the events already de- 
scribed. 

It was Colonel Russell's purpose to march 
to the Old Towns on the Cahawba River, and 
thence to attack the Indians wherever he could 
find them, establishing his base of supplies at that 
point. He provided a barge, loaded it with food 
for the troops, and putting Captain Denkins in 
command of it, with a piece of artillery as his 
armament, he directed that officer to ascend the 
Alabama River to the mouth of the Cahawba 
River, and thence to make his way up the Cahaw- 
ba to Old Towns, where the army would meet 
him. Then, with his regiment reinforced by an 
infantry company from the neighborhood of Fort 
Madison under command of Captain Evan Au- 
stin, and a cavalry company commanded by Cap- 
tain Foster — the two forming a battalion under 
the lead of Sam Dale, who was now a Major — 
Colonel Russell marched to the appointed place 
of rendezvous. 

There he learned that the barge had not ar- 



228 RED EAGLE. 

rived, and as he had marched with but six days' 
provisions his situation was a critical one. To 
hasten the coming of the barge he despatched a 
canoe manned by Lieutenant Wilcox and five 
men in search of Captain Denkins. This party, 
while making its way down the river, travelling 
at night and hiding in the cane on the banks by 
day, was attacked by Indians. Lieutenant Wil- 
cox and three of his companions were made pris- 
oners, the other two escaping and making their 
way through many hardships to the settlements, 
where they arrived in a famished condition. 

Captain Denkins had passed the mouth of the 
Cahawba River by mistake, and had gone a con- 
siderable distance up the Alabama River before 
discovering his error. When he did discover it, 
he knew that it was now too late for him to think 
of carrying out his original instructions. He 
knew that before he could possibly reach the Old 
Towns, the army would be starved out and com- 
pelled to retreat. 

He therefore determined to return to Fort 
Claiborne. On his way down the river he dis- 
covered the canoe, and found in it Wilcox 
scalped and dying, and his two companions al- 
ready dead. 

Meantime Colonel Russell had waited two days 



HOW CLAIBORNE EXECUTED HIS ORDERS. 229 

at the Old Towns for the coming of the barge, 
and then, being wholly without provisions, be- 
gan his return march, saving his army from 
starvation by killing and eating his horses on the 
route. 



CHAPTER XXII. 
HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 

We now return to General Jackson's camp at 
Fort Strother, near the Ten Islands. The situa- 
tion there was bad from the time of the Talla- 
dega expedition, and it grew steadily worse. The 
army was nearly starved, and Jackson was shar- 
ing their hunger with them. When a few lean 
kine were secured, seeing that the supply was 
sufficient only to give to each man a very scant 
portion, Jackson declined to take any part of the 
beef for his own table, and took some of the en- 
trails instead, saying with cheerfulness that he 
had always heard that tripe was nutritious and 
savory food. He lost no opportunity to secure 
such provisions as could be had from the sur- 
rounding country, but these were barely suffi- 
cient to keep famine at bay from day to day, and 
Jackson busied himself with the writing of let- 
ters to everybody who could in any way contrib- 
ute to hasten forward adequate supplies. He 
wrote to one contractor, saying : 

11 I have been compelled to return here for the 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 23 1 

want of supplies when I could have completed the 
destruction of the enemy in ten days ; and on my 
arrival I find those I had left behind in the same 
starving condition with those who accompanied 
me. For God's sake send me with all despatch 
plentiful supplies of bread and meat. We have 
been starving for several days, and it will not do 
to continue so much longer. Hire wagons and 
purchase supplies at any price rather than defeat 
the expedition. General White, instead of form- 
ing a junction with me, as he assured me he 
would, has taken the retrograde motion, after 
having amused himself with consuming provi- 
sions for three weeks in the Cherokee Nation, 
and left me to rely on my own strength. ' ' * 

Nothing that the perplexed commander could 
do or say or write, however, could help him. 
Day by day food became scarcer, poorer, and 
more difficult to get, and the men were becoming 
mutinous, as volunteers are sure to do when left 
to starve in inaction. If the enemy had appeared 
in his immediate neighborhood, Jackson would 
certainly have cured all the disorders of the camp 
and removed its discontent by giving the men 
constant occupation for their minds in conflicts 
with the foe. As it was, there was neither food 

* Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson. 



232 RED EAGLE. 

nor fighting to be had at Fort Strother, and 
General Jackson did not dare to attempt a march 
upon the nearest Indian stronghold, about sixty 
miles away, without supplies. 

Not many days had passed after the return to 
the Ten Islands when information reached Jack- 
son that the men of the militia regiment intended 
to return to their homes with or without permis- 
sion, and that they had appointed the next day 
as the time of starting. Luckily he believed that 
he could still depend upon the volunteers. He 
knew, too, that in this matter he had to deal with 
bodies of men, not with individuals. The power 
of public sentiment, which in this case was corps 
sentiment, was the power arrayed against him. 
He knew that the men would not desert singly, 
that their pride would restrain them from deser- 
tion unless they could act together, each being 
sustained by the opinion and the common action 
of all his fellows. The militia had determined to 
march home in a body ; Jackson determined to 
restrain them in a body. 

On the appointed day he called tne volunteers 
to arms, and at their head placed himself in the 
way of the mutinous militiamen. He plainly in- 
formed the men that they could march homeward 
only by cutting their way through his lines, and 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 233 

this was an undertaking which they were not pre- 
pared for. Being unable to overcome Jackson, 
they had no choice but to yield to him and return 
to their tents, which they did at once, with what 
cheerfulness they could command. 

The volunteers whose power Jackson was thus 
able to use in arresting the departure of the mi- 
litia were scarcely less discontented than they. 
On the very day on which they stopped the 
march of the militia they resolved themselves to 
go home, and prepared to depart on the following 
morning. Jackson had information of what was 
going on, and he prepared to reverse the order 
of things by using the militia in their turn to op- 
pose the volunteers. The militia having returned 
to their duty obeyed the commands of their gen- 
eral, and opposed a firm front to the mutinous 
volunteers. The affair wore so much of the ap- 
pearance of a practical joke that it put the whole 
force into momentary good-humor. 

With his men in this mood, however, Jackson 
knew that he had merely gained a very brief time 
by his firmness, and that the discontent of which 
the mutiny was born existed still in undimin- 
ished force. He therefore sent the cavalry to 
Huntsville to recruit their horses, first exacting 
a promise that they would return as soon as that 



234 RED EAGLE. 

end could be accomplished — a promise which the 
men afterward violated shamelessly. He then 
called all the officers of the army together, and, 
after giving them all the facts in his possession 
upon which he founded the confident hope that 
provisions in plenty would soon arrive, he made 
a speech to them, trying to win them back to 
something of their old devotion to duty. He 
had good reason to believe that supplies both of 
meat and of breadstuffs were now actually on 
their way to him, and his chief present purpose 
was to gain time, to persuade his followers to 
patience and obedience for the two or three days 
which he thought would end the period of short 
rations. According to Eaton's report of the 
speech, Jackson said to his officers : 

"What is the present situation of our camp ? 
A number of our fellow-soldiers are wounded and 
unable to help themselves. Shall it be said that 
we are so lost to humanity as to leave them in 
this condition ? Can any one, under these circum- 
stances and under these prospects, consent to an 
abandonment of the camp ; of all that we have 
acquired in the midst of so many difficulties, pri- 
vations, and dangers ; of what it will cost us so 
much to regain ; of what we never can regain 
— our brave wounded companions, who will be 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 235 

murdered by our unthinking, unfeeling inhu- 
manity ? Surely there can be none such ! No, 
we will take with us when we go our wounded 
and sick. They must not, shall not perish by our 
cold-blooded indifference. But why should you 
despond ? I do not ; and yet your wants are not 
greater than mine. To be sure we do not live 
sumptuously ; but no one has died of hunger or 
is likely to die. And then how animating are 
our prospects ! Large supplies are at Deposit, 
and already are officers despatched to hasten 
them on. Wagons are on the way ; a large num- 
ber of beeves are in the neighborhood, and de- 
tachments are out to bring them in. All these 
resources cannot fail. I have no wish to starve 
you, none to deceive you. Stay contentedly, and 
if supplies do not arrive in two days we will all 
march back together, and throw the blame of our 
failure where it should properly lie ; until then 
we certainly have the means of subsisting, and if 
we are compelled to bear privations, let us re- 
member that they are borne for our country, and 
are not greater than many, perhaps most, armies 
have been compelled to endure. I have called 
you together to tell you my feelings and wishes. 
This evening think on them seriously, and let me 
know yours in the morning/ ' 



236 RED EAGLE 

To this appeal the response was not satisfac- 
tory. The militia indeed agreed to remain dur- 
ing the stipulated two days, and promised that if 
the expected provisions should come within that 
time they would cease to murmur, and go on 
with the campaign ; but the volunteers were now 
wholly given over to mutiny. They insolently 
informed General Jackson that they were going 
to march back to the borders of Tennessee, and 
that if he refused to yield immediately to their 
will in the matter, without waiting for the allotted 
two days to expire, they would go without per- 
mission and would use force if necessary to ac- 
complish that end. 

There can be no doubt whatever about the 
nature of the reply which Jackson would have 
made to this message if he had had even a small 
force upon which he could rely at his back. In 
that case the volunteers must have chosen be- 
tween submission to his will and a battle with 
him. As it was, he was one man against the 
whole force. He could not oppose the mutinous 
volunteers with arms, and he felt that he must 
in some way prevent the abandonment of all that 
had been gained in the campaign. He there- 
fore resorted to a compromise, which he hoped 
would solve the perplexing problem. He com- 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 237 

manded the militia and one regiment of the vol- 
unteers to remain in the fort as a garrison, and 
ordered the other volunteer regiment to march 
toward Fort Deposit until it should meet the pro- 
vision train, and then to countermarch and return 
with it. In this way he lost immediately only one 
half of the volunteers, winning the rest of them to 
his proposition for a delay of two days ; and even 
the regiment which had been sent away might 
yet return with the provisions, as the lack of food 
was the only plea that had been urged in defence 
of the mutiny. 

The discontent really lay much deeper than 
that : it had come as much from idleness in camp 
and from home-sickness as from hunger, and it 
had eaten into the soldierly characters of the men, 
honeycombing them with sedition and insubordi- 
nation ; but while the plea of starvation remained 
to them the men urged no other, and Jackson's 
memory of their courage and good conduct on 
former occasions, led him to hope that with this 
cause of trouble removed the trouble itself would 
disappear. 

When the two days of waiting had passed, 
and no supplies had come, a new difficulty lay in 
Jackson's path, namely, his own voluntary prom- 
ise. He had asked for two days' delay, promising 



238 RED EAGLE. 

to permit the men to march away if food did not 
arrive within that time. The promise now fell 
due and the men exacted its fulfilment. In his 
sore distress he could do nothing further to com- 
pel obedience. He had even relinquished his 
right to command the men to remain and his 
privilege to bargain for further delay. He must 
let them go now, but there was no reason why 
any of them who chose to do so might not vol- 
untarily remain to defend the fort. It was a slen- 
der hope, but Jackson was grasping at straws 
now. He set out to seek volunteers, declaring 
that if even two men should consent to stay with 
him he would not abandon Fort Strother and the 
campaign, but would stay there and wait for the 
coming of reinforcements. One of his captains 
at once offered himself as one of this army of two, 
and by an earnest effort they succeeded in swell- 
ing the number of volunteers to one hundred and 
nine men. 

This was all that was left of Jackson's army, 
and the campaign lay mostly before him. A man 
of less stubborn resolution would have despaired ; 
but Jackson held on in the hope of gaining 
strength after awhile and gathering men enough 
around him to make a resumption of operations 
possible. 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 239 

He permitted the rest of his troops to leave the 
post, first exacting a promise that they would 
return if they should meet the supply train, and 
in order the more effectually to enforce this de- 
mand Jackson accompanied the column, leaving 
his army, one hundred and nine strong, to hold 
the fort until his return. 

Twelve miles from the fort the column met the 
provision train. Jackson called a halt and ordered 
rations to be distributed to the men. It was now 
his turn to insist upon the faithful fulfilment of a 
promise. He had kept his word in permitting his 
men to abandon Fort Strother at the time ap- 
pointed ; he could now, with especially good 
grace, insist that the men should keep their prom- 
ise and return with the provision train. 

Now for the first time the mutiny began to as- 
sume its true colors. With stomachs filled with 
good beef and bread — for a large drove of beef 
cattle was with the provision train, and Jackson 
had given the men beef rations — it was no longer 
possible to urge hunger in excuse for abandon- 
ment of duty ; but the men had set out intending 
to go home, and they had no thought of relin- 
quishing that intention merely because the excuse 
by which they had justified their conduct would 
no longer serve their purpose. 



24O RED EAGLE. 

When ordered to take up the line of march to- 
ward the fort the men rebelled and started home- 
ward instead. 

Then ensued one of the most impressi^ scenes 
in Jackson's career. Raving witi rage, his thin 
lips set and his frame quivering with anger, the 
commander's face and mien were terrible. His 
left arm was still carried in a sling, and the hard- 
ships, hunger, fatigue, and ceaselesss anxiety to 
which he had been subject ever since he quitted 
his sick-bed to come upon this campaign had not 
made his wasted frame less emaciated ; he was a 
sick man who ought to have been in bed : but the 
illness was of the body, not of the soul. The spirit 
of the man was now intensely stirred, and when 
Jackson was in this mood there were few men 
who had the courage to brave him. 

Riding after the head of the column, he placed 
himself with a few followers in front of it, and 
drove the men back like sheep. Then leaving 
the officers who were with him he rode alone 
down the road, until he encountered a brigade 
which was drawn up in column, resolved to con- 
quer its way by a regular advance against any 
body of men who might oppose its homeward 
march. If a company or a battalion had under- 
taken to arrest the march of these men there 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 241 

would have been a battle there in the road with- 
out question. They were prepared to fight their 
comrades to the death ; they were ready to meet 
a force equal to their own. They met Andrew 
Jackson instead — Andrew Jackson in a rage, An- 
drew Jackson with all the blood in his frail body 
boiling ; and that was a force greatly superior to 
their own. 

Snatching a musket from one of the men Jack- 
son commanded the mutineers to halt. He broke 
forth in a torrent of vituperation, and declared 
that they could march toward home only over 
his dead body ; he declared, too, with an empha- 
sis which carried conviction with it, that while he 
could not, single-handed, overcome a brigade of 
armed men, he at least could and would shoot 
down the first man who should dare to make the 
least motion toward advancing. 

The men were overawed, terrified, demoralized 
by the force of this one resolute man's fierce de- 
termination. They stood like petrified men, not 
knowing what to do. It was now evident that 
no man there would dare to make himself Jack- 
son's target by being the first to advance. Jack- 
son had beaten a brigade, literally single-handed, 
for he had but one hand that he could use. 

By this time General Coffee and some staff offi- 



2 42 RED EAGLE. 



cers had joined Jackson, and now a few of the 
better disposed men, seeing their general oppos- 
ing a brigade of mutineers, ranged themselves 
by his side, prepared to assist him in any en- 
counter that might come, however badly over- 
matched they might be. The mutineers were 
already conquered, however, and sullenly yield- 
ing they were sent back to the fort. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 

Having thus succeeded in sending what re- 
mained of his army back to Fort Strother, with 
abundant food at least for present uses, Jackson 
hastened to Fort Deposit and succeeded there in 
effecting arrangements for a constant supply of 
bread and meat. 

Then he mounted his horse and rode back to 
Fort Strother, determined to collect what force he 
could without delay, and by vigorous measures 
to bring the campaign to a speedy and successful 
end. 

His first measure was to order General Cocke 
to join him with the East Tennessee troops, say- 
ing in his letter to that officer that if he could ar- 
rive at Fort Strother by the 12th of December, 
bringing with him all the provisions he could 
gather, the Creeks could be crushed within three 
weeks. This was a most inspiriting prospect, 
and Jackson was apparently all the more elated 
because of his recent depression. 

His good fortune was destined to be short- 



244 RED EAGLE. 

lived, however. He had scarcely leached Fort 
Strother on his return from Fort Deposit when 
he discovered that his volunteers were planning 
a new mutiny, or, as they stoutly maintained, 
were preparing to leave him with legal right and 
justice on their side. 

The state of the case may be briefly summed 
up as follows : These volunteers had been mus- 
tered into service on the ioth of December, 1812, 
the terms of their enlistment being that they 
should serve for one year within the next two 
years, unless sooner discharged ; that is to say, 
they were to be discharged as soon as they should 
have served a year ; or, if their actual service in 
the field should not amount to a full year they 
should be discharged on the ioth of December, 
1 8 14. They were called into service when Jack- 
son made his march with them to Natchez, which 
has been spoken of in a former chapter. After a 
few months, their services not being needed, they 
were dismissed from actual service to their homes, 
subject, however, to a call at any time until their 
time of service should expire. 

Under this enlistment they were recalled to the 
field in September, 18 13, as we have seen, and 
were under obligation to serve for a sufficient 
time to complete their term of one year in the 



A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 245 

field ; but as it had been supposed when they 
were enlisted that their services would be needed 
continuously for a year, they had thought little 
about the alternative condition. They now held 
that their enlistment would expire just one year 
after it had begun — that is to say, on the 10th of 
December, 181 3, a date now at hand. They were 
determined to permit no allowance to be made 
for the months which they had passed at home, 
and insisted that as they had enlisted for one year 
they would go home when the year should end. 

In this demand for discharge the officers, who 
should have been the men's instructors in such a 
case, made the matter hopeless by joining the dis- 
contented soldiery. With their colonels and ma- 
jors and captains to second them, the men were 
doubly certain to persist in their interpretation of 
the contract of service. 

Not long before the disputed date the colonel 
of one of the volunteer regiments laid their case 
before Jackson in a letter, in which he assured 
him that the volunteers would demand their 
honorable discharge from service on the 10th of 
December, the anniversary of their enlistment. 
The appeal made in this letter was an adroit effort 
to play upon next to the strongest feeling in Jack- 
son's heart — his fatherly affection for the men 



246 RED EAGLE. 

who had followed him into battle. We say next 
to the strongest feeling in his heart, because the 
strongest was, undoubtedly, his desire to serve 
his country by accomplishing the utter suppres- 
sion of the Creeks. The colonel told Jackson that 
the volunteers looked to their loved and honored 
general to protect them in this their right, and to 
secure justice to them ; that they lamented the ne- 
cessity of leaving the field at such a time, but that 
their families and their private affairs required 
their return to their homes ; that upon him, to 
whom they looked with reverence as to a father, 
depended the question whether, after their hard 
service under his leadership they should be per- 
mitted to go home with the certificates of honor- 
able discharge to which they were entitled, or 
should be forced to carry with them the ill-repute 
of deserters. He was strongly implored not to 
reward their devotion to the cause and to him by 
fixing this brand of disgrace upon them and their 
children after them. 

The appeal was adroit we say, and a masterly 
piece of special pleading ; but the officer who 
wrote it must have known when he did so that 
the demand which he sought to enforce was un- 
just ; that even if it had been just, Jackson had 
no more authority than he himself had to grant 



A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 247 

it ; and that the disputed question had already 
been submitted formally and fully to the Secre- 
tary of War, who had decided it adversely to the 
men, and had accompanied that decision by the 
assurance that as the matter was governed by an 
express act of Congress, no power short of that 
of the national legislature — neither the Secretary 
nor the President himself — was competent to 
change the terms of the enlistment, or to discharge 
the troops until either they had given a year to 
actual service, or the two years during which 
they were subject to a call had expired. For the 
men, and perhaps also for the subordinate offi- 
cers, there may have been the excuse of an hon- 
est misunderstanding, but for this colonel, whose 
letter shows him to have been a man of high in- 
telligence, there can have been no excuse at all. 

Jackson replied to this letter in one of the 
ablest documents which has come from his hand. 
Eaton has preserved it in his Life of Jackson, 
and Mr. Parton has copied it. Let us see what 
the commander, touched without doubt by the 
argumentum ad hominem that was used, had to say 
by way of answer : 

" I know not what scenes will be exhibited on 
the 10th instant, nor what consequences are to 
flow from them, here or elsewhere ; but as I shall 



248 RED EAGLE. 

have the consciousness that they are not imput- 
able to any misconduct of mine, I trust I shall 
have the firmness not to shrink from a discharge 
of my duty. 

4 It will be well, however, for those who intend 
to become actors in those scenes, and who are 
about to hazard so much on the correctness of 
their opinions, to examine beforehand with great 
caution and deliberation the grounds on which 
their pretensions rest. Are they founded on any 
false assurances of mine, or upon any deception 
that has been practised toward them ? Was not 
the act of Congress, under which they are en- 
gaged, directed by my general order to be read 
and expounded to them before they enrolled 
themselves ? That order will testify, and so will 
the recollection of every general officer of my di- 
vision. It is not pretended that those who now 
claim to be discharged were not legally and fairly 
enrolled under the act of Congress of the 6th of 
February, 181 2. Have they performed the ser- 
vice required of them by that act, and which they 
then solemnly undertook to perform ? That re- 
quired one year's service out of two, to be com- 
puted from the day of rendezvous, unless they 
should be sooner discharged. Has one year's 
service been performed ? This cannot be seri- 



A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 249 

ously pretended. Have they then been dis- 
charged ? It is said they have, and by me. To 
account for so extraordinary a belief, it may be 
necessary to take a review of past circumstances. 
* ' More than twelve months have elapsed since 
we were called upon to avenge the injured right 
of our country. We obeyed the call. In the 
midst of hardships, which none but those to 
whom liberty is dear could have borne without 
a murmur, we descended the Mississippi. It was 
believed our services were wanted in the prose- 
cution of the just war in which our country was 
engaged, and we were prepared to render them. 
But though we were disappointed in our expec- 
tations we established for Tennessee a name which 
will long do her honor. At length we received 
a letter from the Secretary of War directing our 
dismission. You will recollect the circumstances 
of wretchedness in which this order was calculated 
to place us. By it we were deprived of every 
article of public property ; no provision was made 
for the payment of our troops or their subsist- 
ence on their return march ; while many of our 
sick, unable to help themselves, must have per- 
ished. Against the opinion of many I marched 
them back to their homes before I dismissed 
them. Your regiment, at its own request, was 



250 RED EAGLE. 

dismissed at Columbia. This was accompanied 
with a certificate to each man, expressing the 
acts under which he had been enrolled and the 
length of the tour he had performed. This it is 
which is now attempted to be construed ' a final 
discharge. ' But surely it cannot be forgotten by 
any officer or soldier how sacredly they pledged 
themselves, before they were dismissed or re- 
ceived that certificate, cheerfully to obey the 
voice of their country, if it should re-summon 
them into service ; neither can it be forgotten, I 
dare hope, for what purpose that certificate was 
given ; it was to secure, if possible, to those brave 
men, who had shown such readiness to serve 
their country, certain extra emoluments, speci- 
fied in the seventh section of the act under which 
they had engaged, in the event they were not 
recalled into service for the residue of their term. 
" Is it true, then, that my solicitude for the in- 
terest of the volunteers is to be made by them a 
pretext for disgracing a name which they have 
rendered illustrious ? Is a certificate, designed 
solely for their benefit, to become the rallying 
word for mutiny ? Strange perversion of feeling 
and of reasoning ! Have I really any power to 
discharge men whose term of service has not ex- 
pired ? If I were weak or wicked enough to at- 



A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 25 1 

tempt the exercise of such a power, does any one 
believe the soldier would be thereby exonerated 
from the obligation he has voluntarily taken upon 
himself to his government ? I should become a 
traitor to the important concern which has been 
intrusted to my management, while the soldier 
who had been deceived by a false hope of lib- 
eration would be still liable to redeem his pledge. 
I should disgrace myself without benefiting you. 
11 1 can only deplore the situation of those offi- 
cers who have undertaken to persuade their men 
that their term of service will expire on the 10th. 
In giving their opinions to this effect they have 
acted indiscreetly and without sufficient author- 
ity. It would be the most pleasing act of my 
life to restore them with honor to their families. 
Nothing could pain me more than that any other 
sentiments should be felt toward them than those 
of gratitude and esteem. On all occasions it has 
been my highest happiness to promote their inter- 
est, and even to gratify their wishes, where with 
propriety it could be done. When in the lower 
country, believing that in the order for their dis- 
missal they had been improoerly treated, I even 
solicited the government to discharge them finally 
from the obligations into which they had entered. 
You know the answer of the Secretary of War : 



252 RED EAGLE. 

that neither he nor the President, as he believed, 
had the power to discharge them. How then 
can it be required of me to do so ? 

" The moment it is signified to me by any com- 
petent authority, even by the Governor of Ten- 
nessee, to whom I have written on the subject, or 
by General Pinckney, who is now appointed to the 
command, that the volunteers may be exonerated 
from further service, that moment I will pro- 
nounce it with the geatest satisfaction. I have 
only the power of pronouncing a discharge, not 
of giving it, in any case — a distinction which I 
would wish should be borne in mind. Already 
have I sent to raise volunteers on my own re- 
sponsibility, to complete a campaign which has 
been so happily begun, and thus far so fortu- 
nately prosecuted- The moment they arrive, and 
I am assured that, fired by our exploits, they will 
hasten in crowds on the first intimation that we 
need their services, they will be substituted in the 
place of those who are discontented here. The 
latter will then be permitted to return to their 
homes with all the honor which, under such cir- 
cumstances they can carry along with them. But 
I still cherish the hope that their dissatisfaction 
and complaints have been greatly exaggerated. 
I cannot, must not, believe that the ' volunteers 



A NEW PLAN OF THE MUTINEERS. 253 

of Tennessee, ' a name ever dear to fame, will dis- 
grace themselves and a country which they have 
honored, by abandoning her standard as mutineers 
and deserters ; but should I be disappointed and 
compelled to resign this pleasing hope, one thing 
I will not resign — my duty. Mutiny and sedition, 
so long as I possess the power of quelling them, 
shall be put down ; and even when left destitute 
of this, I will still be found in the last extremity 
endeavoring to discharge the duty I owe my 
country and myself/' 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

JACKSON'S SECOND BATTLE WITH HIS OWN 

MEN. 

When troops unused as these men were to 
systematic obedience make up their minds to 
abandon the service they are of very little ac- 
count thereafter, as soldiers. If one pretext for 
mutiny and desertion fails them, they quickly find 
another, as the men had done in this case. While 
famine lasted, famine was the best possible ex- 
cuse for wishing to go home, and the men 
thought of no other. They even protested their 
devotion to the cause and their willingness to re- 
main in service if food could be found for them ; 
but no sooner were their mouths stopped with 
abundant supplies of beef and bread than they 
tried to leave, as has been described, without any 
pretext whatever. Failing in that, they picked 
this flaw, or this pretended flaw, in their contract 
of enlistment, and Jackson probably knew that so 
far as their restoration to the condition of good 
soldiers was concerned, he was wasting words in 
arguing the case ; but it was necessary to detain 



JACKSON'S SECOND BATTLE WITH HIS MEN. 255 

these men until the others for whom he had sent 
to Tennessee should arrive to take their places. 
They were useless for any thing like offensive 
operations, else he would have marched with 
them at once toward the Creek strongholds ; but 
while they should remain at Fort Strother he 
could depend upon them to defend that post 
against any assault that might be made upon it, 
simply because in the event of an attack they 
must defend themselves, and to do that would 
have been to defend the fort. 

Jackson had ordered the enlistment of a new 
force to take the place of these discontented men, 
but until the new army should come he was bent 
upon keeping the old one. 

Precisely what arrangements he had made to 
meet trouble on the 10th of December we have 
no means of knowing. He was not permitted to 
wait for the coming of that day. On the even- 
ing of the 9th, word was brought to him that the 
men were already strapping their knapsacks on 
their backs and getting ready to march imme- 
diately. 

It was time to act. Jackson issued one of the 
shortest of all his proclamations, ordering all good 
soldiers to assist in putting down the mutiny. 
Then he ordered the militia to parade at once 



256 RED EAGLE. 

under arms. Placing his cannon in a command- 
ing position, he drew up the militia in line of 
battle and confronted the mutinous volunteers. 

Riding to the front he made a speech to the 
volunteers, beginning by assuring them that they 
could march only over his dead body ; that he 
had done with entreaty, and meant now to use 
force ; that they must now make their choice be- 
tween returning to their tents and remaining qui- 
etly upon duty, and fighting him and his troops 
right where he stood ; the point, he said, could 
be decided very quickly by arms if they chose to 
submit the question to that kind of argument. 
He told them, too, that he was expecting new 
troops to take their places, and that until these 
new troops should arrive not a man present should 
quit the post except by force. 

He was now terribly in earnest, and bent upon 
no half-way measures. He had drawn his men 
up in line of battle, not as a threat, but for pur- 
poses of battle. He was ready to fight, and 
meant to fight, not defensively, but offensively. 
He wanted no negotiation, asked no man upon 
what terms he would submit. He had dictated 
the terms himself and meant now to enforce 
them. He had given the volunteers a choice — 
either to remain peaceably until he should send 



JACKSON'S SECOND BATTLE WITH HIS MEN. 257 

them home, or to fight a battle with him right 
there in the road and right then on the 9th of 
December ; he had offered them this choice, and 
they must choose and say what their choice was. 
When he ended his speech the volunteers stood 
grimly, sullenly silent. They did not offer to 
advance, but that was not enough. They must 
say whether they would remain and obey, or ac- 
cept battle. If they would promise to remain 
without further attempts of this kind, he was con- 
tent ; if not, the battle would begin. 

' I demand an explicit answer," he said ; and 
no reply coming, he turned to his artillerymen 
and ordered them to stand to their guns with 
lighted matches. 

It was now a question merely of seconds. 
Jackson gave the men time to answer, but not 
many moments would pass before he would speak 
the only words which were left to him to speak 
— the words ' ' commence firing, ' ' those words 
which in every battle are the signal for the trans- 
formation of iron or brazen guns from harmless 
cylinders of metal into bellowing monsters, belch- 
ing fiery death from their throats. 

There was silence for a moment — that awful 
silence which always precedes the turmoil of bat- 
tle, doing more to appall men than all the demo- 



258 RED EAGLE. 

niac noises of the contest do ; then a murmur was 
heard as of men hastily consulting ; then the 
officers of the volunteer brigade stepped a pace 
to the front and delivered the answer which Jack- 
son had demanded. 

They had made their choice, and the answer 
was that they would return to duty, and remain 
at the fort until the new men should come, or 
until their commander should receive authority 
to discharge them. 

This affair of the 9th of December, 1813, is 
nowhere set down in the list of Jackson's battles ; 
but nowhere did he win a more decided victory 
or display his qualities as a great commander to 
better advantage. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

JACKSON DISMISSES HIS VOLUNTEERS 
WITHOUT A BENEDICTION. 

Jackson had not deceived himself with respect 
to these mutinous men. He knew very well that 
their usefulness as soldiers was hopelessly gone, 
and he had no thought of undertaking a cam- 
paign with them. Even before this last trouble 
came he had abandoned all hope of this, and had 
ceased to regard the army he had with him as 
worth keeping, except as a garrison for Fort 
Strother, during the period of waiting for a new 
army to be raised to take its place. It was his 
purpose to send this army back to Tennessee as 
soon as he could replace the men with others fit 
to fight with, and to get those others he was 
working in every possible way. He had sent to 
Tennessee for the enlistment of a new force, and 
had written to everybody he knew there who 
had aught of influence — preachers, doctors, law- 
yers, and men of affairs — urging them to stir the 
enthusiasm of the young men and persuade them 
to volunteer. He had already ordered General 



260 RED EAGLE. 

Cocke to join him with his force, and that offi- 
cer had promised to do so immediately. As this 
would give him a sufficient garrison for tue fort 
almost immediately, Jackson determined to send 
home at once every man who could not be 
stirred to a proper sense of his duty, every man 
who could not be induced, by a fair and earnest 
statement of the case, to remain voluntarily and 
finish the campaign. In order to separate any 
such sheep, if there were any, from the homesick 
goats, the commander on the 13th of December 
issued a final appeal, which was read to the 
troops. It was as follows : 

11 On the 1 2th day of December, 18 12, you 
assembled at the call of your country. Your 
professions of patriotism and ability to endure 
fatigue were at once tested by the inclemency of 
the weather. Breaking your way through sheets 
of ice you descended the Mississippi and reached 
the point at which you were ordered to be halted 
and dismissed. All this you bore without mur- 
muring. Finding that your services were not 
needed, the means for marching you back were 
procured ; every difficulty was surmounted, and 
as soon as the point from which you embarked 
was regained, the order for your dismissal was 
carried into effect. The promptness with which 



JACKSON DISMISSES HIS VOLUNTEERS. 261 

you assembled, the regularity of your conduct, 
your attention to your own duties, the deter- 
mination manifested on every occasion to carry 
into effect the wishes and will of your govern- 
ment, placed you on elevated ground. You not 
only distinguished yourselves, but gave to your 
state a distinguished rank with her sisters, and 
led your government to believe that the honor of 
the nation would never be tarnished when en- 
trusted to the holy keeping of the volunteers of 
Tennessee. 

1 * In the progress of a war which the implacable 
and eternal enemy of our independence induced 
to be waged, we found that without cause on our 
part a portion of the Creek Nation was added to^ 
the number of our foes. To put it down, the 
first glance of the administration fell on you, and 
you were again summoned to the field of honor. 
In full possession of your former feelings, that 
summons was cheerfully obeyed. Before your 
enemy thought you in motion you were at Tal- 
lushatchee and Talladega. The thunder of your 
arms was a signal to them that the slaughter of 
your countrymen was about to be avenged. You 
fought, you conquered ! Barely enough of the 
foe escaped to recount to their savage associates 
your deeds of valor. You returned to this place 



262 RED EAGLE. 

loaded with laurels and the applause of your 
country. 

Can it be that these brave men are about to 
become the tarnishers of their own reputation, 
the destroyers of a name which does them so 
much honor ? Yes, it is a truth too well disclosed 
that cheerfulness has been exchanged for com- 
plaints. Murmurings and discontents alone pre- 
vail. Men who a little while since were offering 
up prayers for permission to chastise the merci- 
less savage, who burned with impatience to teach 
them how much they had hitherto been indebted 
to our forbearance, are now, when they could 
so easily attain their wishes, seeking to be dis- 
charged. The heart of your general has been 
pierced. The first object of his military affec- 
tions and the first glory of his life were the vol- 
unteers of Tennessee. The very name recalls to 
him a thousand endearing recollections. But 
these brave men, these volunteers, have become 
mutineers. The feelings he would have in- 
dulged, your general has been compelled to sup- 
press ; he has been compelled, by a regard to 
that subordination so necessary to the support of 
every army, and which he is bound to have ob- 
served, to check the disorder which would have 
destroyed you. He has interposed his authority 



JACKSON DISMISSES HIS VOLUNTEERS. 263 

for your safety — to prevent you from disgracing 
yourselves and your country. Tranquillity has 
been restored in our camp ; contentment shall 
also be restored. This can be done only by per- 
mitting those to retire whose dissatisfaction pro- 
ceeds from causes that cannot be controlled. 

u This permission will now be given. Your 
country will dispense with your services if you no 
longer have a regard for that fame which you have 
so nobly earned for yourselves and her. Yes, 
soldiers ! You who were once so brave, and to 
whom honor was so dear, shall be permitted to 
return to your homes, if you still desire it. But 
in what language, when you arrive, will you ad 
dress your families and friends ? Will you tell 
them that you abandoned your general and youi 
late associates in arms within fifty miles of a sav- 
age enemy, who equally delights in shedding the 
blood of the innocent female and her sleeping 
babe as that of the warrior contending in battle ? 
Lamentable, disgraceful tale ! If your disposi- 
tions are really changed, if you fear an enemy 
you so lately conquered, this day will prove it 
I now put it to yourselves ; determine upon the 
part you will act, influenced only by the sugges- 
tions of your own hearts and your own under- 
standings. All who prefer an inglorious retire- 



204 RED EAGLE. 

ment shall be ordered to Nashville, to be dis- 
charged as the President or the Governor may 
direct. Those who choose to remain and unite 
with their general in the further prosecution of 
the campaign can do so, and will thereby fur- 
nish a proof that they have been greatly tra- 
duced, and that although disaffection and cow- 
ardice have reached the hearts of some, it has 
not reached theirs. To such my assurance is 
given that former irregularities will not be at- 
tributed to them. They shall be immediately 
organized into a separate corps, under officers of 
their own choice ; and in a little while it is con* 
fidently believed an opportunity will be afforded 
of adding to the laurels you have already won." 

If these men had had a single spark of soldierly 
spirit left in them — if the manhood itself had not 
all gone out of them — such an appeal as this would 
have shamed them into their duty. It is incredi- 
ble that men who had once had spirit enough to 
volunteer in the service of their country should 
have lost it so utterly that they could resist this 
plea to their pride, their duty, and their regard 
for their own good name ; but such was the fact. 
Out of the whole brigade, officers and men, only 
one was found with manliness enough to stay. 
That one man was a Captain Wilkinson, the men- 



/ACKSON DISMISSES HIS VOLUNTEERS. 265 

tion of whose name is only a just tribute to his 
soldierly manhood. The rest were no longer 
men in spirit, but homesick wretches, lusting for 
the flesh-pots of Tennessee, the ease, the indo- 
lence, the comfort of home. 

Public opinion is particularly strong in a new 
country, where every man's history is known to 
all his neighbors, and few men in such a case can 
successfully brave it. Public opinion in Ten- 
nessee sharply condemned these volunteers for 
their abandonment of the service upon a mere 
technicality, at a time when the enemy was in 
their front. How sorely they smarted under the 
taunts of their neighbors we may easily imagine ; 
and when they could silently endure the censure 
no longer, they prepared a plea in their own jus- 
tification, which was published in March of the 
following year. This plea was offered in the form 
of a statement, signed by the brigadier-general 
who commanded the disaffected brigade, one col- 
onel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, an 
aide-de-camp, and the brigade-quartermaster. 
These officers in their statement recount the his- 
tory of their service, and rest their case upon the 
dates used in their muster-rolls, and the techni- 
cality that in dismissing them after their Nat- 
chez expedition Jackson had used the word " dis- 



266 RED EAGLE. 

charge" instead of " dismiss." They assert that 
they and their men were fully and finally dis- 
charged at the end of that expedition, and ex- 
plain their readiness to answer the call to march 
against the Creeks, when Jackson assembled them 
a second time, by a confession that they thought 
they saw a chance to secure pay for service not 
rendered. They declare that they returned to 
the service, believing that their term could only 
last till the ioth of December in any case, and 
that by doing so they could compel the govern- 
ment to give them soldiers' pay for all the time 
which they had passed at home. 

Read carelessly, their plea seems to palliate 
their misconduct ; read at all carefully, it adds to 
their shame. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

HOW JACKSON LOST THE REST OF HIS 

ARMY. 

Having begun the work of getting rid of men 
upon whom he could not depend for active ser- 
vice, Jackson was disposed to complete it as 
speedily as possible, in order that he might re- 
sume the active operations of the campaign, 
knowing precisely what he could count upon in 
the way of an army and governing his measures 
accordingly. 

He had counted upon General Cocke's force 
for at least half his strength, but here again he 
was doomed to disappointment. General Cocke 
came, it is true, according to the appointment, 
and brought an army of two thousand men with 
him ; but they were three-months' men, and they 
had already served more than two months ! 
General Cocke has declared in a printed letter 
that he had asked these men to give up the 
thought of going home at the expiration of their 
term of service, and voluntarily remain until the 
end of the campaign, and that the men had 



^68 RED EAGLE. 

promised him to do so. He expressed in that 
letter surprise, not unmixed with indignation, that 
Jackson did not take them at their word ; but 
when we remember what Jackson had just gone 
through, and reflect that these men would have 
ceased to be soldiers and become citizens when 
their time should expire ; that their promise to 
remain till the end of the campaign would have 
had no binding force whatever ; that they would 
have had the fullest right, individually or in bod- 
ies, to abandon the army at any moment, how- 
ever critical the situation might be ; and that 
Jackson would have had absolutely no authority 
over them, even to command obedience to orders 
in camp or battle, we cannot wonder that he 
declined to begin a campaign in the wilderness 
against a savage and wily foe, with an army 
which might dissolve at any moment and go 
home, and which, even while it should remain 
with him, would be free to disobey orders at its 
own sweet will. Campaigns are not successfully 
carried on, battles are not won, with mobs. Jack- 
son meant to have an army before setting out 
again to crush the Creeks, and accordingly he 
sent Cocke's men home, retaining only Colonel 
Lillard's regiment as a temporary garrison iot 
the fort. 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 269 

He then ordered General Cocke to return to 
East Tennessee and enlist a new force, and urged 
the returning men to volunteer again as soon as 
they should have provided themselves at home 
with suitable clothing for a winter campaign. 

It was his hope that two thousand men or 
more would be secured in East Tennessee and a 
like number in West Tennessee, and with such a 
force he could march into the Creek Nation and 
crush the savages, he believed, within a very brief 
time. 

General Cocke obeyed the order very reluc- 
tantly, as he has himself told the public. His 
confidence in his men was so great, that he 
thought it unnecessary and unwise to dismiss 
them and search for others to take their place. 
He did as he was bidden, however, returning to 
East Tennessee and speedily securing a new 
force two thousand strong. These men volun- 
teered for six months, and were mustered into 
service in time to march on the 17th of January. 

On the march, however, these six-months' men 
learned that the new levies from the western part 
of the State — men between whom and the East 
Tennesseeans a wretched jealousy prevailed — ■ 
were to be enlisted for only three months, and 
this bred sore discontent in General Cocke's 



27O RED EAGLE. 

camp. General Cocke met this difficulty reso- 
lutely, and in a published letter he has given an 
account of what he did. 

M I overtook the troops," he says, "at the 
Lookout Mountain, when I found a dissatisfaction 
among the troops amounting almost to mutiny. 
They declared their determination to return 
home at the end of three months. I made them 
a speech, in which I told them that if they left 
the army without any honorable discharge, they 
would disgrace themselves and families ; that 
much of their time had already expired, and for 
all the good they could do, if they intended to 
leave at the end of three months they had better 
go home then, but appealed to their magnanim- 
ity and patriotism to go on like brave men and 
good soldiers, and serve until the expiration of 
the term for which they were ordered into ser- 
vice/' 

These troops were certainly not in a mood to 
become soldiers fit for the work they had to do. 
Meantime the work of enlistment in West Ten- 
nessee had gone on very slowly and unsatisfac- 
torily, and even Coffee's troopers, whom Jackson 
had sent to Huntsville to recruit their horses, 
exacting a promise from them that they would 
return as soon as they should accomplish that 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 271 

object, had broken faith and deserted in a body 
in spite of all that their gallant leader could do to 
restrain them. 

Even this was not the end of Jackson's troubles. 
The men whom he had retained from Cocke's 
command were ready to leave as soon as their 
term of service should expire, and the date of its 
expiration was near at hand. This would dimin- 
ish the force in Fort Strother from fourteen hun- 
dred to six hundred men. These six hundred 
were militiamen, and now, as if to break down 
what remained of Jackson's hopes, these troops 
managed to find an excuse for quitting the ser- 
vice and going home presently. The act of the 
legislature by which they had been called into 
service was bunglingly drawn, and upon ex- 
amining it the militia officers discovered that 
nothing whatever had been said in the law with 
respect to the length of time for which they 
should serve. Then the question arose, How 
long have these men engaged to serve ? The 
men held that as no term was set by the law 
the lawgivers must be held to have meant the 
shortest time for which it was customary to call 
out the militia, namely, three months, and that 
time would end on the 4th of January. Jackson, 
on the other hand, held that the law set no other 



272 RED EAGLE. 

limit to the term of service, because it meant that 
the service should continue as long as the war 
did. The men had been called out, he said, to 
suppress the Creeks, and their term of service 
would end when they had done that, and not be- 
fore — whether that should be three months or 
three years after their enlistment. Jackson had 
fourteen hundred men, of whom eight hundred 
had an unquestioned right to quit in the middle 
of January, while the remaining six hundred as- 
serted their right to retire at the beginning of 
that month. The new East Tennessee troops 
who were on their way to him had enlisted for six 
months, but, as we know, were determined to 
serve only half of that term, a considerable part 
oi which had already expired. Never was a com- 
mander in a sorer strait. Sent to fight a cam- 
paign and held responsible for its success, he was 
denied an army with which to fight at all. His 
commanding general urged him to activity, on 
the ground that the British must at any cost be 
shorn of the strength they had sought to secure 
by stimulating Indian hostilities ; the British were 
already in Florida, threatening Mobile and New 
Orleans ; the Seminoles in the Spanish province 
and the runaway negroes there were ready to 
take up arms and assail the Georgia borders : 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 273; 

while in the North and West the war was pros- 
ecuted by the enemy with untiring perseverance. 

But what was Jackson to do ? The troops he 
had were about to leave him, and it began to ap- 
pear that no others were likely to come to him. 
Even Governor Blount advised him to yield to 
the demands both of the six-months* volunteers 
who wanted to quit the service at the end of three 
months, and of the militia who wanted to quit al- 
most immediately. Governor Blount sent Jack- 
son a letter in which he urged this course upon 
him, advising him to regard the campaign as at 
an end, retire to the borders of Tennessee and 
protect that state as well as he could, abandon 
the attempt to raise a new force by enlisting vol- 
unteers, and quietly wait until the National Gov- 
ernment should provide him with an army by 
ordering a draft or by some other means. 
Governor Blount believed that he had no au- 
thority to raise further forces, and that any at- 
tempt which he might make to do so must injure 
rather than help the service. 

Then Jackson rose to the occasion, and showed 
that he was no less able as a debater than as a 
fighter. He wrote a letter to Governor Blount 
which changed the whole face of affairs, con 
verted that executive officer to views the op 



274 RED EAGLE. 

posite of those that he had held, and led to the 
creation of a new army, or rather of two new 
armies, one being a temporary supply of short- 
term men, with whom Jackson did some work, 
and the other coming immediately to take its 
place. 

This letter, for the text of which we are in- 
debted to Mr. Parton, is called by that writer 
1 'the best letter he [Jackson] ever wrote in his 
life — one of those historical epistles which do the 
work of a campaign." Jackson wrote : 

11 Had your wish that I should discharge a part 
of my force and retire with the residue into the 
settlements assumed the form of a positive order, it 
might have furnished me some apology for pursu- 
ing such a course, but by no means a full justifica- 
tion. As you would have no power to give such 
an order, I could not be inculpable in obeying, 
with my eyes open to the fatal consequences 
that would attend it. But a bare recommenda- 
tion — founded, as I am satisfied it must be, on the 
artful suggestions of those fireside patriots who 
seek in a failure of the expedition an excuse for 
their own supineness, and upon the misrepresen- 
tations of the discontented from the army, who 
wish it to be believed that the difficulties which 
overcame their patriotism are wholly insup 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. Z?$ 

mountable — would afford me but a feeble shield 
against the reproaches of my country or my 
conscience. Believe me, my respected friend, 
the remarks I make proceed from the purest 
personal regard. If you would preserve your 
reputation or that of the State over which you 
preside, you must take a straightforward, deter- 
mined course, regardless of the applause or cen- 
sure of the populace, and of the forebodings of 
that dastardly and designing crew who at a time 
like this may be expected to clamor continually 
in your ears. The very wretches who now be- 
set you with evil counsel will be the first, should 
the measures which they recommend eventuate 
in disaster, to call down imprecations on your 
head and load you with reproaches. 

* * Your country is in danger ; apply its re- 
sources to its defence. Can any course be more 
plain ? Do you, my friend, at such a moment as 
the present, sit with your arms folded and your 
heart at ease, waiting a solution of your doubts 
and definitions of your powers ? Do you wait for 
special instructions from the Secretary of War, 
which it is impossible for you to receive in time 
for the danger that threatens ? How did the 
venerable Shelby act under similar circumstances, 
or rather under circumstances by no means sa 



Vj6 RED EAGLE. 

critical ? Did he wait for orders to do what every 
man of sense knew, what every patriot felt to be 
right ? He did not ; and yet how highly and justly 
did the government extol his manly and energetic 
conduct ! and how dear has his name become to 
every friend of his country ! 

" You say that an order to bring the necessary 
quota of men into the field has been given, and 
that of course your power ceases ; and although 
you are made sensible that the order has been 
wholly neglected, you can take no measure to 
remedy the omission. I consider it your imperi- 
ous duty, when the men called for by your author- 
ity, founded upon that of the government, are 
known not to be in the field, to see that they be 
brought there ; and to take immediate measures 
with the officer who, charged with the execution 
of your order, omits or neglects to do it. As the 
£xecutive of the State, it is your duty to see that 
the full quota of troops be constantly kept in the 
field for the time they have been required. You 
are responsible to the government ; your officer 
to you. Of what avail is it to give an order if 
it be never executed and may be disobeyed with 
impunity ? Is it by empty mandates that we can 
hope to conquer our enemies and save our de- 
fenceless frontiers from butchery and devasta- 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 2// 

tion ? Believe me, my valued friend, there are 
times when it is highly criminal to shrink from 
responsibility or scruple about the exercise ol 
our powers. There are times when we must dis- 
regard punctilious etiquette, and think only of 
serving our country. What is really our present 
situation ? The enemy we have been sent to 
subdue may be said, if we stop at this, to be only 
exasperated. The commander-in-chief, General 
Pinckney, who supposes me by this time pre- 
pared for renewed operations, has ordered me 
to advance and form a junction with the 
Georgia army ; and upon the expectation that I 
will do so are all his arrangements formed for 
the prosecution of the campaign. Will it do to 
defeat his plans and jeopardize the safety of the 
Georgia army ? The General Government, too, 
believe, and have a right to believe, that we 
have now not less than five thousand men in the 
heart of the enemy's country, and on this 
opinion are all their calculations bottomed ; and 
must they all be frustrated, and I become the in- 
strument by which it is done ? God forbid ! 

M You advise me to discharge or dismiss from 
service, until the will of the President can be 
known, such portion of the militia as have ren- 
dered three months' service. This advice as 



278 RED EAGLE. 

tonishes me even more than the former. I have 
no such discretionary power ; and if I had, it 
would be impolitic and ruinous to exercise it. 
I believed the militia who were not specially re- 
ceived for a shorter period were engaged for six 
months, unless the objects of the expedition 
should be sooner attained ; and in this opinion I 
was greatly strengthened by your letter of the 
15th, in which you say, when answering my 
inquiry upon this subject, ' The militia are de- 
tached for six months* service ;' nor did I know 
or suppose you had a different opinion until the 
arrival of your last letter. This opinion must, 
I suppose, agreeably to your request, be made 
known to General Roberts' brigade, and then 
the consequences are not difficult to be foreseen. 
Every man belonging to it will abandon me on the 
4th of next month ; nor shall I have the means 
of preventing it but by the application of force, 
which under such circumstances I shall not be at 
liberty to use. I have labored hard to reconcile 
these men to a continuance in service until they 
could be honorably discharged, and had hoped 
I had in a great measure succeeded ; but your 
opinion, operating with their own prejudices, 
will give a sanction to their conduct, and render 
useless any further attempts. They will go ; but 



HOW JACKS* «OST HIS ARM\ . 279 

I can neither discharge nor dismiss them. Shall 
I be told that, as they will go, it may as well be 
peaceably permitted ? Can that be any good 
reason why I should do an unauthorized act ? Is 
it a good reason why I should violate the order 
of my superior officer and evince a willingness 
to defeat the purposes of my government ? 
And wherein does the ' sound policy ' of the 
measures that have been recommended consist ? 
or in what way are they ' likely to promote the 
public good ' ? Is it sound policy to abandon a 
conquest thus far made, and deliver up to havoc 
or add to the number of our enemies those friend- 
ly Creeks and Cherokees who, relying on our 
protection, have espoused our cause and aided 
us with their arms ? What ! Retrograde under 
such circumstances ? I will perish first. No. I 
will do my duty ; I will hold the posts I have es- 
tablished, until ordered to abandon them by the 
commanding general, or die in the struggle ; 
long since have I determined not to seek the pre- 
servation of life at the sacrifice of reputation. 

44 But our frontiers, it seems, are to be de- 
iended ; and by whom ? By the very force that 
is now recommended to be dismissed : for I am 
first told to retire into the settlements and pro- 
tect the frontiers ; next to discharge my troops r 



£80 RED K^GLE. 

and then that no measures can be taken for rais- 
ing others. No, my friend, if troops be given 
me, it is not by loitering on the frontiers that I 
will seek to give protection : they are to be 
defended, if defended at all, in a very different 
manner — by carrying the war into the heart of 
the enemy's country. All other hopes of defence 
are more visionary than dreams. 

"What, then, is to be done? I'll tell you 
what. You have only to act with the energy and 
decision the crisis demands, and all will be well. 
Send me a force engaged for six months and I 
will answer for the result ; but withhold it and 
all is lost — the reputation of the State, and yours 
and mine along with it." 

Fortunately, Governor Blount had not only 
the sense to see into what errors he had fallen, 
when the real state of the case and the obliga- 
tions it placed upon him were thus pointed out, 
out the courage also to act inconsistently and to 
do that which he had once solemnly declared that 
he ought not to do. It was too late to undo the 
mischief he had done by advising the discharge 
of the discontented militia, but he set to work at 
once to provide men to take their places. The 
militia left in spite of all that Jackson cared to 
do to detain them, and Cocke's volunteers foi- 



HOW JACKSON LOST HIS ARMY. 28 1 

lowed them ten days afterward, but in the mean- 
time a force of nine hundred new men had ar- 
rived. They had enlisted in part for two and in 
part for three months, and were therefore of com- 
paratively little value ; but Jackson resolved to 
use them at least while waiting for the arrival of 
the larger and better force which had been 
ordered to gather at Fayetteville on the 28th of 
January. He meant to strike a blow with what 
force he had while its enlistment should continue, 
so that no more men might be paid for service as 
soldiers without doing any fighting. The volun^ 
teers whose term had expired marched out of 
camp on the 14th of January, and on the next 
day Jackson set his new men in motion for work. 
They were undrilled, undisciplined, and weak 
in numbers, but Jackson was now bent upon 
fighting with any thing that he could get which 
remotely resembled an army. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOP- 
CO— HOW THE CREEKS "WHIPPED CAP- 
TAIN JACKSON." 

T N an earlier chapter of this book the author 
expressed the opinion that if the Creeks could 
have had an equal share with their enemies in 
writing the history of the war their story would 
have given us very different impressions from 
those that we now have with respect to many of 
the events of the struggle. Perhaps no better 
illustration of the truth of this assumption could 
be given than that which is furnished by the story 
of Jackson's short campaign with his two and 
three months' men. The Creek chiefs who 
fought this force in the battles of Emuckfau and 
Enotachopco always declared, in talking of the 
matter after the war, that they " whipped Cap- 
tain Jackson and ran him to the Coosa River," 
and while neither Jackson's report of the cam- 
paign nor any other of the written accounts of it, 
admit the truth of this Indian version of the 
story, they furnish a good many details which 



' BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 283 

strongly suggest that the Creek chiefs may not 
have been altogether wrong in their interpreta- 
tion oi events. 

But as they had no historians to put their ac- 
count upon record, except by reporting their 
verbal assertion which we have quoted, the wri- 
ter is compelled to rely upon the testimony of 
the other side exclusively for all information 
about matters of detail. 

The force which had come from Tennessee 
consisted of about nine hundred men in all, of 
whom eight hundred and fifty were fit for duty. 
They were in two regiments, one commanded 
by Colonel Perkins, the other by Colonel Hig 
gins. 

With this small force Jackson at once began 
his march. Crossing the Coosa River on the 
day after their arrival, he pushed forward to 
Talladega, where he was reinforced by a body of 
friendly Indians consisting of sixty-five Chero- 
kees and about two hundred Creeks. He had 
with him an artillery detachment with a single 
iron six pounder cannon ; a company of spies 
under Captain Russell, and another under 
Captain Gordon ; and one company composed 
exclusively of officers. These were officers of 
various grades whose men had gone home. 



284 RED EAGLE. 

General Coffee, whose troops also had left him, 
had gathered these officers together and com* 
manded them in person. General Jackson said 
in his report that his force numbered exactly 
nine hundred and thirty men, exclusive of the 
friendly Indians who accompanied him. These 
Indians are said to have been somewhat alarmed 
when they saw how small a force Jackson had 
with him, but there is nothing to show that they 
in the least faltered in their duty or hesitated to 
march when ordered to do so. 

General Floyd was already moving to strike 
the Creeks again, having recovered from his 
wound. Of this movement and of the nature of 
Floyd's plans Jackson was advised, in order that 
he might as far as possible arrange his own in 
accordance with them. 

At Talladega General Jackson received a 
despatch from Colonel Snodgrass, commanding 
at Fort Armstrong, that a force of Creeks had 
assembled at Emuckfau, in a bend of the Talla- 
poosa River, near the mouth of Emuckfau Creek, 
in what is now Tallapoosa County, Alabama, and 
that these Indians, now about nine hundred 
strong, were preparing to attack Fort Arm- 
strong. Jackson resolved to find and fight this 
Creek force at once. His men, as he tells us in 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 28$ 

his report, were both undrilled and insubordinate, 
and their officers were without skill or experi- 
ence ; but the troops were really anxious to fight 
a battle, and in this particular their general was 
disposed to gratify them as speedily as possible. 
Luckily he had a few good men upon whom he 
could depend, and his company of brave and ex- 
perienced officers who were serving as private sol- 
diers with General Coffee for their captain were 
his special staff of reliance. 

Pushing forward as rapidly as possible, the 
army arrived at Enotachopco, about a dozen miles 
from Emuckfau, on the afternoon of January 20th. 
The march was resumed the next morning, and 
early in the day signs were discovered of the 
Proximity of a large Creek force. Well-beaten 
traw ;7^re found, and a few Indians seen. 

It was necessary now to reconnoitre before 
proceeding further, in order to avoid a surprise 
in some unfavorable spot. Jackson selected a 
halting-place and ordered the men to encamp in 
the form of a hollow square, taking great pains 
to surround the camp with a line of well-placed 
picket-guards. Then he sent out his spies to dis- 
cover the whereabouts and the strength of the 
Indian force. 

Before midnight the spies reported that a largi 



286 RED EAGLE. 

Indian encampment lay within about three miles 
of Jackson's position, and that the Indians were 
removing their women and evidently preparing 
for battle. It was probable that they did not 
intend to await Jackson's attack, but intended to 
fall upon his camp during the night, but the 
careful commander, having already taken every 
precaution against surprise, contented himself 
with warning the pickets against neglect of vigil- 
ance and the men against panic in the event of a 
night attack. 

The Indians advanced as morning approached, 
and at six o'clock, while it was not yet light, 
fell upon Jackson's left flank with great fury. 
The men, raw as they were, behaved well and met 
the assault with spirit. General Coffee rode at 
once to the point at which the firing was heaviest, 
and both by his presence and his words animated 
the men ; but the struggle was a severe one, and 
for a time the left flank was so hard pressed that 
their ability to hold their position was a matter 
of some doubt. As soon as it was light enough 
to see, and hence light enough to move troops 
from one part of the line to another without 
danger of producing confusion and panic, a fresh 
company of infantry was ordered to reinforce the 
left ; and Coffee, who with the adjutant-general, 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 287 

Colonel Sitler, and the inspector-general, Col- 
onel Carroll, for his aids, had assumed the im- 
mediate command, ordered the whole line for- 
ward, leading the men to one of the most gallant 
and determined charges of the war. Thus as- 
saulted the Creeks gave way, and after a few 
moments of irregular resistance fled precipitately, 
closely pressed both by the troops and by the 
friendly Indians. Coffee with his usual vigor 
followed the broken and retreating savages for 
two miles, inflicting considerable damage upon 
them. 

Then Jackson ordered Coffee to take four hun- 
dred men and march to the Indian encampment, 
about three miles away, and, if it should be 
practicable, to destroy it. He cautioned the 
gallant, and perhaps too daring general — who 
was said by one of his contemporaries to have 
been "a great soldier without knowing it' ' — to 
avoid unnecessary risk, and not to attack the 
place if it should prove upon inspection to be 
strong. 

Coffee marched at once, taking the single piece 
of artillery with him ; but upon arriving at 
Emuckfau he found the place so well fortified and 
the force there so strong that he deemed it im- 
portant not only to withdraw without attacking, 



288 RED EAGLE. 

but to hasten his return to the camp lest the 
army thus divided should be attacked and beaten 
in detail. It was soon made plain that the attack 
of the morning had been not much more than a 
beginning of the Indian attempt to overwhelm 
Jackson. 

Half an hour after Coffee returned the Creeks 
renewed the battle. A considerable force began 
the action by making an assault upon Jackson's 
right flank. As soon as their line was developed 
Coffee asked permission to turn their left flank — 
moving from the rear of Jackson's right — with 
two hundred men. Through some misunder- 
standing only fifty-four men accompanied Coffee, 
but that particularly enterprising officer, not to 
be balked of his purpose or delayed in executing 
it, dashed on though the woods with his little 
force, which consisted chiefly of his own officer 
company, and fell upon the flank of the savages 
fiei cely. Jackson seeing with how small a force 
Coffee was making this critical movement, mov- 
ed two hundred friendly Indians to the right 
to assist the flanking party by attacking that part 
of the Indian line in front. 

Had the Indian attack been what it appeared 
to be, the battle would have been decided by the 
results of this combined blow upon the Indian left 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 289 

— from Jackson's right and Coffee's position be- 
yond ; but it was presently apparent that the at- 
tack upon the right of Jackson's line was merely 
a feint designed to distract attention from the 
real object of the savage leader, and to lead Jack- 
son to strengthen his right at the expense of his 
left, upon which the savages intended then to fall 
with crushing force. 

In this scheme the Indians were baffled. Jack- 
son, anticipating something of the sort, not only 
avoided weakening his left, but specially com- 
manded the officers there to expect an attack in 
force and prepare to meet it. 

As soon as the right was fully engaged, the 
main body of the Indians advanced with spirit 
and confidence against the left. The assault was 
well made, the shock falling upon the whole front 
of the left flank at once ; but it was equally well 
received. For a time the firing was very heavy 
and at short range ; then, knowing that raw 
troops can stand any amount of active work bet- 
ter than a strain which must be borne passively, 
Jackson, who had ridden to this part of the field 
as soon as the alarm was given, ordered his men 
to cease firing,, fix bayonets, charge, and sweep 
the field. The men behaved, Jackson tells us, 
with "astonishing intrepidity," and quickly 



29O RED EAGLE. 

cleared their front, Colonel Carroll leading tho 
charge. The Indians wavered, gave way, and 
then broke and fled in confusion, under a de- 
structive fire, and with their pursuers close upon 
their heels. 

The friendly Indians did good work whenever 
actual fighting was going on in their front, but 
being without that habit of unquestioning obe- 
dience which more than any thing else makes the 
difference between a good soldier and a raw re- 
cruit, they could never be depended upon to exe- 
cute an order the ulterior purpose of which they 
could not see. In this battle of Emuckfau their 
habit of acting for the good of the cause upon 
their own judgment and without regard to 
orders came near involving Coffee and his com- 
pany of officers in serious disaster. When Jack- 
son ordered them to the right to co-operate with 
Coffee, they went gladly and fought well, enabling 
Coffee to drive the savages in his immediate front 
into the swamps ; but when the firing began on 
the left they quickly withdrew from the position 
they had been ordered to occupy, and went to 
join in the metie at the other end of the line, 
without pausing to think of what might befall 
Coffee in consequence. 

No sooner had they gone than the Creeks rai- 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 291 

lied and attacked Coffee again, well-nigh over* 
whelming his small force with their greater num- 
bers. Luckily, Coffee was both an able and an 
experienced officer, and it was equally a fortu- 
nate circumstance that his followers, the ex-offi- 
cers, were the very best troops in the army, else 
the whole of the little band, including Coffee, an 
officer whom Jackson could ill have spared, must 
have been destroyed. The little band fought 
with desperate determination, holding their 
ground and keeping the Indians at bay, but hav- 
ing to fight on every side at once. Coffee fell 
severely wounded, but continued to direct the 
operations of his men. His aide-de-camp and 
three others of his followers were killed. 

Jackson, hearing the firing on that flank, re- 
called the friendly Indians from the pursuit at the 
left as soon as he could, and sent them at double- 
quick to rescue Coffee. They came up at a run 
and with a yell, headed by their chief, Jim Fife. 
As soon as Coffee was thus reinforced he ordered 
a charge, before which the foe gave way and fled, 
followed for miles by the relentless Jim Fife and 
his Indians. 

Thus ended the battle of Emuckfau. Whether 
or not it ended in victory for Jackson is a ques- 
tion with two sides to it, even when the evidence 



292 RED EAGLE. 

comes to us altogether from one side. Jackson 
held the field, it is true, but he did not think it 
prudent to advance a few miles and destroy the 
Indian encampment. He determined, on the 
contrary, to retreat without delay to Fort Stro- 
ther, and even for the single night that he was to 
remain on the battle-field he deemed it neces- 
sary to fortify his camp. Certainly he did not 
regard the Indians as very badly beaten on this 
occasion. They were still so dangerously strong 
that the American commander thought it neces- 
sary to provide camp defences, which he had not 
thought of on the preceding night. In view of 
these things and of the retreat and pursuit which 
followed, we may fairly acquit the Indians of the 
charge of unduly boasting when they said, as 
already quoted, " We whipped Captain Jackson 
and ran him to the Coosa River." 

In his official report of the affair, Jackson ex- 
plained his determination to retreat by saying : 
" Having brought in and buried the dead and 
dressed the wounded, I ordered my camp to be 
fortified, to be the better prepared to repel any 
attack which might be made in the night, deter- 
mining to make a return march to Fort Strother 
the following day. Many causes concurred to 
make such a measure necessary. As I had not 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 293 

set out prepared or with a view to make a per- 
manent establishment, I considered it worse than 
useless to advance and destroy an empty encamp- 
ment. I had, indeed, hoped to have met the 
enemy there ; but having met and beaten them a 
little sooner, I did not think it necessary or pru- 
dent to proceed any further — not necessary, be- 
cause I had accomplished all I could expect to 
effect by marching to their encampment, and 
because, if it was proper to contend with and 
weaken their forces still farther, this object would 
be more certainly attained by commencing a re- 
turn, which having to them the appearance of a 
retreat, would inspirit them to pursue me : not 
prudent, because of the number of my wounded ; 
of the reinforcements from below, which the 
enemy might be expected to receive ; of the 
starving condition of my horses, they having had 
neither corn nor cane for two days and nights ; 
of the scarcity of supplies for my men, the Indians 
who joined me at Talladega having drawn none 
and being wholly destitute ; and because if the 
enemy pursued me, as it was likely they would, 
the diversion in favor of General Floyd would be 
the more complete and effectual/ ' 

The retreat began the next morning, and was 
conducted with all the caution and care possible. 



294 RED EAGLE. 

Jackson knew very well that the fight of the day 
before had been really little better than a drawn 
battle. He knew that he had not broken the 
strength of the Indian force which he had been 
fighting, and that their running away was the 
running away of Indians, not of regular soldiers ; 
that it indicated no demoralization or loss of 
readiness to renew the fight, but merely their 
conviction that for the moment they had better 
run away. This distinction is an important one 
to be made. When a disciplined army breaks be- 
fore the enemy and runs away, the fact proves 
their utter discomfiture ; it shows that they have 
lost spirit and abandoned their standards in panic, 
and in such a case it is certain that they are in no 
fit condition to renew the battle either offensively 
or defensively. But, in the case of Indians, run- 
ning away indicates nothing of the kind. Indians 
fight in a desultory way, advancing and retiring 
equally without regard to regular principles. 
They run away if they think that to be the best 
thing to do for the moment, whether they are 
frightened or not ; and the moment they see an 
opportunity to strike their foes successfully, they 
are as ready to turn and fight as they were to 
run. 

Jackson knew this, and hence he made his re- 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 295 

treat with all points guarded against surprise. 
Before nightfall he had reached Enotachopco, and 
there he selected a camp with reference to its de- 
fensive capabilities, and strongly fortified it before 
permitting his men to go to rest for the night. 
The Indians were discovered to be in the neigh- 
borhood, having dogged the retreating army's 
footsteps through the day, but the precautions 
taken to strengthen the camp deterred them from 
attacking during the night. 

The next morning, January 24th, Jackson had 
even greater reason than on the preceding day to 
anticipate an attack. His pursuers had shown 
themselves rather boldly during the night, and 
were evidently contemplating an assault upon his 
column during the day's march. Knowing that 
the deep Enotachopco Creek between two hills 
lay just ahead of him, and that the road by which 
he was retreating crossed this creek in a defile 
which offered his pursuers every opportunity to 
attack him with advantage, Jackson ordered his 
guides to seek a more favorable place of crossing, 
and they chose a place where the banks were 
clear of reeds and underbrush, and where, if at- 
tacked, the army could defend itself better than 
at the regular place of crossing. When the 
guides reported Jackson moved out of his camp 



296 RED EAGLE. 

in the order of a harassed general in retreat. 
He moved in three columns, with strong front 
and rear guards out, the wounded men in the 
centre, and light companies on the flanks. He 
had even taken the precaution, so confident was 
he that his enemy would attack him that morn- 
ing, of making his dispositions for battle, issuing 
a general order instructing the men in what order 
to form in the event of an attack in front, in rear, 
or on either flank. 

Can we wonder that the Indians who saw all 
these precautions taken believed that they had 
" whipped Captain Jackson" and were " driving 
him to the Coosa River" ? 

The army moved forward in this cautious way 
and arrived at the creek. The advance-guard 
crossed first, and after them the wounded were 
carried to the opposite shore. Having cared for 
the helpless wounded men, the solitary gun in the 
army's possession became the next most im- 
portant object of solicitude, and the artillery 
company advanced to cross. Just as they were 
entering the water a shot in the rear announced 
that the enemy was pressing Colonel Carroll, who 
had command there. According to Jackson's 
orders for the formation of a line of battle in the 
event of an attack from the rear, Carroll, with 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 297 

the centre column of the rear-guard, was to face 
about and maintain his position with his front to 
the rear of the line of march ; Colonel Perkins, 
commanding the right column of the rear-guard, 
was to face to the right and wheel to the right, 
using Carroll's flank as a pivot ; while Colonel 
Stump, with the left column of the rear-guard, 
was to execute a corresponding movement, thus 
inclosing the enemy's force within three sides of 
a hollow square, and attacking him simultane- 
ously in front and on both flanks. 

Colonel Carroll executed his part of the ma- 
noeuvre perfectly. The moment that the savages 
attacked the rear company in the column, he 
faced his men about, deployed them in line, and 
received the shock of the onset manfully ; but 
the right and left columns behaved badly, break- 
ing and fleeing precipitately without firing a gun. 
The worst of it was that their flight bred a panic 
among the troops of the centre, and nearly the 
whole force fled like a mob, Colonel Stump ac- 
tually leading the retreat, riding frantically into 
and across the creek. As he passed by Jackson, 
the infuriated general, who had chosen the 
ground in the hope that he might crush the enemy 
here by attacking him on all sides, made an effort 



298 RED EAGLE. 

to cut the coward down with his sword, but 
without success. 

The flight had effectually dissipated all hopes of 
winning a victory, and it had done more — it had 
left the worthy men of the army, very nearly all 
of them who were worth having in an army at 
all, exposed to destruction. Colonel Carroll had 
only twenty-five men left, with Captain Quarles 
in direct command, but he stood firm and held 
his ground like a soldier. Jackson says, in his 
elaborate report : 

" There was then left to repulse the enemy 
the few who remained of the rear-guard, the ar- 
tillery company, and Captain Russell's company 
of spies. They, however, realized and exceeded 
my highest expectations. Lieutenant Armstrong, 
who commanded the artillery company in the 
absence of Captain Deaderick (confined by sick- 
ness), ordered them to form and advance to the 
top of the hill, whilst he and a few others 
dragged up the six-pounder. Never was more 
bravery displayed than on this occasion. Amidst 
the most galling fire from the enemy, more than 
ten times their number, they ascended the hill, 
and maintained their position until their piece 
was hauled up, when having levelled it they 
poured upon the enemy a fire of grape, reloaded 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 299 

and fired again, charged and repulsed them. The 
most deliberate bravery was displayed by Constan- 
tine Perkins and Craven Jackson, of the artillery, 
acting as gunners. In the hurry of the moment, 
in separating the gun from the limbers, the ram- 
mer and picker of the cannon were left tied to 
the limber. No sooner was this discovered than 
Jackson, amidst the galling fire of the enemy, 
pulled out the ramrod of his musket and used it 
as a picker, primed with a cartridge, and fired 
the cannon. Perkins, having pulled off his bay- 
onet, used his musket as a rammer and drove 
down the cartridge ; and Jackson, using his for- 
mer plan, again discharged her. The brave 
Lieutenant Armstrong, just after the first fire of 
the cannon, with Captain Hamilton of East Ten- 
nessee, Bradford, and McGavock, all fell, the 
lieutenant exclaiming as he lay, ' My brave fel- 
lows, some of you may fall, but you must save 
the cannon ! ' " 

The charge made by the artillery company 
was seconded by Captain Gordon's spies, who, 
marching at the head of the column, had crossed 
the creek when the action began, but who 
quickly turned and recrossed, striking the ene- 
my in the left flank. A number of other men 
had now rallied and regained their positions in 



300 



RED EAGLE. 



the line, and as soon as a determined assault was 
made the enemy gave way and the field was 
cleared, leaving Jackson free to resume his re- 
treat toward the Coosa River. 

In the two battles of Emuckfau and Enota- 
chopco the Indian loss was heavy, one hundred 
and eighty-nine bodies being found on the field. 
Jackson's loss was twenty men killed and seventy- 
five wounded, some of them mortally. Among 
the killed was Captain Quarles, who fell at the 
head of his brave twenty-five rear-guardsmen, 
who checked the enemy and prevented utter 
disaster from overtaking the army by their cour- 
age and coolness. 

General Coffee was moving forward on a litter 
when the battle at Enotachopco began, suffering 
from the wound he had received at Emuckfau ; 
but when the army broke into a confused and fly- 
ing mass he mounted his horse in spite of his 
condition, and to his exertions chiefly Major 
Eaton attributes the rallying of the men and the 
ultimate repulse of the enemy. 

It became Coffee's duty to write a letter break- 
ing the news of Captain Donelson's death to his 
friends, and in that letter, the manuscript of which 
is preserved in the archives of the Tennessee 



BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO. 30I 

Historical Society, he says of the ill-luck of the 
expedition : 

" Our great loss has been occasioned by our 
troops being raw and undisciplined, commanded 
by officers of the same description. Had I had my 
old regiment of cavalry I could have driven the 
enemy wherever I met them, without loss. But 
speculation had taken them out of the field, and 
thus we have suffered for them. Their advisers 
ought to suffer death for their unwarrantable 
conduct, and I hope our injured citizens will 
treat them with the contempt they so justly 
merit. ' ' 

Jackson had no sooner reached his camp at 
Fort Strother, than he called Colonels Perkins 
and Stump to account for their conduct at Eno- 
tachopco, preferring charges against them and 
sending them before a court-martial for trial. 
The court, upon the evidence submitted, ac- 
quitted Colonel Perkins, but found Colonel 
Stump guilty of the charge of cowardice, and 
sentenced him to be cashiered. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

HOW RED EAGLE WHIPPED " CAPTAIN 
FLOYD" — THE BATTLE OF CALEBEE 
CREEK. 

We left Floyd retiring upon his base of sup- 
plies on the Chattahoochee River after the battle 
of Autosse, suffering from a wound received in 
that action. After a few weeks of inaction he re- 
sumed operations, with the town of Tookabatcha 
for the objective point of His campaign. Jack- 
son's chief purpose in his expedition to Emuckfau 
had been to create a diversion in favor of Floyd, 
and so help to the accomplishment of that gen- 
eral's purpose. In his report of the operations 
detailed in the last chapter, Jackson, apparently 
feeling that it was necessary to vindicate the 
wisdom of the movement, laid special stress upon 
the fact that his operations had tended thus to 
assist Floyd. If Floyd had attained the objects 
of his expedition, this might have been full re- 
compense for Jackson's ill-success ; but almost at 
the very time when the Red Sticks — for that 
was the term by which the hostile Creeks were 



THE BATTLE OF CALEBEE CREEK. 303 

called, because Tecumseh had given sticks painted 
red to all the Creeks who would " take his talk " 
— almost at the very time, we say, when the 
Red Sticks were " whipping Captain Jackson " 
at Emuckfau and Enotachopco, they were also 
" whipping Captain Floyd " — they always called 
commanders captains — at Calebee Creek, not de- 
feating him in battle, but so hurting him as to 
compel him to retire and abandon the purpose 
with which he set out, even more entirely than 
they had compelled Jackson to abandon his. 

Floyd made his advance slowly and cautiously, 
pausing to establish forts at intervals so that a 
line of defensive posts should lie like a trail be- 
hind him, protecting his line of communications 
and affording convenient places for the storage and 
safe keeping of supplies. He began his march 
with about twelve hundred infantry, four hundred 
friendly Indians, one cavalry company and his 
artillery, making a total force of seventeen hun- 
dred or eighteen hundred men. It was his pur- 
pose to push his column into the Creek country, 
not rapidly, but resistlessly ; so firmly establish- 
ing it as to make it, as it were, a permanent 
wedge of invasion. 

When he arrived at a point on Calebee Creek, 
in what is now Macon County, Alabama, he de- 



304 RED EAGLE. 

termined to establish one of his fortified posts upon 
some high ground there. Here, however, Red 
Eagle entered his protest against the plans of the 
Georgia general. Leading a force of Creeks in 
person, the commander of the Indians was dog- 
ging Floyd's footsteps for several days before his 
arrival at Calebee Creek, but having selected 
that as the ground on which he would give battle 
to the whites, the shrewd Indian general adroitly 
concealed his presence, so handling his force as 
to keep himself fully informed of Floyd's move- 
ments without permitting that officer to know in 
return that the enemy was near. Floyd took all 
those precautions which prudence dictates to a 
commander marching through an enemy's coun- 
try, but he does not appear to have discovered 
Red Eagle's presence, or to have expected the 
attack that was made upon him on the morning 
of January 27th. 

Adopting the tactics which had so often been 
used against the Indians, Red Eagle moved his 
men under cover of darkness into position on 
three sides of Floyd's camp, and fell upon the 
post by surprise, making his attack simultaneously 
in front and upon both flanks. In order to effect 
this surprise, Red Eagle and his men had lain 
concealed in the swamps until about half after 



THE BATTLE OF CALEBEE CREEK. 305 

five o'clock in the morning, and then, while it 
was still entirely dark, made their assault quickly, 
silently, and so violently as to crowd the sentries 
back and reach the lines of the camp itself before 
Floyd's men could form. The troops, thus rudely 
and suddenly awakened from their slumbers by 
an attack which does not appear to have bsen 
in the least expected, behaved particularly well, 
forming without confusion and maintaining a 
firm front in the darkness. 

The assault of the savages was fierce and deter- 
mined. They always fought better under Red 
Eagle's eye than at other times. Even when 
Captain Thomas brought his artillery to the 
front, supported by Captain Adams's riflemen, 
and opened that fire of grapeshot which Indians 
have everywhere found it most difficult to stand 
against, the Red Sticks not only held their 
ground, but gallantly advanced their line until it 
was not more than thirty yards distant from the 
guns, and there, at short pistol range, endured 
the murderous discharges from the cannon. 

The friendly Indians in camp did little during 
this part of the action, being panic-stricken by 
the suddenness of the alarm, but the w r hites 
everywhere behaved well. 

Captain Broadnax, in command of a picket 



306 RED EAGLE. 

post, was passed by the Indian line at the first 
assault, and was thus cut off from the camp and 
the army, but refusing to surrender, he and his 
squad cut their way through the lines of the en- 
emy and reached their friends in safety. 

While darkness lasted Floyd could do nothing 
more than stand on the defensive. As soon as 
the light was sufficient to justify an attempt to 
shift the positions of his battalions, he ordered his 
right and left wings to swing round to the front 
upon their pivots, so as to reverse the order of the 
battle and inclose the Indian force within three 
sides of a parallelogram. As soon as this move- 
ment was executed he ordered a charge, which 
quickly drove the savages back to the swamps, 
whither they were pursued by the cavalry, the 
light companies, and the friendly Indians, who 
had now recovered their courage. 

In the battle Floyd's horse was killed under 
him. His loss was seventeen white men and five 
friendly Indians killed, and one hundred and 
thirty-two white men and fifteen friendly Indians 
wounded. He was sorely hurt, and it was not 
known how much damage he had inflicted in 
return, although it is pretty certain that Floyd 
had greatly the worst of the affair. He held 
the battle-field, it is true, but the Indians were 



THE BATTLE OF CALEBEE CREEK. 307 

manifestly disposed to renew the attack, and for 
that purpose were still hovering around his 
camp and threatening it. It was clear that they 
believed themselves to be the winners in the 
action, and that they were preparing to renew 
it and to crush the Georgia army. 

Floyd feared they might accomplish this. 
His respect for Red Eagle's skill as a com- 
mander was so increased by the experience of 
that morning that he abandoned the object for 
which he had set out, and retreated again. 

It is said that Zachariah McGirth — whom the 
reader will remember as the half-breed who, sup- 
posing that his family were among the victims at 
Fort Mims, became a despatch-bearer, and dared 
all manner of dangers — arrived at Floyd's head- 
quarters on the night of the attack, bearing 
a despatch from Claiborne. He had passed 
through the swamp when it was filled with lurk- 
ing Indians awaiting the moment of attack. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

RED EAGLE'S STRATEGY. 

When Red Eagle established his camp at the 
Holy Ground, from which Claiborne drove him, 
his purpose was to provide for resistance by con- 
centrating the warriors of the nation after the 
manner of civilized armies. The Indian practice 
of breaking into small, roving bands and concen- 
trating only when some special occasion arose, 
was in favor among the Creek chiefs, but Red 
Eagle was too capable a soldier not to see how 
fatal this practice must be in the end. After the 
massacre at Fort Mims it was his wish to keep 
his army together and operate with persistent 
vigor against Mobile if he could gain Spanish 
consent, and if not, against Georgia and Ten- 
nessee. If he could have done this, there can be 
little doubt that he would have driven Jackson 
from Fort Strother during the days of starva- 
tion and mutiny, by bringing a strong force for- 
ward to the attack. His influence had been 
greatly weakened, however, by his attempt to 
restrain the demoniac fury of his men at Fort 



RED EAGLE S STRATEGY. 309 

Mims, and in spite of all that he could do, his 
army dissolved into small wandering bands be- 
fore he could strike an effective blow. The war- 
riors were still willing enough to serve under 
his command whenever occasion for an immedi- 
ate fight should arise, but he could not restrain 
their natural tendencies, or convert them from 
their practice of desultory warfare to a policy 
of systematic operations. Hence Jackson had 
time for his long struggle with his mutinous men, 
and escaped the destruction which must other- 
wise have threatened him for want of an efficient 
army. 

Seeing how impossible it was to convert the 
savage Creeks into a cohesive body of civilized 
troops, and to use them as an aggressive army, 
Red Eagle sought to do the next best thing — » 
namely, to establish strong posts at certain strat- 
egic points, collect his warriors around them, 
and moving out from them, as occasion should 
offer, strike sudden blows at advancing columns 
of whites. 

In pursuance of this policy he fortified the 
Holy Ground, from which Claiborne drove him 
on the 23d of December, as has been related in 
a former chapter. The Holy Ground was only 
one of Red Eagle's strategic points, however. 



3IO RED EAGLE. 

He established the post at Emuckfau, against 
which Jackson marched with the slender suc- 
cess already described, and a still more important 
one a few miles away — at Tohopeka, or the Horse 
Shoe. This Horse Shoe is a peninsula formed 
by a sharp bend in the Tallapoosa River, enclos- 
ing about one hundred acres of ground, high in 
the middle and marshy along the river - bank. 
This peninsula, together with an island in the 
river, Red Eagle selected as the central strong- 
hold of the nation, and he strengthened it by 
every means in his power. Of that, however, 
we shall have occasion to speak more fully 
hereafter ; just now we are concerned only with 
Red Eagle's general disposition of his force. 

When Jackson advanced from Fort Strother 
and Floyd from the Chattahoochee River, the 
wisdom of the Indian commander's arrange- 
ments was made manifest. From his central posi- 
tions he was able to send five hundred warriors 
against Jackson ; for notwithstanding the asser- 
tions frequently made that Jackson was outnum- 
bered at Emuckfau and Enotachopco, it is ap- 
parently a well-established fact that the Indian 
force there was only five hundred strong, while 
he himself led a larger force against Floyd's 
larger and better organized army. He was thus 



RED EAGLES STRATEGY. 31I 

able to defeat the plans of both generals, getting 
the best of both, and compelling both to abandon 
the objects with which they had set out. He 
struck them in detail, after the best modes of 
grand tactics, and his plan of operations bears 
the test of the soundest military criticism. His 
first purpose was to strike the two armies sepa- 
rately ; his second to interpose his own forces 
between them, so that if he should be forced back 
toward the point of convergence of the two lines 
of march his own divided force would be united 
before his enemies could form a junction with 
each other. This was thoroughly good grand 
tactics ; it was precisely the course which any 
trained military commander in like circumstances 
would have adopted. 

It would perhaps be too much to say that Red 
Eagle either overcame his two skilled opponents 
in battle or outgeneralled them in his strategy ; 
but it is not too much to say that he read their 
purpose, and thwarted them, or that he fairly 
matched their tactics with his own, and inflicted 
upon them in battle at least as severe damage as 
he himself suffered. They outnumbered him in 
both instances ; their men were civilized and 
organized, while his were savages without or- 
ganization, discipline, or training ; they had ar- 



312 RED EAGLE. 

tillery to aid them and he had none, many of his 
men having no better arms than bows and war- 
clubs ; yet he managed so firmly to resist their 
advance as to turn both of them back in worse 
condition than they left him. Shall we hesitate 
to recognize this man as a thoroughly capable 
military commander, who, with very imperfect 
means and against tremendous odds, acquitted 
himself well ? It would be idle to speculate 
upon what Red Eagle might have accomplished 
if he could have had means equal to those of his 
enemies ; but it is only just to recognize his ge- 
nius as it was shown in what he did with the inad- 
equate means at his command. He was an Indian 
and the commander of savages ; but he was a pa- 
triot, who fought for what he believed to be the 
interest of his country, and he fought with so 
much skill and so much courage as to win the 
admiration and even the friendship of Jackson, 
whose manly spirit recognized a brother in the 
not less manly spirit of the Creek chieftain. 

Red Eagle's success was necessarily but tem- 
porary. It was not in the nature of things that 
he should win the war, although he might win a 
campaign. He had matched the Creek Nation 
against the United States, and the contest was a 
hopelessly unequal one. For him to overcome one 



RED EAGLE S STRATEGY. 313 

army and drive it back, broken and discouraged, 
was only to make certain the coming of another 
army, stronger and larger, against him. He knew 
this perfectly, and he had known it probably from 
the beginning. He had never intended to make 
the unequal match in which he was engaged ; he 
had meant to lend the strength of the whole 
Creek Nation to an English army of invasion, and 
as we know had tried to avoid the contest when 
he learned that it must be fought by a part of the 
Creeks only, and without the expected assistance 
from without. Having entered the war, how- 
ever, he was determined to fight it out, with all 
his might, to the very end. In order that his 
resistance might be as determined as possible, 
and that the whites might be made to pay a 
high price for their ultimate victory, he was 
now gathering men from every available quar- 
ter, and strengthening his fortified posts, in 
which he intended to make his last desperate 
stand. He had persuaded the warriors of the 
Ocfuske, Hillabee, Oakchoie, Eufaulahatchee, 
New Yauca, Fishpond, and Hickory Ground 
towns to join his forces, and they were now at 
the Horse Shoe. The end of the war was draw- 
ing near, but a fierce battle remained to be fought 
before the power of the Creeks could be broken. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

JACKSON WITH AN ARMY AT LAST 

Jackson's long and earnest entreaty tor an 
army with which to carry on the campaign at 
last produced its desired effect. He who had 
so long and vainly begged for men, getting only 
a handful at a time, and getting even them upon 
terms which made it impossible to use them 
with full effect, now saw men coming in great 
numbers from every quarter to fight under his 
standard. How far this was merely the accumu- 
lated result of his successive pleas, and how far 
the return of the militiamen who had fought at 
Emuckfau and Enotachopco, bearing with them 
their general's warm commendation, was influ- 
ential in behalf of enlistments, it is difficult to 
determine ; but in some way an enthusiasm for 
Jackson and for the service had sprung up in 
Tennessee, and the long baffled and weary gen- 
eral at last, saw coming to him an army five 
thousand strong an army so greatly outnumber- 
ing any force which the Creeks could now put 



JACKSON WITH AN ARMY AT LAST. 315 

into the field, that its coming promised the speedy 
overthrow of what remained of the Creek power. 

Two thousand men came from West Tennessee, 
two thousand more from the eastern half of that 
State. Coffee succeeded in gathering together 
a part of his old brigade, backed by whom he 
always felt himself to be capable of accomplish- 
ing any thing, and at the head of these trained 
and trusted veterans the general who had made 
himself Jackson's right hand in all difficult enter- 
prises galloped into the camp at Fort Strother^ 
amid the cheers of all the men assembled there. 

Better still, if any thing could be better in Jack- 
son's eyes than Coffee's coming with his hard- 
fighting old brigade, Colonel Williams arrived 
on the 6th of February with the Thirty-ninth 
Regiment of regular troops, a body of men six 
hundred strong, whose example of discipline as 
regular soldiers was of incalculable advantage 
in the work of converting volunteers into some- 
thing better than raw recruits. 

As if to verify the adage that * ' it never rains 
but it pours, ' ' a messenger came from the chiefs 
of the Choctaw Nation offering the services of all 
their warriors for the campaign. 

Thus at last Jackson had an army as large as 
he needed or wanted, but before moving such a 



316 RED EAGLE. 

force it was necessary to provide an abundant 
supply of food for them, and this was no light 
task. The winters in North Alabama are rainy, 
with alternate freezings and thawings, which ren- 
der roads almost impassable ; and in addition to 
the usual difficulty of securing the food needed 
there was the still greater difficulty of transport- 
ing the supplies from Fort Deposit to Fort Stro- 
ther to be overcome. 

Jackson bent all his energies to this task. He 
set large forces of his men at work upon the road, 
paving it in the worst places with logs, making 
what is called in the South a corduroy road of it. 
In spite of all that could be done, however, the 
road remained a bad one, and it was with great 
difficulty that wagons moved over it at a snail's 
pace, even when drawn by four horses and very 
lightly loaded. Seven days were consumed upon 
each wagon journey from Fort Deposit to the 
Ten Islands, although a force of men accompanied 
each wagon to lift it out of mires and hurry it 
forward. The wagons were lightly loaded too, 
else they could not have made the journey at 
all. The strongest of the teams could draw no 
more than sixteen hundred pounds. 

Little by little the supplies were brought up in 
this laborious fashion, and meantime boats were 



JACKSON WITH AN ARMY AT LAST. 317 

built, with which Jackson intended to send his 
provisions down the Coosa River, while he should 
march his men overland to an appointed place of 
rendezvous. 

At last all was ready. Jackson had a satisfac- 
tory army and a satisfactory supply of food for 
his men, and he was now at last prepared to 
crush the Creeks by an irresistible blow, deliv- 
ered at the centre of their strength. There was 
no chance now for any Creek force to " whip 
Captain Jackson. ' ' 

Sending his wounded and sick men to Tennes- 
see, Jackson sent his flatboats down the river, 
accompanied by the regiment of United States 
regular troops as a guard. Then, leaving Colonel 
Steele with a garrison of four hundred men to 
hold Fort Strother, and if necessary to co-op- 
erate with the troops left between that point and 
Fort Deposit in protecting the army's commu- 
nications, Jackson began his final march into the 
Creek Nation, at the head of three thousand effec 
tive men. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 

The Indians were now concentrated at Toho- 
peka, or the Horse Shoe, the peninsula already 
mentioned, which was formed by a sharp bend 
of the Tallapoosa River, as the reader will see 
by reference to any good map of Alabama, as the 
place has not lost its name. This bend incloses 
about one hundred acres of ground, and the dis- 
tance across its neck or narrowest part is between 
three hundred and four hundred yards. Across 
this isthmus the Indians had constructed a strong 
breastwork composed of heavy timbers built up 
into a thick wall, and designed, unlike the ordi- 
nary Indian stockade, to withstand artillery fire. 
This breastwork was provided with port-holes 
through which the fire of the garrison could be 
delivered, and the angles of the fortification were 
so well and so regularly drawn after the manner 
of educated military engineers, that any force 
which should approach it in assault must do so 
at cost of marching under a front and an enfilad- 
ing fire. Care was taken also so to dispose the 



THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 319 

houses within the inclosure, the log-heaps, felled 
trees, and even the earth in some places, as to 
make additional fortifications of all of them ; and 
about one hundred canoes were fastened along 
the river-bank as a means of retreat to the forest 
on the other side in the event of defeat. 

All of this systematic preparation, and espe- 
cially the erecting of the strong and well-placed 
breastworks, were things wholly new in Indian 
warfare. This is not the way in which the sav- 
age warrior prepares himself for battle : it is the 
method of the trained soldier ; and Mr. Parton, 
struck with the unlikeness of the preparations to 
any thing ordinarily seen in Indian warfare, says : 
" As the Indian is not a fortifying creature, it 
seems improbable that Indians alone were con- 
cerned in putting this peninsula into the state of 
defence in which Jackson found it." To which 
we may add, that Red Eagle was not only an In- 
dian chief : he was on one side the white man, 
William Weatherford, and the white man in 
him was essentially a civilized white man. He 
had been trained by that old soldier, General Alex- 
ander McGillivray, and by that other soldier, 
General Le Clerc Milfort ; he had visited Mobile 
and Pensacola, and must have learned both the 
nature and the elementary principles of fortifica- 



320 RED EAGLE. 

tion there. It was he who planned the establish- 
ment of the strongholds of which Tohopeka was 
one, and what is more probable than that he 
planned the defences whose fitness for their pur- 
pose was so remarkable ? 

The fighting force of the Creeks at Tohopeka 
is believed to have been about one thousand 
strong. They had with them, of course, their 
women and children, and they had news of Jack- 
son's approach ; but notwithstanding the over- 
whelming numbers opposed to them, they re- 
mained in their stronghold determined to await 
their enemy's attack there, instead of hanging 
upon his flank after their usual manner, and seek- 
ing to surprise him. 

The road was long and difficult over which 
Jackson marched. Rather there was no road, 
and Jackson had to cut one through an unbroken 
wilderness, establishing a depot of supplies and 
garrisoning it before he dared advance to the 
work he had to do. 

Finally, on the morning of March 27th, 18 14, 
the Tennessee commander found himself, after all 
his toils and harassing difficulties, in front of the 
enemy he had so long wished to meet in a deci- 
sive struggle. He had about two thousand effec- 
tive men with him, the rest having been left in 



THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 32I 

garrison at the different posts which it was neces- 
sary to defend. 

Having made himself acquainted with the na- 
ture of the ground, he sent General Coffee with a 
force of seven hundred cavalry and six hundred 
friendly Indians down the river, with orders to 
cross two miles below and march up the eastern 
bank to the bend, where he was directed to oc- 
cupy a continuous line around the curve, and thus 
cut off retreat across the river. 

Then with the main body of his army and his 
two light field-pieces — one of them a three- 
pounder and the other a six-pounder — Jackson 
himself marched up the river and formed his line 
of battle across the isthmus, facing the breast- 
works. 

About ten o' clock, Coffee arrived at the bend, 
and directed his Indians under Morgan to oc- 
cupy the margin of the river. This they quickly 
did, deploying along the stream until their line 
stretched all the way around the bend, leaving 
no gap anywhere. With the mounted men Coffee 
posted himself upon a hill just in rear, for the 
double purpose of intercepting any Creeks who 
might come from below to the assistance of their 
beleaguered friends, and of being in position him- 



322 RED EAGLE. 

self to reinforce any part of his Indian line which 
might be hard pressed. 

When all was ready, Coffee signified the fact to 
Jackson by means which had been agreed upon 
between them, and the commander advanced his 
line to give the enemy battle. The artillery un- 
der Captain 'Bradford was advanced to a point 
within eighty yards of the breastwork, with the 
hope that its fire at short range might make a 
breach in the formidable line of fortification. The 
position was a fearfully exposed one for the can- 
noniers, but they were gallant fellows, under 
command of a brave officer, and they held their 
ground manfully under a most galling fire, bom 
barding the works ceaselessly. The riflemen 
added their fire to that of the artillery, not be- 
cause it was likely to have any effect upon the 
thick breastworks, but because its maintenance 
would prevent the concentration of the enemy's 
fire upon the artillery. 

The cannon-shot plunged into the fortification 
at every discharge ; but the parapet was too thick 
to be penetrated, and except when a missile 
chanced to pass through a port-hole, the artillery 
fire accomplished very little beyond making the 
Creeks yell a little more fiercely than usual in 



THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 323 

their exultation over the ineffectiveness of the 
means employed for their destruction. 

Meantime Coffee could not contentedly stand 
still while all this work was going on just in his 
front. Like Ivanhoe in the castle, he chafed at 
his compulsory inaction while others were doing 
"deeds of derring-do/ ' In the absence of any 
thing else to be about, he conceived the notion 
of capturing the enemy's fleet, and ordered the 
best swimmers in his command to cross the river 
and bring away the canoes. Having thus se- 
cured the means of transporting men to the other 
side, he eould not resist the temptation to make 
an attack in the enemy's rear. If he might have 
spared enough men for the purpose and led them 
in person, Coffee would have brought the battle 
to an early close by this means, saving a deal of 
bloodshed ; but his orders were to maintain a line 
all along the shore, and to resist the approach of 
reinforcements from below. He could neither 
detach a strong force for the attack in rear nor 
leave his appointed post to lead them in person. 
But he could at least make a diversion in Jack- 
son's favor, and this he proceeded to do. He 
sent Morgan across in the canoes, with as many 
men as could be withdrawn with propriety from 
the line, ordering him to set fire to the houses by 



324 RED EAGLE. 

the river-bank and then to advance and attack the 
savages behind the breastwork. 

Morgan executed this order in fine style, and 
although his force was too small to enable him 
to maintain his attack for any considerable time, 
the movement was of great assistance to Jackson. 
The burning buildings and the crack of Morgan's 
rifles indicated to Jackson what his active and 
sagacious lieutenant was doing, and he resolved 
to seize the opportunity, while the Creeks were 
somewhat embarrassed by the fire in their rear, 
to make the direct assault upon the works which 
it was now evident must be made before any thing 
effective could be done. 

To storm such a work was sure to be a costly 
way of winning, even if it should succeed, while 
if it should fail, its failure would mean the utter 
destruction of the army attempting it. The 
general hesitated to make so hazardous an at- 
tempt, but the men clamored to be led to the 
charge. It was the only way, and the army was 
evidently in the best possible temper for the doing 
of desperate deeds. 

Jackson gave the order to storm the works. 

Then was seen the grandest, awfullest thing 
which war has to show. The long line of men, 
pressing closely together, advanced with quick, 



THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 325 

cadenced step, every man knowing that great 
rents would be made in that line at every second, 
and none knowing what his own fate might be. 

Without wavering, but with compressed lips, 
the Tennesseeans, in line with Colonel Williams's 
regulars, rushed upon the breastwork, which 
flashed fire and poured death among them as 
they came. Pushing the muzzles of their rifles 
into the port-holes they delivered their fire, and 
then clambered up the side of the works, fighting 
hand to hand with the savages, who battled to 
beat them back. The first man upon the parapet, 
Major Montgomery, stood erect but a single 
second, when he fell dead with a bullet in his 
brain. His men were close at his heels, and 
surged like a tide up the slope, pouring in a tor- 
rent over the works and into the camp. The 
breastwork was carried, and in ordinary circum- 
stances the battle would have ended almost im- 
mediately in the enemy's surrender ; but this 
enemy had no thought of surrendering. The 
consequences of a blunder committed so long be- 
fore as the 1 8th of November were felt here. 
General White's attack upon the Hillabees when 
they had submitted and asked for peace had 
taught these men to expect nothing but cruellest 
treachery at the hands of Jackson, whom they con- 



326 RED EAGLE. 

fidently believed to be the author of that most 
unfortunate occurrence. Having no faith in his 
word, the Creeks believed that he and his men 
offered quarter only to save themselves the work 
of killing warriors who could yet fight. They 
believed that to surrender was only to spare 
their enemies, who, as soon as the prisoners could 
be disarmed, would butcher them in cold blood, 
paying no recompense in the death of any of their 
own number. Convinced of this, the men at the 
Horse Shoe simply refused to be taken prisoners, 
either in a body or singly ; they would yield 
only to death, not to their enemies. They fought 
for every inch of ground. Wounds were noth- 
ing to them, as long as they could level a gun or 
hurl a tomahawk. Jackson's men had to drive 
them slowly back, dislodging them from brush 
heaps and felled trees, and suffering considerable 
loss in doing so. They had carried the works, 
but had not yet conquered the defenders of the 
place. To do that they had simply to butcher 
them. 

It was horrible work, but it must be done. 
Brave men revolted from it, but whenever one 
of them sought to spare even a badly- wounded 
enemy his reward was a bullet, or a blow from 
the fallen but still defiant warrior's club. 



THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WAR. 327 

Little by little the savages were driven to the 
river bank, where the remnant of them made a 
last stand under strong cover, from which even 
a well-directed artillery fire at short range failed 
to dislodge them. They were driven out at last 
only by the burning of the heap of timber in 
and behind which they had taken refuge. When 
their situation was most desperate, Jackson made 
a last effort to spare them. Sending a friendly 
Indian forward, he assured them of his disposi- 
tion to save them alive if they would surrender, 
but they answered only by firing upon the mes- 
senger and riddling his body with bullets. When 
at last they were driven out by the flames they 
were shot down like wild beasts. 

Night finally came to stop the slaughter of 
hiding warriors, but it was renewed in the morn- 
ing, sixteen warriors being found then concealed 
in the underbrush. They refused even then to 
surrender, and were slain. 

It was in this battle that Samuel Houston, after- 
ward the president of the Republic of Texas, and 
still later a Senator in the Congress of the United 
States, first distinguished himself by his valor, 
and fell so severely wounded that his recovery 
was always thought to be little less than mirac- 
ulous. 



328 RED EAGLE. 

When the battle was ended five hundred and 
fifty-seven dead warriors were found upon the 
field, but even this was by no means the total 
number of the slain. Many of them had tried to 
escape by swimming, and for a long time Coffee's 
men were busy shooting them in the water, where 
when killed they sank out of sight. 

Mr. Pickett tells us that one brave old chief, 
Manowa, escaped in an ingenious and wonderful 
way, after being literally shot to pieces. * He 
fought as long as he could. He saved himself 
by jumping into the river where the water was 
four feet deep. He held to a root and thus kept 
himself beneath the waves, breathing through 
the long joint of a cane, one end of which he 
held in his mouth, while the other end came 
above the surface of the water. When night set 
in the brave Manowa rose from his watery bed 
and made his way to the forest bleeding from 
many wounds." 

Mr. Pickett conversed with Manowa many 
years after the war, and heard the story of his 
escape from his own lips. 

Jackson's loss was thirty -two white men and 
twenty-three friendly Indians killed, ninety-nine 
white men and forty-seven friendly Indians 
wounded. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

RED EAGLE'S SURRENDER. 

The power of the Creek Nation was crushed 
at the battle of Tohopeka. The force which 
fought so desperately there represented not all, 
but by far the larger part, of what was left of the 
fighting force of the nation, and they were so 
utterly beaten that there was nothing to encour- 
age an effort to assemble the scattered warriors 
again for a struggle. The slight cohesion which 
tribes of Indians have was gone, and Jackson 
knew very well that no more severe battles need 
be fought if the present one was properly fol- 
lowed up with measures designed to convince 
the Creeks of the uselessness of further resistance. 
He prepared, therefore, to establish his army in 
the heart of the Creek Nation, to overawe what- 
ever bands might remain, to strike at roving par- 
ties, and to reduce the tribes to submission and 
peacefulness. 

Sinking the bodies of his dead in the river, in- 
stead of burying them, he withdrew with his 
army to Fort Williams, the place he ha<i estab- 



330 RED EAGLE. 

lished and garrisoned as his supply depot, for the 
double purpose of putting his wounded men into 
hospital and of replenishing his supply of food, 
for he had carried nothing with him beyond Fort 
Williams except one week's provisions in the 
men's haversacks. 

After a tedious march lasting five days, Jack- 
son rested his worn-out men at Fort Williams, 
and there wrote the following address, which was 
ordered to be read to the army : 

" You have entitled yourselves to the gratitude 
of your country and your general. The expedi- 
tion from which you have just returned has, by 
your good conduct, been rendered prosperous 
beyond any example in the history of our war- 
fare ; it has redeemed the character of your State, 
and of that description of troops of which the 
greater part of you are. 

" You have, within a few days, opened your 
way to the Tallapoosa, and destroyed a confed- 
eracy of the enemy, ferocious by nature and who 
had grown insolent from impunity. Relying on 
their numbers, the security of their situation, and 
the assurances of their prophets, they derided our 
approach, and already exulted in anticipation of 
the victory they expected to obtain. But they 
were ignorant of the influence and effect of gov- 



RED EAGLES SURRENDER. 33 1 

crnment on the human powers, nor knew what 
brave men and civilized could effect. By their 
yells they hoped to frighten us, and with their 
wooden fortifications to oppose us. Stupid mor- 
tals ! Their yells but designated their situation 
the more certainly, while their walls became a 
snare for their own destruction. So will it ever 
be when presumption and ignorance contend 
against bravery and prudence. 

" The fiends of the Tallapoosa will no longer 
murder our women and children, or disturb the 
quiet of our borders. Their midnight flambeaux 
will no more illumine their council-house or 
shine upon the victim of their infernal orgies. In 
their places a new generation will arise who will 
know their duty better. The weapons of warfare 
will be exchanged for the utensils of husbandry ; 
and the wilderness, which now withers in ster- 
ility and mourns the desolation which over- 
spreads her, will blossom as the rose and become 
the nursery of the arts. But before this happy 
day can arrive other chastisements remain to be 
inflicted. It is indeed lamentable that the path to 
peace should lead through blood and over the 
bodies of the slain ; but it is a dispensation of 
Providence, and perhaps a wise one, to inflict 



33 2 RED EAGLE. 

partial evils, that ultimate good may be pro- 
duced. 

" Our enemies are not sufficiently humbled ; 
they do not sue for peace. A collection of them 
await our approach, and remain to be dispersed. 
Buried in ignorance, and seduced by the false 
pretences of their prophets, they have the weak- 
ness to believe they will still be able to make a 
decided stand against us. They must be unde- 
ceived, and made to atone their obstinacy and 
their crimes by still further suffering. Those 
hopes which have so long deluded them must be 
driven from their last refuge. They must be made 
to know that their prophets are impostors, and 
that our strength is mighty and will prevail. 
Then, and not till then, may we expect to make 
with them a peace that shall be permanent/' 

Ten days after the battle of the Horse Shoe 
the army again advanced, the men carrying pro- 
visions in their haversacks as before. A long 
march brought them to the confluence of the 
Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers, where a junction 
with the southern army was effected and supplies 
were abundant. 

There Jackson established his camp and for- 
tified it. The force of Creeks which he had expect- 
ed to strike had dispersed, and there was now no- 



RED EAGLE S SURRENDER. 333 

vvhL/c a body of Indians for him to march against 
or light. His presence with a strong army, 
well supplied with food and able to maintain it- 
self there in the very heart of the nation, did the 
rest. Seeing the utter hopelessness of contend- 
ing farther with such an army so commanded, and 
hearing through friendly Indians, who were sent 
out for the purpose, that Jackson wished to make 
peace, the savages rapidly flocked to his camp 
and surrendered themselves. 

Peter McQueen, Josiah Francis, and several 
other chiefs fled to Florida, but the greater num- 
ber of the Creek leaders preferred to sue for Jack- 
son^ clemency. 

To them Jackson replied that he had no further 
desire to make war, but that peace would not 
be granted to the nation until Red Eagle — or 
Weatherford, for by that name only the whites 
called the Creek commander — should be brought 
to him bound hand and foot. It was his purpose 
to hang Red Eagle as a punishment for the 
massacre of women and children at Fort Mims, he 
knowing nothing, of course, of the warrior's dar- 
ing efforts to prevent that bloody butchery, and 
to make of the affair a battle, not a massacre. 

News of Jackson's determination was carried 
to Red Eagle, and he was warned to fly the coun- 



334 RED EAGLE. 

try and make his escape to Florida, as many of his 
companion chiefs had done. There, of course, he 
would have been safe beyond the jurisdiction ol 
Jackson and of the government which Jackson 
represented ; but Red Eagle was a patriot, and 
when he was told that the fierce commander of 
the whites would give no terms to the Creeks 
under which the women and children now starv- 
ing in the woods could be saved, except upon his 
surrender, that the price of peace for his people 
was his own ignominious death — he calmly re- 
solved to give himself to suffer for his race, to 
purchase with his blood that peace which alone 
could save his people from destruction. 

Mounting his famous gray horse — the one 
which had carried him over the bluff at the Holy 
Ground, he rode away alone toward Jackson's 
camp. 

The author of that history of Alabama which 

has been quoted frequently in these pages gives 

the following account of what followed, drawn, 

he assures us, from Red Eagle's own narrative in 

conversations had with him : 

" He rode within a few miles of Fort Jackson, 
when a fine deer crossed his path and stopped 
within shooting distance, which he fired at and 
killed. Reloading his rifle with two balls, tor tne 



RED EAGLE'S SURRENDER. 335 

purpose of shooting the Big Warrior, should he 
give him any cause, at the fort, he placed the deer 
behind his saddle and advanced to the American 
outposts. Some soldiers, of whom he politely in- 
quired for Jackson's whereabouts, gave him some 
unsatisfactory and rude replies, when a gray- 
headed man a few steps beyond pointed him to 
the marquee. Weatherford rode up to it and 
checked his horse immediately at the entrance, 
where sat the Big Warrior, who exultingly ex- 
claimed : 

" ' Ah ! Bill Weatherford, have we got you at 
last?' " 

' * The fearless chieftain cast his keen eyes at the 
Big Warrior, and said in a determined tone : 

* ' ' You traitor, if you give me any inso- 
lence I will blow a ball through your cowardly 
heart. ' 

"General Jackson now came running out of 
the marquee with Colonel Hawkins, and in a 
furious manner exclaimed : 

1 How dare you, sir, to ride up to my tent 
after having murdered the women and children 
at Fort Mims ? ' 

" Weatherford said : 

" ' General Jackson, I am not afraid of you. I 
fear no man, for I am a Creek warrior. I have 



3j6 RED EAGLE. 

nothing to request in behalf of myself ; you can 
kill me if you desire. But I come to beg you to 
send for the women and children of the war 
party, who are now starving in the woods. Their 
fields and cribs have been destroyed by your peo- 
ple, who have driven them to the woods without 
an ear of corn. I hope that you will send out 
parties who will safely conduct them here, in 
order that they may be fed. I exerted myself in 
vain to prevent the massacre of the women and 
children at Fort Mims. I am now done fighting. 
The Red Sticks are nearly all killed. If 1 could 
fight you any longer I would most heartily do so. 
Send for the women and children. They never 
did you any harm. But kill me, if the white peo- 
ple want it done. ' 

1 ' At the conclusion of these words many per- 
sons who had surrounded the marquee ex- 
claimed : 

" ' Kill him ! kill him ! kill him ! ' 

" General Jackson commanded silence, and in 
an emphatic manner said : 

" - Any man who would kill as brave a man as 
this would rob the dead ! ' 

" He then invited Weatherford to alight, drank 
a glass of brandy with him, and entered into a 
cheerful conversation under his hospitable mar- 



red eagle's surrender. 337 

quee. Weatherford gave him the deer, and they 
were then good friends. ' ' 

Mr. Pickett discredits the accounts of this affair 
which were given by persons who were present 
at its occurrence, but they have been accepted 
by so many writers of repute, including Eaton 
and Meek, whose opportunities for learning the 
truth were as good as his, that Mr. Parton re- 
gards them as trustworthy at least in their main 
features. Following him in this, we give the re- 
mainder of the conversation between Jackson and 
the heroic chieftain. Jackson told Weatherford 
what terms he had offered to the Creeks, and 
added : 

" As for yourself, if you do not like the terms, 
no advantage shall be taken of your present sur- 
render. You are at liberty to depart and re- 
sume hostilities when you please. But, if you 
are taken then, your life shall pay the forfeit of 
your crimes. ' ' 

Straightening himself up, the bold warrior an- 
swered : 

" I desire peace for no selfish reasons, but that 
my nation may be relieved from their sufferings ; 
for, independent of the other consequences of the 
war, their cattle are destroyed and their women 
and children destitute of provisions. But I may 



338 RED EAGLE. 

well be addressed in such language now. There 
was a time when I had a choice and could have 
answered you. I have none now. Even hope 
has ended. Once I could animate my warriors 
to battle. But I cannot animate the dead. My 
warriors can no longer hear my voice. Their 
bones are at Talladega, Tallushatchee, Emuckfau, 
and Tohopeka. I have not surrendered myself 
thoughtlessly. While there were chances of 
success I never left my post nor supplicated 
peace. But my people are gone, and I now ask 
peace for my nation and myself. On the miseries 
and misfortunes brought upon my country I 
look back with the deepest sorrow, and wish to 
avert still greater calamities. If I had been left 
to contend with the Georgia army I would have 
raised my corn on one bank of the river, and 
fought them on the other. But your people have 
destroyed my nation. General Jackson, you are 
a brave man ; I am another. I do not fear to 
die. But I rely upon your generosity. You 
will exact no terms of a conquered and helpless 
people but those to which they should accede. 
Whatever they may be, it would now be folly 
and madness to oppose them. If they are op- 
posed, you shall find me among the sternest en- 
forcers of obedience. Those who would still 



RED EAGLE S SURRENDER. 339 

hold out can only be influenced by a mean spirit 
of revenge. To this they must not and shall not 
sacrifice the last remnant of their country. You 
have told us what we may do and be safe. 
Yours is a good talk, and my nation ought to 
listen to it. They shall listen to it. ' ' 

Jackson was too brave a man not to discover 
the hero in this courageous, self-sacrificing man, 
who, knowing that an ignominious death had 
been determined upon for him, calmly refused to 
save himself, and boldly placed his life in his 
enemy's hands for the sake of his people. When 
two men so brave as these meet there is fellow- 
ship between them, because there is brotherhood 
between their souls. When Red Eagle thus 
faced Jackson and offered to accept death at his 
hands in return for peace for the now helpless 
Creeks there was peace between the two great- 
souled men, who knew each other by the free- 
masonry of a common heroism, a common cour- 
age, and a common spirit of self-sacrifice. 

Seeing Weatherford in this transaction, do we 
need to remember his battles as proof that he was 
a great man in the larger and better sense of the 
word ; that he did his duty, as he understood it, 
without regard to his personal welfare ; that he 
was a patriot as well as a soldier ? 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

RED EAGLE AFTER THE WAR. 

Having made peace with Red Eagle, Jack- 
son afforded him that protection which was 
necessary while he was in a camp filled with 
the friendly Indians, whose hatred of the warrior 
was undying. Big Warrior even tried to take 
his life in spite of Jackson's orders, and was re- 
strained only by the general's personal interfer- 
ence. 

Red Eagle busied himself at once in the paci- 
fication of the country, as he had assured Jackson 
that he would do, and to his great influence, in 
a large measure, the prompt acquiescence of the 
Creeks in the terms of peace was due. 

As soon as the country was pacified Red Eagle 
sought to return to the ways of peace, and for 
that purpose went to his plantation near Fort 
Mims, and tried to gather together his property 
which had become scattered, and resume his busi- 
ness as a planter. 

He was not long in learning, however, that 
his foes among the half-breeds and Indians who 



RED EAGLE AFTER THE WAR. 341 

had sided with the whites were implacable, and 
that their thirst for ijis blood made his peaceful 
stay there impossible. He therefore went to Fort 
Claiborne and put himself under the protection 
of the commanding officer there, who assigned 
him a tent near his own and a body-guard for his 
protection. Here Weatherford remained for 
ten or fifteen days, but there were so many per- 
sons in the camp who had lost friends at Fort 
Mims, and who were determined to take the 
Creek chieftain's life, that his protector feared 
to keep him at the fort longer, even under the 
constant protection of a strong guard detail. But 
it was dangerous to remove him, except secretly, 
so determined was the enmity of the men who 
sought to kill him ; and therefore the com- 
mander of the post ordered an aide-de-camp at 
midnight to take the great chieftain beyond the 
camp lines and there to arrange for his escape, 
through Captain Laval, who was instructed to 
escort him to a tree outside of the line of out- 
posts. There a powerful horse had been pro- 
vided, and Red Eagle, mounting the animal, gal- 
loped away in the darkness. 

Upon his arrival at Jackson's camp he was re- 
ceived by the Tennessee general with the respect 
due to so gallant a soldier, and there he remained 



342 RED EAGLE. 

under Jackson's watchful care until after the sign- 
ing of the treaty of August 9th, 1814, by which 
the Creeks gave up all the southern part of their 
territory. This was exacted nominally as an in- 
demnity to the government for the expenses of 
the war, but the real purpose was to plant a 
strong and continuous line of white settlements 
between the Creeks and their bad advisers, the 
Spanish, at Pensacola. By these means Jack- 
son, who managed the affair, made impossible any 
future renewal of the war to which he had put 
an end by arms. 

When the treaty was concluded, Jackson's 
mission was done, and he returned to his Ten- 
nessee home — the Hermitage — taking Red Eagle 
with him as his guest, and in order that the chief- 
tain might be safe from the assassination with 
which he was still threatened, Jackson carefully 
concealed the fact of his presence. For nearly a 
year the two commanders who had fought each 
other so fiercely lived together as friends under 
one roof, the conquered the guest of the con- 
queror. J 

Then Weatherford returned to Alabama and 
established himself as a planter. His relatives had 
saved much of his property, which they returned 
to him, and by wise management he recovered 



RED EAGLE AFTER THE WAR. 343 

his fortunes and became again a man of consid- 
erable wealth. 

His influence was always on the side of law 
and order, and how valuable the influence of such 
a man, so exerted, is in a new country, where two 
races are constantly brought into contact, we may 
easily conceive. 

Red Eagle had been overcome in war, and was 
disposed to maintain the peace, in accordance 
with his promise ; but his spirit was not broken, 
and none of his courage had gone out of him. 

On one occasion a very brutal assassination 
was committed at a public sale by two ruffians 
of the most desperate border type. A magistrate 
summoned the people as a posse comitatus to ar- 
rest the offenders, but they so violently swore 
that they would kill any one who should approach 
them, that no man dared attempt the duty. 
Red Eagle, who was present, expressed his in- 
dignation at the murder, and his contempt for the 
fears of the bystanders, and volunteered to make 
the arrest if ordered by the magistrate to do so. 

The magistrate gave the order, and drawing a 
long, silver-handled knife, which was his only 
weapon, Weatherford advanced upon the mur- 
derers, who warned him off, swearing that they 
would kill him if he should advance. Without 



344 RED EAGLE. 

a sign of hesitation, and with a calm look of reso- 
lution in his countenance which appalled even his 
desperate antagonists, he stepped quickly up to 
one of them and seized him by the throat, call- 
ing to the bystanders to ' ' tie the rascal. ' ' Then 
going up to the other he arrested him, the des- 
perado saying as he approached : " I will not re- 
sist you, Billy Weatherford." 

Weatherford's plantation was among the white 
settlements, and the country round about him 
rapidly filled up with white people, among 
whom the warrior lived in peace and friendship. 
Mr. Meek writes of him at this time in these 
words : 

" The character of the man seemed to have 
been changed by the war. He was no longer 
cruel, vindictive, idle, intemperate, or fond of dis- 
play : but surrounded by his family he preserved 
a dignified and retiring demeanor ; was industri- 
ous, sober, and economical ; and was a kind and 
indulgent master to his servants, of whom he had 
many. A gentleman who had favorable oppor- 
tunities of judging says of him that ' in his inter- 
course with the whites his bearing was marked 
by nobleness of purpose, and his conduct was 
always honorable. No man was more fastidious 
in complying with his engagements. His word 



BC 



1 0.5 



RED EAGLE AFTER THE WAR. 345 

was by him held to be more sacred than the most 
binding legal obligation. Art and dissimulation 
formed no part of his character. Ever frank and 
guileless, no one had the more entire confidence 
of those among whom he lived ? ' Another gen- 
tleman who knew Weatherford intimately for a 
number of years informs me that ' he possessed 
remarkable intellectual powers ; that his percep- 
tions were quick almost to intuition, his memory 
tenacious, his imagination vivid, his judgment 
strong and accurate, and his language copious, 
fluent, and expressive. In short, ' he says, ' Weath- 
erford possessed naturally one of the finest minds 
our country has produced. ' These traits of char- 
acter exhibited for a number of years won for 
their possessor the esteem and respect of those 
who knew him, notwithstanding the circum- 
stances of his earlier life. Indeed those circum- 
stances threw around the man a romance of 
character which made him the more attractive. 
After the bitterness which the war engendered 
had subsided his narratives were listened to with 
interest and curiosity/ Though unwilling gen- 
erally to speak of his adventures, he would, 
when his confidence was obtained, describe them 
with a graphic particularity and coloring which 
gave an insight into conditions of life and phases 



346 RED EAGLE. 

of character of which we can now only see the 
outside. He always extenuated his conduct at 
Fort Mims and during the war under the plea 
that the first transgressions were committed by 
the white people, and that he was fighting for the 
liberties of his nation. He also asserted that he 
was reluctantly forced into the war." 

Red Eagle died on the 9th of March, 1824, from 
over-fatigue incurred in a bear hunt. He left a 
large family of children, who intermarried with 
the whites, well-nigh extinguishing all traces of 
Indian blood in his descendants. 




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